Smith v. Cahill
| Decision Date | 12 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2130357. |
| Citation | 182 So.3d 557 |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
| Parties | Antoinette Cahill SMITH v. Shannon CAHILL. |
Randall W. Nichols of Massey, Stotser & Nichols, PC, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles H. Dunn of Boyd, Fernambucq & Dunn, P.C., Birmingham; and Jeffrey P. Montgomery of Montgomery Law Group, Gadsden, for appellee.
Antoinette Cahill Smith ("the former wife") appeals from a judgment of the Marshall Circuit Court ("the trial court") in a postdivorce action. We reverse and remand with instructions.
This is the third time these parties have been before us. Our decisions in the two previous appeals are Smith v. Cahill, 72 So.3d 692 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) ("Smith I "), and Smith v. Cahill, 141 So.3d 1047 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) ("Smith II ").
The former wife and Shannon Cahill ("the former husband") married in 1986 and divorced in 1993. In 1988, the parties jointly purchased a poultry farm using marital funds. The former husband subsequently operated the poultry farm pursuant to an agreement with Gold Kist, which was then a cooperative association. Under the terms of that agreement, Gold Kist, while it was a cooperative association, assigned value to an equity account in the former husband's name ("the equity account") based on Gold Kist's profits. The parties' 1993 divorce judgment ("the divorce judgment"), which incorporated an agreement between the parties regarding the division of the marital property, awarded the former husband the tangible assets of the poultry farm but did not dispose of the good will of the poultry farm ("the good will") or the equity account.
During the parties' marriage, the equity account accrued a value of $197,829.21. In 2004, Gold Kist converted from a cooperative association to a for-profit corporation. When it converted to a corporation, Gold Kist notified the former husband that the equity account had a value of $337,134.76 and that, based on that value, he was entitled to 36,471 shares of Gold Kist stock ("the 36,471 shares"). Thereafter, on or before May 11, 2005, Gold Kist issued the former husband the 36,471 shares to replace the equity account, and the former husband placed the 36,471 shares in a brokerage account ("the brokerage account"). Later in 2005, the former husband sold the 36,471 shares and received net proceeds of $724,408.27. The former husband subsequently used the entire $724,408.27 he had received from the sale of the 36,471 shares for his benefit.
In 2005, the former husband brought a postdivorce action against the former wife in which he sought a reduction in the child support he had been ordered to pay in the divorce judgment. During discovery in that postdivorce action, the former wife propounded discovery requests seeking a list of all the former husband's assets. The former husband's responses to those discovery requests did not list among his assets the equity account, the 36,471 shares, or the $724,408.27 that had resulted from the former husband's selling the 36,471 shares.
In 2009, the former wife brought the present postdivorce action against the former husband. The former wife alleged, among other things, that the equity account had been marital property when the parties divorced; that the former husband had not revealed the existence of the equity account before the parties agreed on the division of the marital property; that the divorce judgment had not disposed of the equity account; and that, therefore, she had continued to own a share of the equity account after the divorce and owned a share of the funds attributable to the equity account. Based on those allegations, the former wife claimed, among other things, that she was entitled to a determination that she had continued to own a share of the equity account after the divorce and that she owned a share of the funds attributable to the equity account and that she was entitled to a judgment awarding her the value of her share ("the equity-account claim"). In addition, she claimed that she was entitled to an award of damages for fraudulent suppression and conversion.
In response, the former husband asserted that the equity account had never been marital property because, he said, that account had been titled in his name only and, therefore, had been his separate property when the parties divorced. He also asserted that the former wife's equity-account claim was barred because, he said, it constituted (1) an improper attempt to modify the division of the parties' marital property in the divorce judgment more than 30 days after the entry of that judgment and (2) an improper attempt to obtain a share of his retirement account based on a marriage that had lasted less than 10 years. Moreover, he asserted that the equity-account claim was barred by (1) the doctrine of laches, (2) the doctrine of res judicata, and (3) the time limits for seeking relief from a judgment contained in Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. In addition, he asserted that he was not liable for fraudulent suppression and conversion.
The trial court conducted a bench trial. At the close of the former wife's case-in-chief, the trial court granted the former husband's motion for a judgment on partial findings as to the equity-account claim, the fraudulent-suppression claim, and the conversion claim ("the judgment on partial findings"). The parties subsequently settled the former wife's other claims. The former wife then filed a postjudgment motion challenging the judgment on partial findings, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the former wife appealed to this court.
In Smith I, this court reversed the judgment on partial findings and remanded the cause. Although a majority of the judges of this court did not join in the main opinion in Smith I, an examination of the main opinion and the special writing concurring in the result reached by the main opinion indicates that four judges concurred in holding that the equity account was marital property when the parties divorced despite the fact that it was titled in the former husband's name, 72 So.3d at 698 and 700 ; that the divorce judgment had not disposed of the equity account, id.; and that, because the divorce judgment had not disposed of the equity account, the former wife's equity-account claim did not seek an improper modification of the property division in the divorce judgment, id. Moreover, an examination of the main opinion and the special writing indicates that four judges concurred in rejecting the former husband's other defenses to the former wife's equity-account claim, although a majority of the court did not agree on the rationales for rejecting those defenses. All the judges concurred in the judgment of this court (1) reversing the judgment on partial findings and (2) remanding the cause. 72 So.3d at 699–700. However, an examination of the main opinion and the special writing indicates that a majority of the judges did not join in giving the trial court specific instructions regarding how the cause was to proceed on remand. See id.
After this court remanded the cause, the former wife amended her complaint to add a claim alleging that the divorce judgment had not disposed of the good will and seeking a determination of the value of her share of the good will and a judgment awarding her an amount equal to that value ("the good-will claim"). Thereafter, the trial court resumed the bench trial, which had been terminated at the close of the former wife's case-in-chief by (1) the granting of the judgment on partial findings and (2) the parties' settlement regarding the former wife's claims that were not disposed of by the judgment on partial findings. After the trial, the trial court entered a judgment awarding the equity account and any value the good will may have had to the former husband and finding in favor of the former husband as to the former wife's fraudulent-suppression claim and conversion claim. The former wife then appealed from that judgment.
In Smith II, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to the fraudulent-suppression claim; reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the equity-account claim, the good-will claim, and the conversion claim; and remanded the cause with instructions for the trial court to determine, based upon the evidence already presented, the amount the former wife was entitled to recover on the equity-account claim, the good-will claim, and the conversion claim and to enter a judgment awarding the former wife that amount. 141 So.3d at 1056.
After we remanded the cause, the trial court held a hearing at which the parties' counsel presented oral argument but no evidence was introduced. Following that hearing, the trial court entered a judgment that stated: "[The former wife] is granted a judgment against [the former husband] in the total amount of Fifty Five Thousand Twenty and 45/100 Dollars ($55,020.45), which amount represents a total of the following: [the former wife's] share of the [Gold Kist] Equity account, goodwill, conversion damages and interest." The former wife then timely appealed.
The trial court did not make any specific findings of fact in its judgment.
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