Smith v. Arnold

• Citation: 564 So.2d 873
• Parties: Jack Carlton SMITH, as administrator of the estate of Derryl Adus Smith, deceased v. Dr. A.G. ARNOLD. 88-831.
• Decision Date: 27 April 1990
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 873

564 So.2d 873

Jack Carlton SMITH, as administrator of the estate of Derryl Adus Smith, deceased v. Dr. A.G. ARNOLD.

88-831.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 27, 1990.

Ronald R. Crook of Hogan, Smith, Alspaugh, Samples & Pratt, Birmingham, for appellant.

W. Stancil Starnes and Laura Howard Peck of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellee.

G.R. "Rick" Trawick, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.

ALMON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in a medical malpractice action in favor of Dr. A.G. Arnold and against James Carlton Smith ("Smith"), the administrator of the estate of Derryl Adus Smith ("Derryl"), in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. ¹ The question presented is whether a psychiatrist employed by the State is protected from tort liability by the doctrine of substantive immunity in an action based on recommendations, made in his official capacity, concerning the care and treatment of a patient confined in a State mental health facility.

On February 20, 1978, Derryl was involuntarily committed by the Probate Court of Geneva County to the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation ("the Department"). That court ordered Derryl's commitment because it found that he posed "a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or to others." Derryl was eventually placed at the Thomasville Adult Adjustment Center ("the Center"), a minimum-security facility operated by the Department.

Dr. Arnold was an attending psychiatrist at Searcy Hospital, another mental health facility operated by the Department. Part of Dr. Arnold's duties included acting as a consulting psychiatrist to the Center. Dr. Arnold traveled to the Center once or twice a month and examined patients that the full-time staff at the Center believed warranted his attention. During these visits Dr. Arnold would examine those patients and make recommendations to the staff regarding their care and treatment. The staff was not required to follow Dr. Arnold's recommendations, but, according to the deposition of Dr. Margaret Henry, a supervisor at the Center, it routinely did so. Those examinations and recommendations were Dr. Arnold's only involvement with the patients at the Center. He was not involved in formulating treatment plans for the patients, nor did he participate in their day-to-day care.

Dr. Arnold examined Derryl approximately six times during his stay at the Center, with the last examination taking place on October 28, 1981. Following that examination, Dr. Arnold noted that Derryl's condition had deteriorated and that his behavior was "out of control" 50 to 60 percent of the time. Dr. Arnold felt the programs and facilities at the Center were not meeting Derryl's needs and recommended that he be transferred to the state mental hospital of origin. Dr. Arnold also recommended that Derryl be taken off all psychotropic medications on a trial basis, so that a more accurate re-evaluation of his underlying psychopathology could be performed.

On November 15, 1981, while still a patient at the Center, Derryl became highly agitated after a telephone conversation with his mother. He became violent and threatened to kill himself. Pursuant to the Center's standard procedures, Derryl's clothing was removed and he was placed in a pair of pajama bottoms. All personal effects with which he could harm himself were confiscated, and he was placed in a seclusion room to allow him to calm down and to protect himself, the staff, and other patients from harm. Derryl was placed in the seclusion room at 8:30 a.m., and the appropriate staff members were contacted to evaluate him. Von Gibson, an employee at the Center, checked on Derryl at 8:45 a.m. and again at 9:15 a.m. At 9:15 Gibson found that Derryl had hanged himself. All attempts at resuscitation were unsuccessful, and Dr. Henry pronounced Derryl dead.

On November 14, 1984, Smith filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County against numerous defendants, including Dr. Arnold. In his complaint, Smith alleged that the defendants had been negligent in diagnosing and treating Derryl and in failing to implement adequate suicide prevention measures and that their negligence had been the proximate cause of Derryl's death. On September 27, 1988, Dr. Arnold filed a motion for summary judgment. That motion was supported by a brief and an affidavit. Dr. Arnold contended that he was entitled to summary judgment because he was not involved in Derryl's day-to-day care, had not participated in the decision to seclude him, and was entitled to substantive immunity. On February 27, 1989, the court granted Dr. Arnold's motion, holding that he was entitled to substantive immunity in accordance with this Court's decision in Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770 (Ala.1988). It is from the resulting summary judgment that Smith appeals.

Generally, the State of Alabama and its officers and agents cannot be made defendants in any court. See Ala. Const., art. I, § 14. This absolute or constitutional immunity extends to state officers when the action filed is, in effect, against the State. DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So.2d 391, 393 (Ala.1982). However, this absolute immunity does not always shield state officers from liability for negligent acts, even when committed in the line and scope of their employment. Hickman v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 421 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Ala.1982). The lack of absolute immunity does not, however, mean that state officials are amenable to suit for any act or omission that could be characterized as negligent. This Court stated in DeStafney, supra:

"This is not to say, however, that every act or performance of duty by a state official or employee, by virtue of its characterization as negligence, necessarily falls outside the immunity doctrine....