Smith v. City of Hemet
| Decision Date | 29 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-56445.,02-56445. |
| Citation | 356 F.3d 1138 |
| Parties | Thomas SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF HEMET, a municipal corporation; Hemet Police Department; Lee Evanson; Dave Quinn; Aaron Medina; Reinbolt; Trainer; Nate Miller; Peter Hewitt, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Donald W. Cook, Esq. and Robert Mann, Esq., Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Julie H. Biggs, City Attorney, Hemet, CA; Elizabeth R. Feffer, Esq., Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00811-VAP.
Before SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge RAWLINSON; Dissent by Judge W. FLETCHER
In this case, we once again address the quagmire created by the interplay between Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) and convictions for violations of California Penal Code § 148. Because the California courts have interpreted § 148 in such a manner as to incorporate a finding of no excessive force, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling that Heck bars Thomas Smith's § 1983 action.
This saga began when Smith's wife, Cynthia, placed an emergency phone call to the Hemet Police Department ("Department") reporting that her husband "was hitting her and/or was physical with her."
Officer Reinbolt was the first officer to arrive in response to the call. Upon his approach, Officer Reinbolt observed Smith standing on his front porch. Officer Reinbolt directed his flashlight towards Smith "and noticed Smith's hands in his pockets."1 Officer Reinbolt announced himself and instructed Smith to remove his hands from his pockets. Smith refused, responding with expletives and directing Officer Reinbolt to approach. Officer Reinbolt informed Smith that he would approach, but only after Smith removed his hands from his pockets to demonstrate he had no weapons. Smith again refused to remove his hands from his pockets and instead entered his home.
After Officer Reinbolt advised dispatch that Smith refused to remove his hands from his pockets and had just reentered his home, Smith reemerged onto the porch with his hands still in his pockets. Officer Reinbolt again requested that Smith show his hands. Smith eventually complied with this instruction, but repeatedly refused to comply with Officer Reinbolt's instruction to "put his hands on his head and walk towards [the officer's] voice[.]" Instead, Smith again directed Officer Reinbolt to approach and enter the home with him.
Officer Nate Miller arrived in response to Officer Reinbolt's radioed request for assistance. Observing Smith's refusal to cooperate with Officer Reinbolt, Officer Miller contacted dispatch to request additional assistance. Officer David Quinn, a canine handler with the Department, arrived shortly thereafter with "Quando," a police canine. Officer Aaron Medina also responded to assist Officer Reinbolt.
Officer Quinn instructed Smith to turn around and place his hands on his head. Smith refused, despite being informed that Quando might be sent to subdue him and might bite. Without warning, Officer Quinn sprayed Smith in the face with pepper spray. Smith responded with expletives and attempted to reenter his residence. Several officers then grabbed Smith from behind, slammed him against the door, and threw him to the ground. Quando bit Smith on his right shoulder and neck area.
Although Smith agreed to comply while Quando was biting him, he admitted that he was "curled up," in an attempt to shield himself from the dog and that one of his hands was "tucked in somewhere," still out of the officer's view. As an officer attempted to secure both arms, Quando bit Smith a second time, this time on his left shoulder blade. Quando retreated, and the officers dragged Mr. Smith off the porch, face down. Once off the porch, Smith continued to hide his arms under his body; Quando bit Smith a third time, on the buttock.
Eventually, Smith complied with the officers' efforts to place him in handcuffs. Officer Reinbolt washed Smith's eyes out with water from a nearby hose. Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter and attended to Smith, who required no serious medical treatment.
The Riverside County District Attorney's Office filed charges against Smith for spousal battery in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 243(e) and for "resist[ing], delay[ing] and obstruct[ing]" an officer in the performance of his duties in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 148. Smith pled guilty to both counts.
Smith subsequently filed a federal Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the officers used excessive force. Appellees moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on the basis of Heck v. Humphrey. Judgment was entered, and Smith filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.2002). "Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law." Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted).
Smith's conviction for resisting arrest bars his excessive force claim.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.... A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence if it would, the complaint must be dismissed...
512 U.S. at 486-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.2
Under Cal.Penal Code § 148, "[e]very person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer [or] peace officer... in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment" is punished as a misdemeanor offender. Cal.Penal Code § 148(a)(1). "The legal elements of a violation of section 148, subdivision (a) are as follows: (1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties." In re Muhammed C., 95 Cal. App.4th 1325, 1329, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21 (2002) (citations omitted).
Smith contends that the force the officers used to effect his arrest was excessive. However, the California Court of Appeal's construction of Cal.Penal Code § 148 makes it clear that a successful excessive force claim would necessarily render a § 148 conviction invalid. See Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1405-1406, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 (2002). In explaining its ruling, the Court of Appeal observed that:
In California, the lawfulness of an arrest is an essential element of the offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. If the officer was not performing his or her duties at the time of the arrest, the arrest is unlawful and the arrestee cannot be convicted under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a). "[E]xcessive force by a police officer ... is not within the performance of the officer's duty."
Id. at 1409, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in the original).
We are bound by decisions of the California Supreme Court interpreting a California statute. See Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir.2001) () (citation omitted). Should no Supreme Court authority exist, and "[i]n the absence of convincing evidence that the state supreme court would decide differently, a federal court is obligated to follow the decisions of the state's intermediate courts." Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1494 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The California Supreme Court has not directly interpreted California Penal Code § 148 as incorporating the lawful use of force. However, it does not appear that the California Supreme Court would decide the issue any differently than the California Court of Appeal. To the contrary, the California Supreme Court has implicitly accepted the interpretation adopted by the California Court of Appeal. "Section 148 has long been construed by the courts as applying only to lawful arrests ..." People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 354, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33 (1969), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159 (1990). "[I]f the arrest is ultimately determined factually to be unlawful, the defendant can be validly convicted only of simple assault or battery." Id. at 355-56.
California law leaves us no choice but to regard a § 148 conviction as incompatible with an allegation that the arrest was unlawful. "[W]here excessive force is used in making what otherwise is a technically lawful arrest, the...
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