Smith v. City and County of San Francisco
Citation | 275 Cal.Rptr. 17,225 Cal.App.3d 38 |
Decision Date | 14 November 1990 |
Docket Number | No. A046622,A046622 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Ernest M. SMITH et al., Cross-Complainants and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Cross-Defendant and Respondent. |
Louis H. Renne, City Atty., Andrew S. Schwartz, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent.
Thomas M. Burton, Burton, Brunt & Robbins, Pleasanton, for defendants, cross-complainants and appellants.
Ernest and Alice Smith appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to their second amended cross-complaint without leave to amend. Appellants attempted to state causes of action against the City and County of San Francisco ("the City") for inverse condemnation, promissory estoppel, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, civil rights violations, and breach of oral contract. We affirm.
On March 18, 1983, the City filed a complaint in eminent domain against appellants and other parties. It sought to acquire property for park and open space use. Appellants cross-complained against numerous parties, including the City, for inverse condemnation, fraud, interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, deprivation of constitutional rights, mandamus, and injunction. The court sustained the City's demurrer to all but the inverse condemnation cause of action, allowing 20 days to amend. The court also severed and stayed the cross-complaint.
After trial began in the City's eminent domain action, the parties settled that case in May 1985. Under the settlement, the City agreed to pay $307,500 for appellants' three lots and portion of a fourth which had been the subject of the eminent domain action ("the upper lots").
Appellants filed a verified first amended cross-complaint asserting various causes of action. The court sustained the City's demurrer to all causes of action with leave to amend.
The Smiths then filed a second amended cross-complaint, which is the subject of this appeal. The relevant factual allegations are as follows:
for the purpose of keeping the land in its undeveloped state.
The City then demurred for a third time to appellants' cross-complaint. On March 14, 1989, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment subsequently entered in favor of the City.
DISCUSSION
Incorporating the factual allegations set forth above, appellants' inverse condemnation cause of action further alleges that:
"18. From and after 1975 the City has taken and damaged the Smiths' real property interests by its administrative scheme to
keep the property undeveloped, from 1980 and thereafter, by its announcements and activities making known its intent and desire to acquire the Smith property for use as a park, and from 1985 by its efforts to thwart even the development of the land not subject to the eminent domain proceeding, solely to discourage the Smiths from further development and from pursuing their cross-complaint.
The courts recognize two forms of compensable inverse condemnation which may apply in this case: (1) excessive regulation which denies the owner all economic use of the property (see First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250; Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25, aff'd (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 rev'd on other grounds, First Lutheran Church, supra ); and (2) improper precondemnation conduct causing a diminution in the property's market value. (See Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 52, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345.) Since appellants do not clearly identify which theory they rely upon, we will determine whether the second amended complaint states a cause of action for either form of inverse condemnation.
To state a cause of action for inverse condemnation based on government regulation amounting to a constitutional taking, appellants must allege facts showing such regulation deprived them of substantially all use of their property. (Terminals Equipment Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 242-244, 270 Cal.Rptr. 329 [ ]; Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 862, 868, 241 Cal.Rptr. 787 [ ]; Pan Pacific Properties, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 244, 256, 146 Cal.Rptr. 428 [ ]; Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 439, 442-443, 144 Cal.Rptr. 776 [ ]; Pinheiro...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.
...relationship between the parties, since the covenant is an implied term in the contract." (Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 49, 275 Cal.Rptr. 17.) Without a contractual underpinning, there is no independent claim for breach of the implied covenant. (Love v......
-
Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
...relationship between the parties, since the covenant is an implied term in the contract." Smith v. City and County of San Francisco, 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 49, 275 Cal.Rptr. 17 (1990). "Without a contractual relationship, [plaintiffs] cannot state a cause of action for breach of the implied cov......
-
Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., A070954
... ... insurance may validly cover liability for punitive damages." (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 39, 151 ... (Ibid.) "[T]he covenant is an implied term in the contract." (Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 49, 275 ... ...
-
Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
...relationship between the parties, since the covenant is an implied term in the contract.” (Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 225Cal.App.3d 38, 49, 275 Cal.Rptr. 17 (Smith ).) “Without a contractual underpinning, there is no independent claim for breach of the implied covenant......
-
Contract actions
..., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1031-32, 1033 n.4, 14 Cal. Rptr. 335, 338-39, 340 n.4 (1992); Smith v. City and County of San Francisco , 225 Cal. App. 3d 38, 49, 275 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1990); Peterson Dev. Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank , 233 Cal. App. 3d 103, 116, 284 Cal. Rptr. 367, 375 (1991). §4:22......
-
Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management Act
...Dep't of Transp. v. DiFurio, 555 A.2d 1379 (Pa. 1989); Brookings v. Mills, 412 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1987); Smith v. San Francisco, 275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); In re Virginia Park, 328 N.W.2d 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Mentzel v. Oshkosh, 432 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. Ct. App. 299. See, e.g.,......