Smith v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 25 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:14-cv-262 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | NEAL THOMAS SMITH, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Neal Thomas Smith ("Smith") challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") determining that he was not disabled and therefore not eligible for supplemental security income ("SSI"), and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act ("Act"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383f. Specifically, Smith alleges that the ALJ erred by finding that he did not meet the requirements of listing 12.05C for intellectual disability, by failing to probe his non-exertional impairments and by failing to consider his ability to function outside of his home. I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination. Thus, I DENY Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 13), and GRANT the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 18.
This court limits its review to a determination of whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's conclusion that Smith failed to demonstrate that he was disabled under theAct.2 Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). The final decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed where substantial evidence supports the decision. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Smith filed for SSI and DIB on December 28, 2010, claiming that his disability began on July 22, 2010.3 Administrative Record, hereinafter "R." 14. The Commissioner denied the application at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review. R. 161-67, 176-82, 183-89. On November 8, 2012, ALJ Anne Sprague held a hearing to consider Smith's disability claim. R. 55-81. Smith was represented by an attorney at the hearing, which included testimony from vocational expert Ruth Fast. Id.
On July 25, 2013, the ALJ entered her decision analyzing Smith's claim under the familiar five-step process,4 and denying Smith's claim for benefits. R. 14-25. The ALJ foundthat Smith suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, borderline intellectual functioning and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. R. 16. The ALJ found that these impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. R. 17. The ALJ further found that Smith had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, except that he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasionally kneel, stoop, crouch and crawl; avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights. R. 19. The ALJ further found that Smith was limited to simple, unskilled, non-stressful, routine, repetitive job tasks and can interact appropriately with others. R. 19. The ALJ determined that Smith could not return to his past relevant work, but that he could work at jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as parking lot attendant, shredder operator, and marker. R. 24. Thus, the ALJ concluded that he was not disabled.
Smith requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ's decision. On March 24, 2014, the denied Smith's request for review (R. 1-5), and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Smith alleges that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt the opinion of his treating physician that his mental impairment meets or equals listing 12.05C. Smith was born in 1972, has a ninth grade education and is unable to read and write. R. 24, 62. He previously worked as an iron worker, construction laborer, and brick manufacturing laborer. He also worked in awood factory. R. 308. Smith stopped working at his construction job in July 2010 when he was rear-ended in a car accident and began to suffer low back pain. R. 63.
A "listed impairment" is one considered by the Social Security Administration "to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). Casillas v. Astrue, No. 3:09-CV-00076, 2011 WL 450426, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(4)).
Listing 12.05(C) for intellectual disability states the following:
...
C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App'x 1, § 12.05. The structure of this listing is different than other mental disorder listings in that it contains "an introductory paragraph with the diagnostic description for intellectual disability" as well as four sets of criteria in Paragraphs A through D. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App'x 1, § 12.00(A). Thus, listing 12.05(C) presents a three-pronged proof requirement. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 2012). First, Prong 1 requires a showing of "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period...." Prong 2 requires avalid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ score of 60 through 70. Prong 3 requires that the claimant establish "a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function." Id. Here, I find that Smith satisfies prongs 2 and 3, but not prong 1 because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Smith did not have deficits in adaptive functioning that initially manifested before age 22.
There is no dispute that Smith has a valid verbal, performance or full scale IQ score of 60 through 70. On May 25, 2011, Angela Berry, Psy.D., completed a psychological evaluation of Smith and performed a Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV). R. 533-38. Smith scored a full scale IQ of 65, with a verbal comprehension composite score of 74, and a perceptional reasoning scale of 75. R. 536. Dr. Berry found a 95% chance that Smith's true IQ score falls in the range of 62-70, although she noted that his test scores may slightly underestimate his true level of cognitive functioning. R. 537. There is no evidence of a change in Smith's intelligence functioning, thus it must be assumed that his IQ has remained relatively constant over time. Luckey v. U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., 890 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, Dr. Berry's report establishes that Smith's IQ scores are within the 60-70 range as required for Prong 2.
Smith also satisfies Prong 3, the presence of a "physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1, § 12.05C. The ALJ found that Smith suffered from degenerative disc disease and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. R. 16. These are severe physical and mental impairments, as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), and the ALJ explicitly found that "these impairments cause more than minimal work-related limitations and are thus 'severe' as that termis defined in the Regulations." R. 16. As listing § 12.00 adopts the definitions in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), this finding necessarily means that the evidence of record met the requirements of Prong 3 of Listing 12.05(C), i.e. "a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App'x 1, § 12.05(C); see Jackson v. Astrue, 467 F. App'x 214, 217 (4th Cir. 2012) (); Alderman v. Chater, 40 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (N.D.W. Va. 1998) ().
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has found that a claimant has a significant work-related limitation if he or she cannot perform his past relevant work. Flowers v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 904 F.2d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Branham v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1271, 1273 (4th Cir . 1985)). Here, the ALJ determined that Smith could not perform his past relevant work as a construction laborer, ironworker helper and lumber helper. R. 23. Thus, the remaining issue is whether Smith satisfies prong 1 of listing 12.05C, deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested prior to age 22.
The ALJ determined that Smith did not have deficits in adaptive functioning that initially manifested prior to age 22, and as such, did not meet the requirement of listing 12.05C. I have carefully considered the ALJ's...
To continue reading
Request your trial