Smith v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002120-MR (Ky. App. 12/21/2007)
| Decision Date | 21 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-CA-002120-MR.,2006-CA-002120-MR. |
| Parties | Cassandra SMITH, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Honorable Denise Clayton, Judge, Action No. 04-CR-000637.
Elizabeth B. McMahon, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General, Samuel J. Floyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee.
Before HOWARD,1 NICKELL, and TAYLOR, Judges.
Cassandra Smith ("Smith") has appealed from the September 7, 2006, judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court, following a multi-day jury trial, finding her guilty of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine)2 and possession of drug paraphernalia,3 and sentencing her to a total of three years' imprisonment, probated for a period of five years. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On April 24, 2003, officers from the Louisville Metro Police Department ("LMPD") executed a search warrant at Smith's residence located on South 15th Street in Louisville, Kentucky. Upon entry, Sergeant Yvette Gentry ("Sgt. Gentry") located Smith in her bedroom and immediately placed her in handcuffs for safety purposes and to ensure she was unable to destroy any potential contraband. She was not placed under arrest at that time. Sgt. Gentry asked Smith if she had any weapons or drugs on her person. Smith stated she had drugs in her pocket. Sgt. Gentry retrieved a small plastic bag containing four individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine from Smith's front left pants pocket and placed Smith under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. Sgt. Gentry then took Smith to the living room to await completion of the search of the residence.
Lead Detective Scott Gootee ("Det. Gootee") was present in the living room when Smith entered, as were Smith's two minor daughters. One of the children was very upset, prompting Det. Gootee to inquire of Smith as to whether there was somewhere the two girls could be taken so they would not have to witness the remainder of the search warrant execution. Smith responded by saying "her daughters knew what was going on and that she had talked to them about the possibility that some day the police may come by." She further stated that she was not a big drug dealer, but rather she sold only small amounts "to get by."
On February 24, 2004, a Jefferson County grand jury returned an indictment charging Smith with trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree4 and possession of drug paraphernalia. Smith filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the statements she had made during the execution of the search warrant, and a hearing on the motion was held on March 20, 2006. Following a lengthy hearing, the trial court granted Smith's motion to suppress, finding Smith had not been read a proper Miranda5 warning. The Commonwealth promptly filed a motion to reconsider the ruling. On March 30, 2006, the trial court ruled the statements were admissible on two grounds. First, Smith was not in custody at the time she made the statement in the bedroom, citing Taylor v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 521 (Ky. 2006), and second, the statements made in the living room were not in response to any police inquiry designed to elicit an incriminating response, citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
Smith proceeded to a jury trial on March 29-31 and April 3-4, 2006. The jury found her guilty of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and possession of drug paraphernalia. Smith then agreed to a sentence of three years' imprisonment conditioned on the Commonwealth not opposing probation and Smith reserving her right to appeal from the conviction. On September 7, 2006, the trial court entered a final judgment and sentence of probation in accordance with the terms of the sentencing agreement. This appeal followed.
Smith first contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements she made during execution of the search warrant. On appellate review of a trial court's denial of a suppression motion, we first review the factual findings for clear error. If the findings are supported by substantial evidence they are considered conclusive and will not be disturbed. CR6 52.01, Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376 (Ky.App. 2000). This is followed by de novo review of the trial court's legal conclusions. Id. See also McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310-1311 (6th Cir. 1996).
The trial court held multiple hearings on the suppression motion before ultimately denying the motion. Neither Smith nor the Commonwealth has challenged the trial court's factual findings, and a careful review of the record reveals the findings were supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we hold these findings to be conclusive as to the suppression motion.
Although the trial court initially held as a matter of law that Smith had not been given her Miranda warnings and suppressed her statements on that basis, it later reversed its decision and stated new legal conclusions. It is these latter conclusions that are properly before us for review. The trial court and the parties have framed the issues based upon the location where the statements were made — the bedroom and the living room. We shall follow suit.
Smith first contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress her statement made in the bedroom that she had drugs in her pocket, claiming she was in custody when the statement was made and had not been given her Miranda warnings. Further, she claims the trial court's reliance on Taylor, supra, was misplaced. We disagree.
Unquestionably, if a suspect is in police custody Miranda requires officers to advise her of her constitutional rights prior to commencing any interrogation intended to elicit incriminating statements. Conversely, if the suspect is not in custody, no warnings need be given under Miranda. See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Ky. 2006). Here, Smith was placed in handcuffs almost immediately after officers encountered her in the bedroom. Testimony elicited at the suppression hearing and at trial revealed this detention was for officer safety and to prevent Smith from destroying or concealing any contraband while the search warrant was being executed. We hold Smith was not in police custody simply because she was placed in handcuffs while the officers completed their search and investigation. See Taylor, supra; United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Therefore, no Miranda warnings were necessary, and the trial court correctly so ruled in denying the motion to suppress the bedroom statement.
Smith alternatively contends that even if she was not in custody when she voluntarily informed the officers she had drugs in her pocket, a violation under Miranda occurred when Officer Gentry specifically questioned whether she had drugs or weapons on her person. Again, we disagree.
It is well-settled that when officers ask questions intended to secure their own safety or that of the public which are not solely intended to elicit incriminating statements, Miranda warnings are unnecessary. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). See also United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2001). This so-called "safety exception" to Miranda has been extended to include questioning about illegal drugs where officers are concerned about evidence thereof which might be uncovered in a search. United States v. Luker, 395 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2005).7 Police officers executing a search warrant are keenly aware of their surroundings and can reasonably be expected to distinguish between questions necessary for their own protection and those designed to obtain incriminating evidence. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2633. Further, Miranda does not preclude questions regarding the location of contraband, especially in situations such as in the case sub judice where a suspect is detained but is not in custody. Foster, supra. It would have been plainly unreasonable, if not inept police work, for the officers herein to have simply allowed Smith to wander about without at least cursory questioning regarding contraband considering the circumstances under which the officers came to be present in her home, that is, in order to execute a search warrant. See United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1998).
The trial court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, as was the decision to deny the suppression motion, and these determinations are therefore conclusive and will not be disturbed in this appeal. RCr8 9.78; Canler v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1994); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. 1991). Further, the trial court's reliance on Taylor, supra, was correct and its legal reasoning was sound. Thus, there was no error in the admission of the incriminating statements made in the bedroom.
Smith next contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress two other statements made after she entered the living room: first, that her daughters "knew what was going on" and actually expected the police to some day come by; and second, that she was not a big drug dealer, but only sold small quantities "to get by." She contends she was subjected to the functional equivalent of a custodial interrogation without having first been read a proper Miranda warning, and further that the trial court's reliance on Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, was erroneous. We disagree.
It is undisputed Smith was in custody at the time she was brought into the living room as she had been placed under arrest following the recovery of narcotics from her person in the bedroom. Thus, if Smith were to be subjected to an...
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