Smith v. City of Oakland
| Decision Date | 17 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. C-05-4045 EMC.,C-05-4045 EMC. |
| Citation | 538 F.Supp.2d 1217 |
| Parties | Torry SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF OAKLAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
John L. Burris, Benjamin Nisenbaum, Law Office of John L. Burris, Oakland, CA, Julie M. Houk, James B. Chanin Law Offices, Berkeley, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Gloria Y. Lee, Oakland City Attorney's Office, Oakland, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR NEW TRIAL (LIABILITY); AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND REMITTITUR (DAMAGES); AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE
In this case, after a vigorously contested trial, the jury concluded that Defendant Officers John Parkinson and Marcus Midyett planted a semi-automatic in order to frame him. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of both Plaintiffs — Mr. Smith and his girlfriend Patricia Gray — on all counts, finding that Defendants had violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights as well as their civil rights protected by state law. Having heard testimony as to the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs, including Mr. Smith's wrongful incarceration for approximately 4½ months, the jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of more than $6 million.
Currently pending before the Court are two post-trial motions, one focusing on liability and the other on damages, in which Defendants seek to overturn the jury's verdict. Having considered the parties' briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral argument of counsel and all other evidence of record, the Court hereby DENIES the liability motion and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the damages motion.
Plaintiffs sued Defendant Officers, claiming that their federal and state law rights had been violated when the officers entered and searched Plaintiffs' house, planted an assault rifle on Plaintiffs' premises, and then used the rifle as a basis to arrest Mr. Smith, subjecting him to prosecution and incarceration until his vindication and release 4½ months later. Defendants vigorously denied that they had planted the weapon and instead contended that they only learned of the rifle when Officer Parkinson saw Mr. Smith walk outside of the house to hide the weapon after being alerted to the presence of the police by Ms. Gray, his live-in girlfriend. Criminal charges for gun possession brought against Mr. Smith were dismissed after two preliminary hearings in which Defendant Officers testified. Mr. Smith, who was on parole at the time of the search, was kept in custody after the dismissal until a parole revocation hearing was held on the gun charge. Officer Parkinson testified at that hearing. The revocation charge was not sustained despite Officer Parkinson's testimony and Mr. Smith was released. By that time, Mr. Smith had spent 4% months in jail.
At trial, both Plaintiffs testified about what took place on the day at issue. Mr. Smith — as well as Ms. Gray — denied having a weapon at the residence. According to Mr. Smith, Defendant Officers questioned him about a known criminal in whose car Mr. Smith's bank card was found. It was that bank card that led Defendants to Mr. Smith's residence. After Mr. Smith denied knowing the individual and knowledge of any other crimes in the area, he was arrested and taken into custody. According to Mr. Smith, he was questioned about his knowledge of other crimes while in the police car. It was not until he was booked at the police station that he was informed of the weapons charge. Defendants conceded at trial that it was not uncommon for them in their investigation of crimes in Oakland to detain individuals subject to arrest, ask them for information about crimes, and then facilitate their release upon their cooperation. Plaintiffs contend that a rifle was planted on Mr. Smith in order to coerce him into giving information about other crimes, information he did not have.
Plaintiffs presented not only their own testimony in support of their case but also the deposition testimony of Tommie Smith, Mr. Smith's father. At the time of the incident at issue, Tommie Smith lived in a duplex next door to Mr. Smith. Tommie Smith provided testimony that was corroborative of Plaintiffs' version of the events and contradicted Officer Parkinson's version. According to Tommie. Smith, he was alerted to activity in Plaintiffs' backyard by the loud noise of Plaintiffs' back screen door opening. On hearing the sound, he looked out of his window into Plaintiffs' backyard and saw two police officers enter the house and yell, "There he is." While Defendants claimed that Mr. Smith had run out of the house, naked, to hide the gun, Tommie Smith did not see Mr. Smith when he heard the sound of the back door opening and looked out the window; he only saw the officers entering the back door.
Mr. Smith's parole agent, Terry Johnson, also testified in support of Plaintiffs' case. Most notably, Mr. Johnson testified that an inspection of Mr. Smith's home was scheduled with Mr. Smith for the very day that the events at issue took place. As Mr. Smith was aware of the scheduled visit, it seemed unlikely that he would have kept an illegal weapon in the house on that day, as Defendants contended. Defendants do not dispute that no ammunition or other guns were found in the house.
Plaintiffs also offered the testimony of two expert witnesses to support their case. Peter Barnett was Plaintiffs' fingerprinting expert. He testified, inter alia, that it is possible for a person to leave fingerprints on a firearm, that fingerprints do not fade with time, and that the Oakland Police Department had run appropriate fingerprinting tests on the weapon that was allegedly found on Plaintiffs' premises but that no fingerprints had been found. Roger Clark was Plaintiffs' expert on standard police procedures. Mr. Clark testified that, if Officer Parkinson had acted consistently with standard procedure, then, upon seeing Mr. Smith outside the house with a gun — as Officer Parkinson contended — he would have detained, arrested, and handcuffed Mr. Smith before letting him back into the house or at least called for back-up. Officer Parkinson testified he did neither. Instead, according to his testimony, he directed Mr. Smith back into the house without handcuffs, not knowing if there might be other weapons or dangerous individuals inside and without first calling for backup help. Mr. Clark's testimony that this conduct would have been contrary to standard police procedure placed the credibility of Office Parkinson in question.
Finally, Plaintiffs had both Defendant Officers testify in support of their case-in-chief. During the examination of each officer, Plaintiffs highlighted inconsistencies in their recitation of the events as well as other problems. Most notably, Defendant Officers claimed that, while they were taking Mr. Smith to the police station in their car, Mr. Smith spontaneously confessed to knowledge and possession of the gun, claiming it was not his and actually belonged to Ms. Gray's brother. But Defendants' credibility on this claim was questionable since Defendants never made any mention of the alleged confession in their police report. Moreover, neither Defendant testified about the alleged confession during either of the two preliminary hearings on the criminal charges. It was not until the parole revocation hearing — which took place only after the criminal charges had been dismissed twice — that the alleged confession was brought up for the first time by Officer Parkinson.
To be sure, Defendant Officers vehemently denied planting the gun on Mr. Smith. At trial, there was significant evidence supporting Defendants' case — e.g., the seeming unlikelihood that the officers would choose to plant a semi-automatic rifle on Mr. Smith" rather than, e.g., a handgun or contraband if their intent was to frame him, inconsistencies in Plaintiffs' testimonies, the fact that the officers did not know Mr. Smith and had no reason in advance to frame him, and the fact that the officers did call for a technician while they were on the scene to process the gun, a step that seemed unlikely if they planted the gun. But, ultimately, the jury found Plaintiffs' version of the events more plausible than Defendants' and rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims.
As a preliminary matter, the Court takes note of Plaintiffs' motion to strike the amended post-trial motions filed by Defendants, in which Defendants added citations to the record not contained in their original motion papers. The Court denies the motion since it is capable of reviewing the new citations in order to determine whether, as Plaintiffs contend, Defendants have mischaracterized the record. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they suffered any prejudice thereby.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs motions for judgment as a matter of law. Under Rule 50(a),
[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:
(A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). The motion must be made before the case is submitted to the jury and "specify ... the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2).
Under Rule 50(b), if the court denies the motion for judgment...
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Part 1: complete case summaries in alphabetical order.
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