Smith v. Avon Prods., Inc., Case No.: 2:18-cv-00826-RDP
| Decision Date | 25 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:18-cv-00826-RDP |
| Parties | BILLIE N. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. AVON PRODUCTS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Defendants Cyprus Amax Minerals Company, Cyprus Mines Corporation (collectively "the Imerys Defendants"), and Imerys Talc America Inc.1 (Doc. # 69) and Defendant Johnson & Johnson (hereinafter "J&J") (Doc. # 71). Following a period of limited jurisdictional discovery, the Motions have been fully briefed (Docs. # 70, 72, 87-88, 98-99) and are ripe for decision. After careful review, and for the reasons explained below, the court concludes that the Motions to Dismiss (Docs. # 69, 71) are due to be granted.
This lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff Billie N. Smith's alleged contraction of mesothelioma following her exposure to multiple talc body products that allegedly contained asbestos. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1-3). Plaintiff used the products on herself and on her son, who has a mental disability, ather residence in Jefferson County, Alabama. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 19). Specifically, Plaintiff avers that from the 1950's through 2015, she used Johnson's Baby Powder that was "designed, tested, produced, manufactured, marketed, distributed, sold, and/or supplied" by J&J and its subsidiary, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. (hereinafter "JJCI"). (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19). She further claims that the Imerys Defendants supplied talc to J&J and JJCI during the relevant time period. (Id. at ¶ 20).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants2 are liable based on theories of negligence (Count One), wantonness (Count Two), and breach of warranty (County Three). She also contends that Defendants are liable under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (the "AEMLD") (Count Four). (Id. at 8-17). The Imerys Defendants and J&J have each filed motions to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. (Docs. # 69, 71).
Defendant Cyprus Amax Minerals Company ("CAMC") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona. (Doc. # 70 at 2), and Defendant Cyprus Mines Corporation ("Cyprus Mines") is a wholly owned subsidiary of CAMC. (Id. at 2). Defendant Imerys Talc America, Inc. ("Imerys") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. (Id. at ¶ 14). Imerys has registered with the Alabama Secretary of State to do business in Alabama. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges the following jurisdictional facts with respect to the Imerys Defendants. From 1979 to May 2000, Defendants owned and operated a talc mine, mill, and pilot plant located in Alpine, Talladega County, Alabama. (Doc. # 87 at 7). In 1979, Defendant Cyprus Mines, through a wholly owned subsidiary, purchased the Alpine Mine and Mill. (Id.). In 1992,Cyprus Mines transferred the business to Cyprus Talc America. (Id.). Thereafter, Cyprus Talc America sold its talc operations to RTZ America, which changed its name to Luzenac America. (Id.). From 1992 to May 2000, Luzenac America owned and operated the Alpine Mine and Mill until it sold the facilities to an unrelated Alabama company. (Id.). For a few years in the early 2000s, Luzenac America continued to operate the Alpine Mine and Mill under a lease. (Id.). In August 2011, Imerys Minerals Holding, Ltd. (a UK entity) purchased Luzenac America, then renamed the entity Imerys Talc America—a defendant in this case, which has filed for bankruptcy protection. (Id. at 8). By 2011, the Alpine Mine and Mill was no longer in operation and its equipment was dismantled and shipped to Imerys's pilot plant in Sappington, Montana. (Id.). Most notably, Plaintiff asserts that from 1989 to the present, Defendants have supplied the majority of cosmetic grade talc used by J&J. (Id.).
In response, the Imerys Defendants argue that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama because (1) Imerys never sold talc directly to J&J in Alabama and (2) CAMC never mined, milled, processed, or sold talc in Alabama or any other state. (Doc. # 70 at 2-3).
Defendant J&J is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, and JJCI is a wholly owned subsidiary of J&J. (Doc. # 71-1). Plaintiff alleges the following jurisdictional facts with respect to J&J. In 1966, J&J purchased a talc mine in Vermont and created a company called Windsor Minerals to own and operate the mine. (Doc. # 88 at 6). In 1989, J&J entered into an agreement to sell the Windsor Mine to Cyprus Mines Corporation. (Id.). Part of that agreement obligated Cyprus Mines Corporation to supply cosmetic grade talc to JJCI. (Id.). The talc used in Johnson's Baby Powder was sourced from the Windsor mine, at least in part, until 2003. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that despite J&J's assertion that JJCI is the soleentity responsible for Johnson's Baby Powder, J&J has continued to be the public voice for that product since the 1980s. (Id. at 7-12). Plaintiff seeks to establish personal jurisdiction over J&J based on its own conduct related to Johnson's Baby Powder within Alabama, or in the alternative, based on JJCI's contacts with Alabama through corporate veil-piercing principles.
J&J first argues that after January 2, 1979, it no longer designed, manufactured, marketed, or sold Johnson's Baby Powder (Doc. # 72 at 2). From January 2, 1979 forward, JJCI (under its current and former names) exclusively sold and distributed Johnson's Baby Powder. (Id. at 4). In fact, J&J submits that it did not design, manufacture, market, or sell any product in Alabama during any actionable time period in this case. (Id.). Applying Alabama's asbestos-specific "last exposure rule," J&J argues that Plaintiff's claims against it relating to the sale of Johnson's Baby Power before that date are time-barred. (Id. 2-5; Doc. # 98 at 3). J&J further submits that it cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction for any claim against it after January 2, 1979 because JJCI - an entirely separate corporate entity -- became the exclusive distributor of Johnson's Baby Powder. (Id. 8-9; Doc. # 98 at 3).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), "[a] plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). After the defendant challenges jurisdiction with affidavit evidence in support of its position, "the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction unless [the defendant's] affidavits contain only conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction." Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002). If, however, "the plaintiff's complaintand supporting evidence conflict with the defendant's affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id.
A federal court sitting in diversity "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent that [an Alabama] court may, so long as the exercise is consistent with federal due process requirements." Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008). Under its long-arm statute, "Alabama permits its courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent allowed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Martin v. Robbins, 628 So.2d 614, 617 (Ala. 1993)); see also Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2 (). Thus, this court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant so long as jurisdiction is consistent with federal due process principles.
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction that are consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923-24 (2011). A defendant subject to general jurisdiction in a forum may be sued in that forum on any and all claims against it, even if the claims have no connection to the forum. Id. at 919. By contrast, a court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant only with respect claims that arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Id. at 923-24.
Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama.3 Therefore, the question the court must decide is whether J&J and the Imerys Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction in Alabama for the claims asserted against them in this lawsuit.
The Eleventh Circuit follows a three-part test to determine whether specific jurisdiction over a defendant is proper. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013). First, the plaintiff's claims must "arise out of or relate to at least one of the defendant's contacts with the forum." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the nonresident defendant must have "purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, if the plaintiff establishes the first two prongs, the defendant may still avoid jurisdiction by making "a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish specific personal jurisdiction over the Imerys Defendants and J&J.
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