Smith v. Clinton
Citation | 253 F.Supp.3d 222 |
Decision Date | 26 May 2017 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-1606 (ABJ). |
Parties | Patricia SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Hillary Rodham CLINTON, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Larry E. Klayman, Freedom Watch, Inc., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Amy Mason Saharia, David Evan Kendall, Katherine Marie Turner, Stephen L. Wohlgemuth, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs Patricia Smith and Charles Woods have brought this action against the former Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton ("Secretary Clinton"), alleging that Secretary Clinton's use of a private email server caused the death of their sons Sean Smith and Tyrone Woods. Plaintiffs' theory is that Secretary Clinton's use of the private email account when she was serving as Secretary of State exposed confidential information about plaintiffs' relatives to the terrorists who ultimately took their lives in Benghazi, Libya in September of 2012. See Compl. [Dkt. # 1] ¶¶ 26–28, 44–47. Plaintiffs also allege that Secretary Clinton defamed them and placed them in a false light when, as a candidate for the office of President of the United States, she disputed their accounts of conversations that she had with them about the circumstances that led to attack in Benghazi. Id. ¶¶ 33–42. Finally, plaintiffs allege that Secretary Clinton's conduct—both as Secretary of State and later on the campaign trail—intentionally and negligently caused them to suffer emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 50–56.
The United States has moved to substitute itself as the defendant for any actions that Secretary Clinton took as Secretary of State. In that capacity, it moves to dismiss the claims for wrongful death (Count I) and negligence (Count IV) in their entirety, along with those portions of the claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts V and VI, respectively) that are premised on actions Secretary Clinton took as Secretary of State.
The law allows the United States to substitute itself as the defendant where a lawsuit challenges acts taken by a government official who was acting in the scope of his or her employment at the time of the alleged torts. To resolve the question of whether Secretary Clinton was acting in the scope of her employment, the relevant inquiry is not whether her use of the private email server was lawful or unlawful. Instead, the only issue to be resolved is whether the Secretary's communication with State Department personnel concerning State Department business through that means fell within the scope of Secretary Clinton's employment. Because the Court finds that Secretary Clinton was acting in the scope of her employment when she transmitted the emails that are alleged to give rise to her liability, the motion to substitute will be granted. And because plaintiffs failed to raise their claims with the State Department before bringing suit as is legally required, the government's motion to dismiss the counts against the United States will be granted.
In addition, Secretary Clinton has moved to dismiss the defamation and false light claims (Counts II and III), as well as the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims insofar as they are premised on actions she took after she left office (Count V and VI). Plaintiffs allege that Secretary Clinton lied to them when she allegedly told them that it was a YouTube video that prompted the attack on the consulate in Benghazi. See Compl. ¶ 24. They further claim that when Secretary Clinton—then candidate Clinton—was subsequently asked about plaintiffs' allegation that she had lied, she defamed plaintiffs or put them in a false light when she disputed their account of their conversation with her. See id. ¶ 23. But because plaintiffs have not stated a claim for defamation or false light, or for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Secretary Clinton's personal motion to dismiss will be granted as well.
The untimely death of plaintiffs' sons is tragic, and the Court does not mean to minimize the unspeakable loss that plaintiffs have suffered in any way. But when one applies the appropriate legal standards, it is clear that plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to rebut the presumption that Secretary Clinton was acting in her official capacity when she used her private email server to communicate with State Department personnel about State Department business, and that they have not stated claims that Secretary Clinton defamed them, put them in a false light, or intentionally inflicted emotional distress. For those reasons, the case will be dismissed. Nothing about this decision should be construed as making any determination or expressing any opinion about the propriety of the use of the private email server or the content or accuracy of the statements made by the Secretary to the family members or to anyone else in the days following the Benghazi attack.
For purposes of this motion, the Court must assume the facts alleged by the plaintiffs to be true.
From 2009 to 2013, Secretary Clinton served as the United States Secretary of State. Compl. ¶ 8. During her tenure—as the world has come to know—she "utilized a private e-mail server to conduct official government business." Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs allege that Secretary Clinton used the private server to send and receive "thousands of e-mails regarding matters of national security, including information that has been categorized as ‘top secret,’ ‘secret,’ and ‘confidential.’ " Id.
Plaintiffs specifically allege that Secretary Clinton used her private e-mail server to "send and receive information about the location of Ambassador Christopher Stevens ... and other government operations in Benghazi, Libya. Compl. ¶ 15.1 From there, they posit that the email server was hacked by a number of foreign countries, that terrorists thereby obtained the e-mails, and that the terrorists used them to "plan, orchestrate, and carry out the horrific and devastating attack on the American diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012, resulting in the death of four Americans, including Sean Smith and Tyrone Woods." Id. ¶¶ 15–16.2
According to plaintiffs, on the day of the attack, and in the days that followed, Secretary Clinton attempted to blame an anti-Muslim YouTube video for inciting the violence. Compl. ¶ 18. In particular, on September 12, 2012, when Secretary Clinton gave public remarks about the attack, she said: "Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place at our Embassy in Cairo yesterday, as a response to inflammatory material posted on the internet." Id. And the complaint states that, two days after the attack, when Secretary Clinton met with the families of the four Americans who were killed, she "lied to Plaintiffs and told Plaintiffs that the Benghazi attack was the result of the anti-Muslim YouTube video that had been posted online," and she promised the families that the "creator of the video would be arrested." Id. ¶ 19. According to the complaint, plaintiff Woods "contemporaneously recorded this September 14, 2012 interaction with [Secretary] Clinton by writing in his diary ... ‘I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are going to have the film maker arrested who was responsible for the death of my son.’ " Id. ¶ 20.
The narrative in the complaint then jumps forward more than three years, and it recounts various statements that Secretary Clinton made during the Presidential election season in late 2015 and early 2016. Secretary Clinton has long maintained that she never told plaintiffs that the Benghazi attack was caused by the YouTube video; plaintiffs allege that when she advanced those denials, Secretary Clinton lied about their September 2012 interaction and thereby defamed them.
Paragraph 23 of the complaint recounts four specific instances of alleged defamation:
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