Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 21 August 2013
• Parties: JACQLYN SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

JACQLYN SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-17398

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-02142-RLH-LRL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Filed August 21, 2013

FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 6, 2013—San Francisco, California

Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

SUMMARY^*

Employment Discrimination

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment in favor of an employer on claims of disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the employer's motion for reconsideration of an order denying summary judgment because in that order the court committed a clear error of law by not applying controlling Supreme Court precedent.

The panel held that, in deciding whether the plaintiff was a "qualified individual" under the ADA, the district court did not properly apply the framework set forth in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), for analyzing the effect of inconsistent statements on applications for disability benefits. The panel concluded that claims for disability retirement, disability leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and private insurance disability benefits do not inherently conflict with an ADA claim because they do not account for an applicant's ability to work with a reasonable accommodation. In addition, the panel held that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, she had offered sufficient explanations for her inconsistent statements in her prior benefit applications so that her case could proceed past summary judgment. Therefore, the panelheld that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the employer, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Michael P. Balaban (argued), Law Offices of Michael P. Balaban, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

S. Scott Greenberg (argued), Clark County School District, Office of General Counsel, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Jacqlyn Smith appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Clark County School District on Smith's claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. See Smith v. Clark County (Smith II), No. 2:09-cv-2142, 2011 WL 4007532 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2011) (unpublished). Smith argues (1) that the district court abused its discretion by granting the School District's motion for reconsideration of its initial order denying summary judgment; and (2) that the district court erred by granting summary judgment under Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Smith worked in the Clark County School District from 1992 to 2008. She first taught elementary school. But in 2001, Smith had a back injury that limited her mobility and led her to pursue a less physically demanding job within the school setting. Literary specialist fit the bill. Literary specialists train and assist elementary school teachers with teaching and testing student literacy skills, but literary specialists are not responsible for all of the duties needed to teach a class of students. Smith earned her literary-specialist certification in 2004 and took a job as a literary specialist in the School District. Smith remained a literary specialist in the School District until 2008. Between 2004 and early 2008, Smith received positive reviews for her work as a literary specialist.

In March 2008, the principal at Kesterson Elementary School told Smith that she would be reassigned to teach kindergarten for the 2008-2009 school year. Smith objected, asking to remain in her literary-specialist position because her back injury prevented her from teaching. According to Smith, she could not perform the "standing, bending, [and] stooping required to be an effective kindergarten or elementary school teacher." Shortly after this meeting, Smith aggravated her back while sorting boxes at work, and she was unable to work as a literary specialist for the rest of the school year. During the next few months, Smith applied for family medical leave and disability benefits. These applications are at the heart of this appeal.

On April 21, 2008, Smith filed a request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. On the request form, Smith'sdoctor explained that Smith was "presently incapacitated" and could not "work at all until released by [a] doctor." In May 2008, Smith applied for and began receiving private disability benefits through American Fidelity Assurance Company. In her application for these benefits, Smith stated that her "dates of total disability" ranged from March 31, 2008 to "Not Sure." Two months later, Smith sought an extension to her FMLA benefits and filed an updated form with her doctor's statement that Smith was "presently incapacitated," would "be out of work indefinitely," and could do "no work of any kind until released by a doctor."

In late August, Smith applied for disability retirement under the Nevada Public Employees' Retirement Systems (PERS) on the basis that she could not perform the duties required for her current job as a kindergarten teacher, including standing for long periods of time, bending, stooping, walking, lifting, and reaching. She also explained that she could not perform the lifting, bending, and stooping required for her former job as a literary specialist, but she could sit to work. Her doctor certified that Smith was "unable to work due to injury or mental or physical illness." The Nevada Retirement Board approved Smith's application for "total and permanent disability" in October 2008.

During this time, Smith was embroiled in heated and unhappy discussions with the School District over whether she could work as a kindergarten teacher and how the School District should accommodate her disability. Smith insisted that she could not teach in the classroom and repeatedly asked that the school district accommodate her disability by keeping her in the literary-specialist position or by transferring her to another non-teacher position within the School District, such as a project facilitator. The School District was adamant,however, that Smith could not remain in the literary-specialist position and that transferring Smith to another position was not a reasonable accommodation. Instead, the School District offered several accommodations for the kindergarten-teacher position, including a special chair that would reduce Smith's need to bend and stoop and a full-time classroom aid to help with lifting and to minimize Smith's movement. After an extended stalemate, the parties failed to reach an agreement. Smith resigned from the School District at the end of September 2008, so she could receive PERS disability retirement. Smith takes the position that she did not want to start disability retirement, but felt she had no choice because she could not work as a kindergarten teacher and she had used all of her sick leave.

Smith sued the School District in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging that the School District violated the ADA by discriminating against Smith and by not providing reasonable accommodation. The School District moved for summary judgment, asserting (1) that Smith was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA because she had represented on her applications for disability benefits that she was permanently disabled; and (2) that the School District did not deny Smith a reasonable accommodation. Initially, the district court denied summary judgment, concluding that triable issues of fact remained as to both issues. Smith v. Clark County (Smith I), 2:09-cv-2142, 2011 WL 1576894, at *4-5 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2011) (unpublished). The School District moved for reconsideration on the qualified-individual issue, which the district court granted, finding that it had committed clear error by not considering whether Smith had offered a sufficient explanation for the inconsistencies between her ADA claim and her PERS application. See Smith II, 2011WL 4007532, at *1-2. Concluding that Smith had not sufficiently explained the inconsistences, the district court granted summary judgment for the School District because Smith's ADA action was irreconcilable with her PERS disability retirement. Id. at *2-3. Smith appealed.

II

We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. See SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int'l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). "Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011)). As we explain below, under Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795, we apply this summary-judgment standard, and thus de novo review, to determine the sufficiency of a plaintiff's explanation for his or her inconsistent claims for disability benefits.

III

We must determine (A) whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the motion for reconsideration, and, if not, (B) whether the district court erred by...