Smith v. Brock
| Decision Date | 21 November 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 2350,2350 |
| Citation | 118 A.2d 336,83 R.I. 432 |
| Parties | Harold R. SMITH et al. v. John F. BROCK et al. Eq. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Aram K. Berberian, Providence, for complainants.
William E. McCabe, City Sol., Harry Goldstein, Asst. City Sol., Providence, for respondents.
This is a bill in equity to enjoin the respondents as members of the city council of the city of Providence from considering and passing a proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance of that city. It was heard in the superior court on the respondents' demurrer and thereupon a decree was entered sustaining the demurrer and denying the bill. From that decree the complainants have prosecuted their appeal to this court on the ground that the decision of the trial justice is against the law.
The complainants in substance allege among other facts that they respectively own several lots of land located in a residential district under the zoning ordinance of the city of Providence; that these lots are near to or abut certain lots which are owned by another person and are also located in the same residential district; that a public hearing on a proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance was held before the ordinance committee of said city council, and as a result thereof the passage of the proposed ordinance was recommended by that committee; that such proposal, if adopted, will amend the zoning ordinance so that the lots of said other owner will be located wholly within an industrial district; and that if such ordinance is passed complainants' residential property will thereby be reduced in value and cause irreparable injury to them.
It is further alleged that at the hearing before the ordinance committee complainants were given an opportunity to be heard in argument but were denied the right to have witnesses testify under oath and to cross-examine them; that therefore complainants were denied due process of law; and that the ordinance if passed will be invalid for failing to comply with certain provisions of the enabling act. Accordingly complainants pray that an injunction may issue to prevent respondents from considering and passing the proposed amended ordinance.
The respondents filed a demurrer to the bill of complaint on five stated grounds, but all of these are essentially based on the claim that the bill does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a proper cause for the intervention of equity by injunction as prayed for in the bill. The trial justice held in substance and effect that while there is great power in the equity court he ought not to assume that the city council would do an illegal act; that equity should always proceed with caution in such matters; and that except possibly in exceptional cases it should not interfere with the action of the city council when it was performing a purely legislative function in passing an ordinance. He further found that the pleadings here did not present any such exceptional case to warrant the action prayed for and therefore sustained the demurrer and denied and dismissed the bill.
The complainants contend that the trial justice was in error. They argue chiefly that the ordinance if passed would be void on the grounds that the hearing conducted by the committee on ordinances was improper in that it did not proceed in accordance with procedural requirements of the enabling act; that such committee's recommendation should have been accompanied by an opinion and finding that the criteria required under the enabling act had been complied with and should have included a statement of the manner wherein such compliance was found; and that the proposed ordinance would beneficially affect only the owner of the land within the amended zone to the detriment of the neighboring property of complainants.
In our opinion the controlling issue is whether a court of equity should interfere in advance by restraining the respondent members of the city council from exercising their discretion in the performance of a purely legislative function. Contrary to complainants' contentions, the proceeding in question was not essentially an adverse judicial or quasi judicial action. It was purely a part of proposed legislative action on the part of the ordinance committee in preparation for the exercise by the...
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Perdue v. Ferguson
...is not merely precedence but the constitutional separation of powers among the branches of government. See, e.g., Smith v. Brock, 83 R.I. 432, 436, 118 A.2d 336, 338 (1955). Under this general rule the trial court in this case clearly exceeded its legitimate powers by enjoining City Council......
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Berberian v. Solomon
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...Citing O'Brien v. Members of Board of Aldermen, 18 R.I. 113, 25 A. 914; McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55, 83 A.2d 75 and Smith v. Brock, 83 R.I. 432, 118 A.2d 336, the trial justice correctly observed that the instant plaintiffs asserting no distinct personal legal interest different from th......