Smith v. Board of Education of Cullman County

• Decision Date: 17 November 1938
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 417.
• Citation: 236 Ala. 649,184 So. 475
• Parties: SMITH v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CULLMAN COUNTY ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

184 So. 475

236 Ala. 649

SMITH v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CULLMAN COUNTY ET AL.

6 Div. 417.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 17, 1938

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cullman County; W. W. Callahan, Judge.

Bill by H. Clay Smith, as a citizen and taxpayer, against the Board of Education of Cullman County, the individual members of said board, and R. E. Moore, as County Superintendent of Education of Cullman County, for a declaratory judgment determining the validity of warrants proposed to be issued by said Board of Education. From a decree favorable to respondents, complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

Earney Bland, of Cullman, for appellant.

St John & St. John, of Cullman, for appellees.

THOMAS Justice.

The petitioner seeks declaratory judgment against the members of the Board of Education of Cullman County, Alabama, as to the validity of proposed warrants, issued under and by the authority of an act of the legislature. General Acts Alabama, Extra Session, 1936, p. 58.

The appellees contend that the proceedings authorizing the levy and collection of the district school tax in question are valid and in compliance with the constitution and laws pertaining thereto. That is that the alleged defects on which petitioner rests his attack are mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the tax levies, when the mandates of the constitution are observed and given a reasonable interpretation, and that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

The main insistence of appellants is that the court of county commissioners did not have jurisdiction to order the election in question because the proceedings do not affirmatively show that there was a due ascertainment of the fact that the county was levying and collecting a three mill tax for school purposes before the levy of a special or district tax was sought and authorized.

In Harris v. Cope, Ala.Sup., 183 So. 407, the public policy in such matters is thus expressed [page 409]:

"While the mandates of the Constitution must be observed, any effort to do so should have a reasonable interpretation. Tommie v. City of Gadsden, 229 Ala. 521, 158 So. 763.

"* * * any conflicts in respect to the date in question could well be treated as irregularities, since the voters did vote on the time in which the tax would continue, to-wit, twenty-five years from October 1, 1928. Different statements in the other proceedings may be treated as mere irregularities which, if not self-correcting, are cured by the Act of January 24, 1935, page 7, and of April 6, 1936, Ex.Sess., section 23, page 68. Harmon v. County Board of Education, 230 Ala. 260, 160 So. 687; Johnson v. Rice, 227 Ala. 119, 148 So. 802; Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, 232 Ala. 324, 167 So. 729."

And in Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, County Tax Collector, 232 Ala. 324, 167 So. 729, the like construction is given, and it was declared that courts will not interfere with the result of a special district tax election upon any narrow or technical grounds.

When the whole of the proceedings had are looked to, it is affirmatively shown that the necessary requirements, for the levying and collecting of the three mill district school tax for the county, existed. The learned trial judge well observed:

"* * * and the Court is of the opinion that the case at hand falls under the latter decision of the Supreme Court ( Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, County Tax Collector, 232 Ala. 324, 167 So. 729) and is in that respect sufficient and that the order of the Court of County Commissioners based upon said petition affirmatively shows the existence of that fact and that the Court of County Commissioners had jurisdiction in the premises.

"It is also urged that the term for which said special district school tax has been levied extends beyond the period for which the county three mill tax was levied. As to this question, the Court has only to look to the proceedings authorizing the election and construing the same in the light of the circumstances and what was reasonably intended thereby. The special district school tax election was held on September 24, 1928, was for a continuation or re-levy of said tax, which original levy expired the previous fall and was to continue beginning with the fall of 1928, and expiring the fall of 1947. The proceedings relative to the levying of the three mill county tax show that said tax was to be levied beginning with the year 1928, and to continue for a period of twenty years. This the Court construes to be sufficient to show that the term for which the district tax was to be levied did not extend beyond the period for which the three mill county tax was to be levied. Harris v. Cope et al., Bullock County Board of Education, Ala. Sup., (183 So. 407). [ [Parenthesis Supplied]."

In these findings, from the whole record, we are in accord.

We are likewise in...