Smith v. Auld

• Decision Date: 03 January 1884
• Citation: 31 Kan. 262,1 P. 626
• Parties: ALBERT G. SMITH v. DAVID AULD, et al
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

1 P. 626

31 Kan. 262

ALBERT G. SMITH v. DAVID AULD, et al

Supreme Court of Kansas

January 3, 1884

Error from Atchison District Court.

THE nature of this action, and the facts, are stated in the opinion. At the December Term, 1882, defendants Auld and two others recovered a judgment for $ 72.98 costs against plaintiff Smith, who brings it here for review.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

W. W Guthrie, for plaintiff in error.

Everest & Waggener, for defendants in error.

BREWER J. VALENTINE, J., concurring. HORTON, C. J., not sitting.

OPINION

BREWER, J.:

The question in this case is one of res adjudicata. The facts are these: On June 24, 1873, plaintiff brought a certain action in the district court of Atchison county against George Scarborough, David Auld, and W. R. Stebbins. The petition alleged that plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of the undivided half of certain real estate in Atchison city; that while entitled to the possession, he had in fact been deprived of it for several years by defendants. It alleged that Scarborough was the owner of the other undivided half; that Auld and Stebbins claimed to own the property by virtue of a tax deed; that the tax deed was void that defendants had held possession for years, and collected rents largely in excess of taxes paid. The prayer was for possession of the undivided half, partition, and for rents and profits; and also that the tax deed be adjudged void, and the cloud cast thereby on plaintiff's title removed. The trial was had in this case at the November term, 1874, before the court without a jury, and judgment rendered in favor of Smith, adjudging him the owner of the undivided half, and decreeing partition as between him and Scarborough. The tax deed was adjudged void, and defendants barred from setting up any claim to the property by reason thereof. The defendants brought the case to this court, and the judgment was affirmed. (18 Kan. 399.) No judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the rents and profits claimed, for reasons to be hereafter stated. Thereafter the plaintiff commenced this action to recover such rents and profits. The case was tried in the district court without a jury, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $ 261.85. That judgment was brought to this court, and reversed. (23 Kan. 65.) The case went back for a second trial, and on this trial the court found in favor of defendants. The plaintiff now alleges error.

On the former trial of this case, the district court treated the findings in the old case of Smith v. Scarborough, as an adjudication, and upon them rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This court held that was error, and that findings without a judgment do not amount to an adjudication. The facts as disclosed by the record in the original case are as follows: "Auld and Stebbins collected $ 1,825 as rent from 1868 to 1875, on the same," that is, on said real property. (10th finding of fact.) "Auld and Stebbins paid $ 1,354.25" taxes on said property. (11th finding of fact.) "Auld and Stebbins and Scarborough went into possession of said lot on March 30, 1868, and have ever since been in possession and receiving rents, and have also paid taxes, as appears on the tax-roll, thereon each year, and each year's rent has been in excess of each year's taxes, and in the aggregate has been $ 470.75 in such excess." (24th finding of fact.) "The plaintiff's claim for a judgment for rents received, being a matter of accounting between them (Smith, Auld and Stebbins), and not affecting all the parties to this action, the same cannot be determined in this action, and the same is refused. It is sufficient here to say that the rents received are in excess of the taxes paid by them (Auld and Stebbins), and consequently there can be no lien against the property." (Part of conclusions of law.) "And plaintiff also excepts to the dismissal by the court of his claim for an account of rents and profits against Auld and Stebbins, and refusal to make a decision thereon." (Part of plaintiff's exceptions.)

"And the court thereupon does dismiss so much of the plaintiff's petition as demands an accounting for the rents and profits against defendants Auld and Stebbins, and a personal judgment therein against such defendants for any excess therein found due to plaintiff." (Order of judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim for rents and profits.)

Judgment was rendered in that action, that the property belonged to Smith and Scarborough, and that neither Auld nor Stebbins had any lien thereon or interest therein, and that the property should be partitioned between Smith and Scarborough; "and that of the costs in the action, said Auld and Stebbins be adjudged to pay ten dollars, part thereof, and each said Albert G. Smith and George Scarborough one-half the balance of such costs, and therefor that execution issue." No judgment further than the said judgment or order of dismissal was rendered concerning said rents or profits.

On the second trial, the district court held that the proceedings in the first case were an adjudication against the plaintiff's right to recovery. This of course goes to the other extreme. On the first trial, the proceedings were held conclusive in favor of the plaintiff, and now they are held conclusive against the plaintiff. This rests upon the theory that the question of rents and profits was in issue in the former case, and that a failure to render judgment for them is equivalent to a judgment against them. And the question now presented is, whether the findings, order and judgment in the first case are an adjudication conclusive against the plaintiff's right of recovery.

The whole philosophy of the doctrine of res adjudicata is summed up in the simple statement that a matter once decided is finally decided; and all the learning that has been bestowed and all the rules that have been laid down, have been for the purpose of enforcing that one proposition. One rule fully established is, that you may examine the entire record of the prior action in order to determine what was in fact adjudicated. The inquiry is not limited to the mere formal judgment. It extends to the pleadings, the verdict, or the findings, and the scope and meaning of the judgment is often interpreted by the pleadings, verdict, or findings. Indeed, to determine the matters which were adjudicated, not only may you look to the entire record, but also in many instances you may resort to parol testimony. ( Wood v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 10; Doty v. Brown, 4 N.Y. 71; Babcock v. Camp, 12 Ohio St. 11; Strother v. Butler, 17 Ala. 733; Littleton v. Richardson, 34 N.H. 179.)

Now if we examine the record, nothing can be plainer than that the court did not pretend to decide whether plaintiff was or was not entitled to recover rents and profits. True, it found the amount of taxes paid, the amount of rents collected, and the excess of the latter over the former, but it expressly said that the plaintiff's claim for judgment for rents, being a matter of accounting between certain of the parties, and not affecting all, could not be determined in that action, and was refused. It is true that the last clause is, that the claim was refused; and if that stood alone, it might be fairly inferred that the court decided against the validity of the claim. But that clause is interpreted manifestly by what precedes, and taking it all together it means that the court refuses to render judgment in reference to this rent matter, because it is not properly determinable in that action. Taking the whole language of this finding together, the question is free from doubt.

But it is said by counsel for defendants in error, that in the entry of judgment was an order dismissing plaintiff's claim for rents and profits; that such dismissal does not purport to have been made without prejudice; that the action was an equitable one; and that the settled rule in equity proceedings is, that a judgment of dismissal, unless expressly stated to be without prejudice, is conclusively presumed to be a judgment on the merits, and a final determination of the controversy -- citing in support thereof, these among other authorities: Barrowscale v....