Smith v. AZZ Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00375-P |
| Parties | LISA SMITH, Plaintiff, v. AZZ INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant AZZ Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff Lisa Smith failed to file a response. Having considered AZZ's Motion for Summary Judgment, briefing, and applicable law, the Court finds that AZZ's Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED.
AZZ hired Smith for the position of Benefits Manager in February 2016 by Tara Mackey, who was serving as the Interim Chief Human Resources Officer at that time.Motion Ex. 1, Smith Offer Letter; Affidavit of Matt Emery ("Aff.") at ¶ 5. In June 2016, Matt Emery took over as Chief Human Resources Officer and became Ms. Smith's supervisor. Aff. at ¶ 5. In January 2017, Emery promoted Smith to Director of Corporate Human Resources. Id. at ¶ 6. Smith continued to manage the benefits team as she had before, and while she took on some additional duties and direct reports, approximately 85% of Smith's workload and duties was benefits-related. Id. Smith supervised nine human resources employees, many of whom were benefits or compensation-related employees. Id. at ¶ 9; Motion Ex. 2, Smith Reports Spreadsheet.
AZZ supported and invested in Smith's professional development and success, approving and paying for Smith to attend many developmental and industry trend conferences, career development classes, and various leadership meetings. Aff. at ¶ 7. In addition, Smith was part of the Extended Leadership Team Annual Meeting that is comprised of the top 10% of AZZ's leadership teams. Id. At the time of her employment, Smith had two peers: Teresa Minish (Director of Human Resources for AZZ's Industrial platform) and Tom Henderson (Director of Human Resources for AZZ's Electric platform), who are, like Smith, over 40. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
In May 2018, in order to reduce company costs and streamline Human Resources, AZZ began exploring outsourcing its benefits department. Id. at ¶ 12. Emery emailed James Noel at Lockton Dunning ("Lockton"), requesting a conversation regarding the potential management of benefits administration by Lockton, as Lockton was alreadyproviding AZZ with heavy benefits support administration at that time, in addition to AZZ's in-house benefits team. Id.; Motion Ex. 3, May 3, 2018 Email. Upon a review of proposals from Lockton and the proposed costs associated with outsourcing the entire benefits function, Emery estimated an annual cost savings for AZZ of $175,000. Aff. at ¶13; Motion Ex. 4, Benefits Outsourcing Business Case. Emery presented the business case for fully outsourcing benefits to AZZ's CEO before moving forward to finalize the deal with Lockton. Aff. at ¶ 13.
As such, once it was approved by AZZ's CEO, in November 2018, Emery informed Smith that the Human Resources department was restructuring and that her position was being eliminated. Id. at ¶ 14. In this conversation, Emery offered Smith a severance package, which Smith rejected, replying with words to the effect, Well, I can't say that you did not tell me. You kept telling me to look for a job and I never did it. Id. (emphasis added). The benefits employees who worked for Smith, Chantel Perez, Kristina Pryor, and Donna Pena, were kept on at AZZ for a few more weeks to continue the day-to-day benefits administration work while Lockton began the transition of services to their firm. Id. at ¶ 15. In connection therewith, Pena was laid off and provided a severance package; Perez and Pryor both subsequently interviewed with Lockton and were ultimately hired by Lockton to perform benefits administration for AZZ's account. Id.
Smith's position, Director of Corporate Human Resources, was permanently eliminated from AZZ, and no one has or will replace her in that position. Id. at ¶ 16. The majority of Smith's duties were outsourced to Lockton, and the rest were absorbed by theremaining employees in the Human Resources department. Id. The other AZZ benefits team positions were also permanently eliminated, and no one has replaced any of those positions. Id. at ¶ 17.
On February 26, 2019, AZZ was notified that Smith filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Fort Worth Human Relations Commission ("FWHRC") and with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Motion Ex. 5, February 26, 2019 Letter from the FWHRC and Charge. Smith's Charge alleged that AZZ discriminated against her based on her race and sex. Id.
On November 1, 2019, following AZZ's submission of its position statement, the FWHRC issued its Letter of Determination, finding that its "[e]xamination of the evidence indicates that there is not reasonable cause to believe that [AZZ] violated the City of Fort Worth's Fair Employment Ordinance No. 7278, as amended; Title VII of the Civils [sic] Rights Act of 1964, as amended; or the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, as amended." Motion Ex. 6, November 1, 2019 Letter of Determination. On December 30, 2019, the EEOC issued its Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter. Motion Ex. 7, December 30, 2019 Dismissal and Notice of Rights Letter.
Smith filed this action on March 16, 2020, in Tarrant County, Texas. Pet., ECF No. 1-2. AZZ removed the case to this Court based on subject matter jurisdiction. In this lawsuit, Smith claims: (1) AZZ violated Title VII based on color and race; (2) AZZ violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"); (3) AZZ violated TitleVII based on sex; (4) AZZ wrongfully terminated Plaintiff; and (5) AZZ violated the Equal Pay Act. Pet. at ¶¶ 18-44. On January 14, 2021, AZZ filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking summary judgment on each of Smith's claims. ECF No. 14. As of the date of this Order, Smith has not responded. Therefore, AZZ's Motion for Summary Judgment is now ripe for review.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movant makes a showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
After the nonmoving party has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find in its favor, summary judgment will be granted. Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000). When the nonmoving party does not respond, the Court treats the facts the moving party has raised as "undisputed for the purposes of the motion." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); Eversley, 843 F.2d at 174.
Smith only asserted claims of discrimination based on race and sex in her EEOC charge. Since Smith has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her claims based on color and age claims, the Court finds that AZZ's Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby GRANTED as to those claims.
To bring a suit under Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC to exhaust her administrative remedies. Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ'g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2019). "A failure to assert a claim of discrimination in an EEOC charge and/or its lack of development in the course of a reasonable investigation precludes the claim from later being brought in a civil suit." Konnethu v. Harris Cty. Hosp. Dist., 669 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792, n.37 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2008)).
In this case, Smith's EEOC Charge only made claims regarding race and sex. Brief at ¶ 17 (citing Motion Ex. 5). Smith's Charge included no claims regarding color or age, despite the Charge form providing the option to include those specific claims. Id. (citing Motion Ex. 5). Smith's attempt to combine color with race under a single cause of action in her Petition is improper because, in the context of discrimination suits, "[r]ace and color are two distinct categories" and Smith only invoked the race category. Washington v. Tarrant Cty., No. 4:18-CV-020-A, 2018 WL 1813304, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018) (McBryde, J.) () (internal citations omitted). Therefore, because Smith failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her claims based on color and age, the Court finds that, as to those claims, AZZ's Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby GRANTED.2
Smith alleges AZZ discriminated against her based on her color, race, sex, and age, by treating her differently than her colleagues and being replaced by a younger, white male.3 These claims fail because Smith fails to allege an adverse employment action under Title VII and her position with AZZ was eliminated...
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