Smith v. Com.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2008-SC-000060-DG.,2008-SC-000060-DG.
• Citation: 312 S.W.3d 353
• Parties: Cassandra SMITH, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

312 S.W.3d 353

Cassandra SMITH, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

No. 2008-SC-000060-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

March 18, 2010.

Rehearing Denied June 17, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender, Elizabeth B. McMahon, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Appellant.

Jack Conway, Attorney General, Jeffrey Allan Cross, Criminal Appellate Division, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Justice VENTERS.

Appellant, Cassandra Smith, appeals from a Court of Appeals decision affirming a Jefferson Circuit Court judgment entered upon a jury verdict convicting her of first-degree possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. For these crimes, pursuant to a sentencing agreement with the Commonwealth, Smith was sentenced to a total of three years to serve, probated for five years.

On appeal, Smith contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress several incriminatory statements she made to police during the execution of a search warrant at her residence, and by precluding her from introducing evidence concerning her husband's prior felony drug convictions. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Smith's statement, which implied that she had drugs in her pocket, made in response to a question asked by police after she was handcuffed. Because the admission of this evidence was not harmless, we reverse Smith's conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance and remand for a new trial. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in all remaining respects.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following an investigation which appeared to implicate Smith in drug trafficking, Louisville Police obtained a warrant to search her residence. On April 24, 2003, police executed the warrant. In executing the warrant police used what was characterized as a "dynamic entry," which involved ramming the door open to gain entry into the residence. Smith and her two children, ages twelve and eleven, were home at the time.

After entering the residence, Sergeant Yvette Gentry found Smith in her bedroom. Upon encountering Smith, Gentry immediately handcuffed her and, without advising her of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), asked her if she had any drugs or weapons on her. Smith replied to the effect that "she had something in her pocket."¹ Based upon this response, Gentry found and removed a packet containing four rocks of crack cocaine from Smith's pants pocket. This cocaine served as the basis of her indictment for trafficking in cocaine and her eventual conviction for possession of the drug.

After recovering the cocaine, Gentry arrested Smith and escorted her into the living room where she was met by Detective Scott Gootee. Gootee testified that pursuant to normal routine, he then gave Smith the Miranda warnings; however, no other witness recalled this and the trial court concluded he had not. The record is unclear about what prompted Smith to make her next comments, though there was testimony that one of the officers may have said something about the children being present and whether they could be moved elsewhere. In any event, Smith made statements to the effect "well, I knew this was going to happen one day so that's why I've told my kids this may happen one of these days", and that she "was not a big drug dealer but just did it to get by." In effect, the statements amounted to an admission of drug dealing.

In the remaining course of the search, police discovered baggies which appeared to contain cocaine residue. The baggies were the basis for the possession of the drug paraphernalia charge.

On February 24, 2004, Smith was indicted for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. In due course she moved to suppress the incriminating statements as previously set forth.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court initially ordered all of the statements suppressed. The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration which persuaded the trial court to reverse its ruling. Under the trial court's ultimate ruling the statement made in the bedroom, implying she had drugs in her pocket, was held to be admissible on the basis that Smith was not in custody at the time she made it. The living room statements were held to be admissible on the basis that those statements were not made in response to any police inquiry designed to elicit an incriminating statement, and thus it was irrelevant whether or not she had been Mirandized.

At trial, Smith's defense was that before the police executed the warrant, her husband, while out on work-release from jail, came by her residence and, while she was visiting with him, placed something in her pants pocket. She assumed it was money, but, as it turned out, was actually the crack cocaine police found in her pants pocket. Smith thus argued that she did not knowingly possess the cocaine discovered in her pocket.

The jury found Smith not guilty of trafficking in cocaine, but convicted her of the lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine. She was also convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. Following the jury's verdict in the guilt phase, Smith entered into a sentencing agreement with the Commonwealth under which she would receive a sentence of three years, probated for five years.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction, and we thereafter granted discretionary review.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE BEDROOM STATEMENT

Smith first argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant her motion to suppress the statement she made to Officer Gentry in her bedroom. The trial court denied the motion based upon its conclusion, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Smith was not in custody for Miranda purposes when she was asked by Gentry whether she had any drugs or weapons on her.

As previously discussed, immediately after entering Smith's residence, Officer Gentry found her in the bedroom. Gentry handcuffed Smith and, without Mirandizing her, asked if she had any drugs or weapons on her. Smith responded that she "had something in her pocket." Gentry searched Smith's pocket and discovered a packet containing crack cocaine, the only drugs found during the execution of the search warrant.

Smith argues that her statement should be suppressed because it was the product of an un-mirandized custodial interrogation. She also argues that the statement was not harmless because it directly contradicted her trial defense that she was unaware the drugs were in her pocket. Relying on Taylor v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 521 (Ky.2006), the Commonwealth argues that the handcuffing of Smith did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes and thus her statement was admissible.

We do not regard Taylor as controlling here for the simple reason that Taylor was not interrogated. Taylor spontaneously told the officer that handcuffed him that he had crack cocaine and marijuana in his pockets. "The statements made by Taylor were not in response to any police statement reasonably calculated to elicit an incriminating response. Miranda requires an individual who is stopped to be apprised of his/her rights only in the context of a custodial interrogation. Here, there was no custodial interrogation." Id. at 523. Thus, Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights were not implicated. Because no interrogation occurred in Taylor, its indication that "Taylor was not in custody for Miranda purposes simply because he was handcuffed and detained in order to prevent his flight until the investigation was completed" is pure dicta and is not persuasive. Taylor, 182 S.W.3d at 524.

In reviewing whether Smith's statement was admissible, we address three questions: whether Smith was placed in custody for Miranda purposes as a result of being handcuffed; whether Gentry's questioning was interrogation; and if she was in custody for Miranda purposes and was interrogated, whether the public safety, or any other, exception applies to allow the admission of her statement.

We first address whether Smith was in custody at the time she made the bedroom statement. We review the question of whether a defendant was in custody de novo. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky.2006).

It is fundamental that Miranda only applies to situations implicating compelled self-incrimination. "Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable.... Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977)) (Emphasis added). To the contrary, custodial questioning is inherently coercive, and protection against this inherent coercion is what Miranda is intended to prevent. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Thus, "Miranda warnings are only required when the suspect being questioned is `in custody.'" Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 405 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)).

"Custodial interrogation has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way." Id. "Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on the freedom of an individual as to render him in custody." Id. "The inquiry for making a custodial determination is whether the person was under formal arrest or whether there was a...