Smith v. Boyle
| Decision Date | 16 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-3005.,97-3005. |
| Citation | 959 F.Supp. 982 |
| Parties | Harold B. SMITH, Dallas C. Ingemunson, Al Jourdan and the Illinois Republican Party, Plaintiffs, v. Kenneth R. BOYLE, Hannelore Huisman, Judith A. Jones, Mitchell P. Kobelinski, David E. Murray, Langdon D. Neal, Theresa M. Petrone, Wanda L. Rednour, only in their official capacities as members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, and George H. Ryan, only in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
James R. Schirott, Phillip A. Luetkehans, Mary E. Dickson, Kenneth Edward Johnson, Schirott & Associates, Itasca, IL, Byron G. Cudmore, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Springfield, IL, Patrick J. O'Shea, Lombard, IL, Patrick K. Bond, Mirabella & Kincaid, Wheaton, IL, for plaintiffs Harold Smith, Dallas C. Ingemunson and Al Jourdan.
James R. Schirott, Phillip A. Luetkehans, Mary E. Dickson, Kenneth Edward Johnson, Schirott & Associates, Itasca, IL, Patrick J. O'Shea, Lombard, IL, Patrick K. Bond, Mirabella & Kincaid, Wheaton, IL, for plaintiff Republican Party of Illinois.
Charles R. Schmadeke, Office of the Attorney General, Springfield, IL, for defendants.
Mary Lee Leahy, Leahy Law Offices, Springfield, IL, Donald M. Craven, Donald M. Craven, P.C., Springfield, IL, William R. Quinlan, James R. Carroll, Quinlan & Crisham, P.C., Chicago, IL, Dennis A. Rendleman, Illinois State Bar Association, Springfield, IL, for intervenor.
In the main, federal courts should stay out of political matters. Federal judges have no business meddling in uniquely state questions unless those issues are in direct conflict with the United States Constitution.
In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court held that to redress legislative action, "the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."1
The bottom line: This Court concludes that the redistricting claim here is a nonjusticiable political question that must be left to the legislative and judicial branches of the State of Illinois.
In 1970, an Illinois Constitutional Convention convened and formulated a new state constitution.2 On December 15, 1970, Illinois' electorate ratified this new constitution, and it became effective on July 1, 1971. Therein, sections 2 and 3 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution provide:
§ 2 Judicial Districts
The State is divided into five Judicial Districts for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges. The First Judicial District consists of Cook County. The remainder of the State shall be divided by law into four Judicial Districts of substantially equal population, each of which shall be compact and composed of contiguous counties.
The Supreme Court shall consist of seven Judges. Three shall be selected from the First Judicial District and one from each of the other Judicial Districts....
So went the elections of Illinois' Supreme Court Justices until the beginning of this year.3 In January, the Illinois General Assembly passed Senate Bill 875 entitled "the Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997". Although under the bill, Cook County still comprises the entire First Judicial District, the bill subdivides the First Judicial District into three separate subdistricts (1A, 1B, and 1C) with each subdistrict to elect one Supreme Court Justice. On April 7, 1997, the Governor signed Senate Bill 875 into law.
In this action, the Republican Party argues that sections 2 and 3 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, it claims that said sections violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Republican Party states that since 1970, no Republican nominee has ever won an election to the office of Illinois Supreme Court Justice in the First Judicial District, and it blames this result on the at-large, multi-member election scheme employed in the First Judicial District.
Furthermore, the Republican Party argues that if the First Judicial District were subdivided into three separate subdistricts, its voting strength would be sufficient to elect a candidate from at least one of the three subdistricts. It asserts that the at-large, multi-member method of electing Illinois Supreme Court Justices impermissibly discriminates against Cook County Republican voters. The Republican Party claims that due to the at-large, multi-member election system, its voting strength has been impermissibly diluted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, the Complaint asks the Court to declare that sections 2 and 3 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution violate the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.
Defendants are the individual members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, the Illinois State Board of Elections as an entity, and Secretary of State George Ryan, in his official capacity, who is responsible for certifying the candidates for the position of Illinois Supreme Court Justice. Defendants offer four arguments as to why the Complaint should be dismissed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Ingemunson and Jourdan do not have standing to bring this suit. Second, Defendants assert that the Illinois State Board of Elections enjoys immunity from this suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Third, Defendants state that Plaintiffs' claim is nonjusticiable. Finally, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to sufficiently allege a claim of vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, for these reasons, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir.1987). Although a complaint is not required to contain a detailed outline of the claim's basis, it nevertheless "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984). Mere conclusions, without supporting factual allegations, are insufficient to support a claim for relief. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir.1978). Dismissal should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Before a federal court can consider a cause of action, a plaintiff must establish that he or she has standing to sue. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 153, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); Doe v. County of Montgomery, Illinois, 41 F.3d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.1994). In order for a plaintiff to have standing, as an irreducible constitutional minimum:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) "actual" or "imminent" not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not.. th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and footnote omitted); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-72, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757-59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Sanner v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago, 62 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1995).
In the instant case, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Ingemunson and Jourdan lack standing to sue because they have not alleged an injury to themselves, and the Court agrees. Nowhere in their Complaint do Ingemunson or Jourdan allege that they have suffered anything more than a generalized injury as a result of Illinois' at-large, multi-member election system in the First Judicial District. A would-be plaintiff must base his or her standing on something more than a generalized injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576, 112 S.Ct. at 2144-45; Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 160, 110 S.Ct. at 1725-26; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205-06, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Family & Children's Ctr., Inc. v. School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir.1994).
In United States v. Hays, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who did not live in the district which was the alleged subject of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering did not have standing to sue. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2436. The U.S. Supreme Court opined that because the plaintiffs did not live in the district, they had not suffered an injury in fact. Here, according to the Illinois State Bar Association's amicus curie brief, neither Ingemunson nor Jourdan reside in Cook County. Therefore, because both Ingemunson and Jourdan have alleged only a generalized injury rather than an injury in fact, the Court finds that they lack standing to bring this suit.
However, Plaintiff Harold B. Smith does have standing to sue.4 In contrast to Ingemunson and Jourdan, Smith resides in Cook County. Smith is also the Chairman of the Illinois Republican Party. Thus, pursuant to Hays, Smith has suffered an injury in fact and not simply a generalized injury. Second, Smith's injury is fairly traceable to Defendant...
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