Smith v. Astrue
Decision Date | 29 July 2011 |
Docket Number | NO. CV 10-4913-MAN,CV 10-4913-MAN |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Parties | TAMI S. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on July 7, 2010, seeking review of the denial by the Social Security Commissioner (the "Commissioner") of plaintiff's applications for a period of disability ("POD"), disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), and supplemental security income ("SSI"). On July 23, 2010, the parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation on May 11, 2011, in which: plaintiff seeks an order reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding this case for the payment of benefits or, alternatively, remanding for the correction of legal errors; and defendant requests that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed or, alternatively, remanded forfurther administrative development. The Court has taken the parties' Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument.
Plaintiff, who was born on June 12, 1964 , 1 filed an application for a POD, DIB, and SSI (A.R. 79-81, 84-87). Plaintiff claims to be disabled since April 10, 2004, due to multiple sclerosis. (A.R. 79, 118.) Plaintiff has past work experience as a dental assistant and retail sales clerk. (A.R. 23, 109-11.)
After the Commissioner denied plaintiff's claim initially and upon reconsideration (A.R. 66-69, 72-76), plaintiff requested a hearing (A.R. 78). On June 19, 2008, plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Evans (the "ALJ"). (A.R. 33-54.) Vocational expert Martin G. Brodwin2 also testified. (A.R. 49-53.) On July 23, 2008, the ALJ denied plaintiff's claim (A.R. 12-25), and the Appeals Council subsequently denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (A.R. 1-3). That decision is now at issue in this action.
The ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 10, 2004, the alleged onset date of the disability. (A.R. 17.) The ALJ further found that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2008.
(Id.) The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the severe impairment of multiple sclerosis. (Id.) The ALJ also determined that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals in severity any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (Id.)3
After reviewing the record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to:
lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, use of the bilateral hands for grasping, gripping, and fine manipulations occasionally, and no exposure to extreme heat, wetness, unprotected heights, hazardous machinery, and extreme cold.
(A.R. 22.)
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work. (A.R. 18, 23.) However, having considered plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, as well as the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that jobs exist in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including those of information clerk or surveillance systems monitor. (A.R. 24.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the time period at issue. (A.R. 25.)
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether it is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (citation omitted). The "evidence must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance." Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). "While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those 'reasonably drawn form the record' will suffice." Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted).
Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the Court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, "weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion." Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); see alsoJones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Court will uphold the Commissioner's decision when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the Court may only review the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision "and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Orn, 495 F.3d at 630; see also Connett, 340 F.3d at 874. The Court will not reverse the Commissioner's decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists only when it is "clear from the record that an ALJ's error was 'inconsequential to the ultimate disability determination.'" Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 446 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence as contained in the treating physicians' opinions. (Joint Stipulation ("Joint Stip.") at 4.)4
For Rejecting The Opinions Of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ rejected the opinions of Yu-En Lee, M.D. and Lingaiah Janumpally, M.D. regarding the episodic nature of plaintiff's severe multiple sclerosis disorder without articulating a legally sufficient rationale for doing so. (Joint Stip. at 4-5.) As discussed below, the ALJ erred in determining plaintiff's RFC by failing to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians.
An ALJ is obligated to take into account all medical opinions of record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). It is the responsibility of the ALJ to resolve conflicts in medical testimony and analyze evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). In the hierarchy of physician opinions considered in assessing a social security claim, "[g]enerally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician's." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). The opinions of treating physicians are entitled to the greatest weight, because the treating physician is hired to cure and has a better opportunity to know and observe the claimant. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. When a treating physician's opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for "clear and convincing" reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)(as amended). When contradicted by another doctor, a treating physician's opinion may only be rejected if the ALJ provides "specificand legitimate" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.; see also Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.
In addition, a finding that the treating physician's opinion "is not entitled to controlling weight does not mean that the opinion is rejected." Social Security Ruling 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS9 at *1, *9-*10, 1996 WL 374188, at *1, *4 (). In this instance, the Social Security regulations still require deference to the treating physician's opinion, but the weight accorded is governed by the factors listed in the regulations, such as the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, and supportability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632-33.
The opinions of examining physicians may constitute substantial evidence upon which an ALJ may rely in assessing a claimant's RFC when they are properly supported by the medical evidence. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)(consultative examiner's opinion on its own constituted substantial evidence, because it rested on independent examination of claimant). Nonexamining physician's opinions "with nothing more" cannot constitute substantial evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1042. However, this does not mean that the opinions of nonexamining sources and medical advisors are entitled to "little" or no weight. Id. at 1041. Reports of a nonexamining advisor "need not be discounted and may serve as substantial evidencewhen they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it." Id.
Here, plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in January 2005.5 (A.R. 18, 307, 345.) Following this initial diagnosis, plaintiff was prescribed oral prednisone. (A.R. 312.) On February 18, 2005, plaintiff sought a second opinion from Yu-En Lee, M.D., a neurologist, regarding the multiple...
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