Smith v. BMW of N. Am. LLC
| Decision Date | 27 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 3352 EDA 2013,J-A20041-14,3352 EDA 2013 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
| Parties | AMY R. SMITH, Executrix of the Estate of Paul A. Rowland, Deceased, Appellant v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC, INDIVIDUALLY AND OWNER OF AND/OR PARENT OF AND/OR SUCCESSOR TO AND/OR F/K/A MINI, BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND SUBSIDIARY OF AND/OR PARENT OF AND/OR A/K/A AND/OR F/K/A BORG & BECK, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, GENUINE PARTS COMPANY, HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF ALLIED SIGNAL, INC., SUCCESSOR TO BENDIX CORPORATION AND BENDIX MINTEX PTY, LTD., JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, INDIVIDUALLY AND ITS PREDECESSORS, SUCCESSORS, PRESENT AND/OR FORMER PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES AND/OR DIVISIONS, NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., THE PEP BOYS - MANNY, MOE & JACK, PNEUMO ABEX, LLC, SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO ABEX CORPORATION AND QUAKER CITY MOTOR PARTS COMPANY, Appellees |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Amy R. Smith, Executrix of the Estate of Paul A. Rowland, Deceased (hereinafter "Rowland"), appeals from the Orders granting summary judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company ("Ford") and Borg-Warner Corporation ("Borg-Warner").1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in its Opinion, which we adopt herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/14, at 1-4.
Following the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Ford and Borg-Warner, Rowland filed a timely Notice of Appeal.2
On appeal, Rowland raises the following questions for our review:
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in granting summary judgment in favor of Ford with respect to its liability as the "alter ego" of its wholly[-]owned subsidiary and decedent [] Rowland's exposures to asbestos from the "Ford" brand vehicles and genuine "Ford" brand brakes and clutches at issue here where: (a) these asbestos-containing products were sold under the "Ford" name and trademark by a wholly[-]owned subsidiary of Ford, whose actions were dominated and controlled by Ford; and (b) Ford's dominance of and control over its wholly[-]owned subsidiary was such that the wholly [-]owned subsidiary operated as a mere department - and the alter ego - of Ford []?
Under our standard of review of an order granting ... a motion for summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Summary judgment is properly entered only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our scope of review is plenary, and our review of a question of law ... is de novo.
Barnett v. SKF USA, Inc., 38 A.3d 770, 776 (Pa. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
Initially, Rowland contends that the trial court erred by ignoring evidence that Rowland's father, an automobile mechanic in Great Britain, used Ford asbestos-containing brakes and clutches, dressed in Ford packaging, thereby misapprehending Ford's liability for holding out these products as Ford's products. Brief for Appellant at 14, 15. Rowland asserts that it is of no import that Ford did not manufacture or supply these products because Ford authorized and permitted its name and trademark (i.e., FOMOCO) to be displayed on the products, thereby causing product users to use the products in reliance upon Ford's reputa tion. Id. at 18. Rowland further contends that Ford implemented a world-wide FOMOCO trademark program, which specified the use of the term "genuine parts," and prohibited any indication of the company or country of origin, such that product users would not know that a particular part had been manufactured by Ford/Britain rather than by Ford. Id. at 19, 24. Additionally, Rowlandasserts that Ford retained the exclusive right to control the quality of any product on which the FOMOCO or Ford trademarks were used, and controlled the warnings placed on all FOMOCO products sold, including those manufactured and sold by Ford/Britain. Id. at 22. Based on this evidence, Rowland contends that the trial court erred by finding that Ford had little control over the brakes and clutches manufactured by Ford/Britain, the "Ford" brand was not synonymous with Ford to product users in Great Britain, and that Ford was not the apparent manufacturer of Ford/Britain's products. Id. at 25-26.
The trial court set forth the relevant law and addressed Rowland's first claim in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/14, at 7-10. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court and adopt its holding with regard to this issue. See id.
In the second claim, Rowland contends that the trial court erred by misapprehending Borg-Warner's liability for holding out Borg & Beck brand asbestos-containing clutches as Borg-Warner products. Brief for Appellant at 26. Rowland contends that disputed issues of material fact existed as to Borg-Warner's liability as the apparent manufacturer of clutches manufactured by Borg & Beck/Britain. Id. at 26-27. Rowland asserts that it is of no import that Borg-Warner did not manufacture or supply the clutches because it authorized and permitted its Borg & Beck trademark to bedisplayed on the clutches, thereby causing product users to use the clutches in reliance upon Borg-Warner's reputation. Id. at 27.
Additionally, Rowland claims, Borg & Beck/Britain manufactured clutches using Borg-Warner's technology, specifications and methods of manufacture. Id. at 30-31. Further, Rowland contends, Borg-Warner retained the right to test and inspect the clutches to ensure that Borg & Beck/Britain maintained Borg-Warner's standard of quality. Id. at 30, 32. Rowland claims that the evidence presented established either that Borg-Warner was the apparent manufacturer of the clutches, or that disputed issues of material fact exist as to its liability as the apparent manufacturer of the clutches. Id. at 33.
The trial court set forth the relevant law and addressed Rowland's second claim in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/14, at 7-10. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court and adopt its holding with regard to this issue. See id.
In the third claim, Rowland contends that Ford's level of control over Ford/Britain was widespread and pervasive, and that Ford/Britain is simply an instrumentality and arm of Ford. Brief for Appellant, at 34, 35. Rowland claims that Ford dominated and controlled all aspects of Ford/Britain's corporate activities, such that its separate corporate existence was meaningless. Id. at 42, 45. Rowland asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the evidence and, therefore, misconstrued the relationshipbetween Ford and Ford/Britain. Id. at 44, 45. Rowland contends that the record evidence was more than sufficient to support a finding that Ford/Britain was the alter ego of Ford or, at a minimum, to raise issues of material fact regarding this issue. Id. at 46, 48.
The trial court set forth the relevant law and addressed Rowland's third claim in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/14, at 5-6. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court and adopt its holding with regard to this issue. See id.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
/s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/27/2014
Plaintiff, Amy R. Smith, Executrix of the Estate of Paul Rowland ("Mr. Rowland"), appeals the October 17, 2013 Orders granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Ford Motor Company and the October 18, 2013 Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Borg Warner Corporation ("Borg Warner"). The Orders should be affirmed because Plaintiff has not established Mr. Rowland's exposure to...
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