Smith v. Ark. Bd. of Election Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 18 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:15-CV-521-JM-BD |
| Parties | FRED SMITH PLAINTIFF v. ARKANSAS BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
This Recommended Disposition ("Recommendation") has been sent to Judge James M. Moody Jr. You may file written objections to this Recommendation. If you file objections, they must be specific and must include the factual or legal basis for your objection. Your objections must be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation.
If no objections are filed, Judge Moody can adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing the record. By not objecting, you may also waive any right to appeal questions of fact.
Plaintiff Fred Smith filed this case as a class action on behalf of "We the People, Constituents of District 50 of Arkansas State." Mr. Smith, who is proceeding pro se, asserts that plaintiffs were "turned away at the polls to vote for Fred Smith Democrat without cause." (Docket entry #2 at p. 1) The complaint includes claims of voter fraud and violations of the Voting Rights Act. (Docket entry #2) Judge Moody has referred the case to this Court for disposition of all pretrial matters. (#3)
Minutes before the filing deadline on March 1, 2012, Mr. Smith filed the necessary documents and tendered the filing fee to run as a Democratic Party candidate for State Representative, District 50, in the May, 2012 primary election. (#25 at p. 17) Prior to the election, on April 9, 2012, the Pulaski County Circuit Court ruled, in a case filed by the Democratic Party of Arkansas, that Mr. Smith "was ineligible on March 1, 2012 when he filed as a Democratic candidate for State Representative, District Number 50." (Id. at p. 21) The Court ordered that votes for Fred Smith "not be counted or certified in the May 22, 2012 Democratic party preferential primary."1 (Id. at p. 22) Mr. Smith did not appeal the Circuit Court's order to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Prior to the 2012 general election, Mr. Smith was nominated as the Green Party Candidate for House District 50, and Defendant Martin certified Mr. Smith as the Green Party candidate on the general election ballot. (#25 at p. 23) Hudson Hallum was the Democratic party nominee for House District 50 on the general election ballot, but he pleaded guilty to election fraud in September, 2012, and Mr. Smith filed suit to have Mr. Hallum removed from the ballot. (#25 at p. 23) In that lawsuit, the Pulaski County Circuit Court ordered that votes for Mr. Hallum in the general election not be counted orcertified. (#25 at pp. 25-26) As a result, Mr. Smith was the only eligible candidate on the ballot and was elected to the State House of Representatives to represent District 50 in the November, 2012, election. (#44 at p. 14)
Mr. Smith took office and served his entire term as Representative. During his term, he was known to generally caucus with the Democratic Party.
In 2014, Mr. Smith filed to run for re-election as Representative for District 50 in the Democratic Party primary, and the Secretary of State certified him as a candidate on the Democratic Party primary ballot. Mr. Smith lost his reelection bid in a contested primary election. (#25 at pp. 27-29)
On behalf of the class, Mr. Smith claims voter fraud; criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; violations of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §10301; violations of RICO and the Sherman Anti-trust Act; violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the equal protection clause; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the due process clause; and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (#2) For relief, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, "exemplary and emotional damages," and attorneys' fees.
In his motion to dismiss, or in the alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings, and motion for summary judgment (#25), Defendant Mark Martin contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit, and argues that the case should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (#26 at p. 6) More specifically, Defendant Martin argues that Plaintiffs do not have standing; that they arere-litigating matters already decided by the state court in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and that Plaintiffs are precluded from bringing claims here that were or could have been raised in the Pulaski County Circuit Court proceeding. (#26 at pp. 6-9)
Defendants Arkansas Board of Election Commissioners and Mike Beebe argue in their motion to dismiss (#32) that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which grants them immunity; that the complaint should be dismissed because it is not signed as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; that the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata or the pendency of another case; that the complaint is an impermissible collateral attack on a state court order; and that the complaint fails to state facts supporting a valid cause of action. Defendant Beebe also argues that Plaintiffs did not properly serve him with the complaint. (Id. at p. 2)
Defendant Cross County Election Commission answered the complaint and moved to dismiss it under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and 12(b)(7) for failure to join the individual commissioners of the Cross County Election Commission, who are "indispensable parties."2 (#30) The Crittenden County Election Commission answered and has moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) on grounds that the complaint is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (#34)
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs'3 claims against all of the Defendants should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), because Plaintiffs lack standing. Further, all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Arkansas Board of Election Commissioners and Former Governor Mike Beebe must be dismissed because these Defendants are entitled to immunity.
A. Standard
Defendant Martin moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A district court has the authority to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plusthe court's resolution of disputed facts." Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008)(citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
B. Standing
Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue "is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit." McClain v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2005) . The question arises from Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution, which limits the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. Id., see also Novartis Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 190 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1999). To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered "(1) an 'injury-in-fact' that (2) is 'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant' and (3) is 'likely ... [to] be redressed by a favorable decision' in court." ABF Freight Sys, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992)). Here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have Constitutional standing.
An injury-in-fact is a "direct injury" that results from the challenged conduct. McClain, 424 F.3d at 731 (citing Steger, 228 F.3d at 892). Voters who allege facts showing they have suffered a disadvantage have standing to sue. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962). Similarly, a citizen's right to vote without arbitrary impairment by stateaction has been recognized as a right secured by the Constitution. Id at 208. The "primary concern is not the interest of the candidate . . . but rather, the interest of the voters, who chose to associate together to express their support for [his or her] candidacy and the views [he or she] espoused." McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 1988).
Several courts have found that voters have standing to challenge ballot access restrictions on the candidate of their choice. Id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1579 (1983); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56 (1972); and Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 666 F.Supp. 763, 770-72 (D.Md.1987) (). For example, in McClain, the Court found that the plaintiff had suffered an injury-in-fact because the ballot access laws at issue would restrict his ability to vote for the candidate of his choice or would dilute the effect of his vote if his chosen candidate was not fairly presented to the voting public. Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs do not challenge Arkansas's candidacy requirements. Instead, they claim that Defendants denied District 50 voters their right to vote for Mr. Smith as their chosen candidate in the 2012 Democratic primary. The flaw in Mr. Smith's complaint, for standing purposes, is that the Circuit Court found that Mr. Smith was not an eligible candidate and ordered that votes cast for Mr. Smith not be counted orcertified.4 Accordingly, even if Defendants told Plaintiffs they could not vote for Mr. Smith, the Secretary of State, at the Circuit Court's direction, would not have counted or certified...
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