Smith v. Cool

• Decision Date: 01 December 1872
• Citation: 21 L.Ed. 324,83 U.S. 560,16 Wall. 560
• Parties: SMITH v. McCOOL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

83 U.S. 560

21 L.Ed. 324

16 Wall. 560

SMITH v. McCOOL.

December Term, 1872

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case was twice argued in this court: once at December Term, 1869, and now again in December Term, 1872.

Messrs. G. F. Harding and H. M. Weed, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. J. B. Hawley and G. C. Lanphere, contra.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE stated the case, and delivered the opinion of the court.

The action in the court below was ejectment. The plaintiff in error was the plaintiff there. A like action between the same parties for the same premises was heretofore decided by this court, and is reported in 1st Black, 459. In that case the jury found a special verdict, which is set out in the statement of the case by the reporter. This court held that the plaintiff had no title at the commencement of the suit, and upon that ground reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause with directions to the court below to enter a judgment upon the special verdict for the defendant, which was accordingly done. Smith, the plaintiff in that action, subsequently instituted the case now before us, upon a title alleged to have been acquired since the commencement of the former suit. Upon the trial in this case, he offered in evidence the special verdict in the former case, to prove the heirship of one of the parties under whom he claimed. The evidence was objected to by the counsel for the defendant, and excluded by the court. The plaintiff excepted and has brought this ruling here for review.

A verdict without a judgment in a case like this is of no validity, either as an estoppel or as evidence.¹ To give efficacy to a verdict, general or special, it must be followed by a judgment, and when offered to establish any fact, such fact must have constituted, in whole or in part, the foundation of the judgment which was rendered. Greenleaf says:² 'It is only where the point in issue has been determined that the judgment is a bar. If the suit has been discontinued, or the plaintiff becomes nonsuit, or for any other reason there has been no judgment of the court upon the matter in issue, the proceedings are not conclusive.' The matter must have become res judicata.³

If the judgment originally rendered upon the special verdict here in question had still subsisted, the case would be a different one. But that judgment was reversed. The reversal took away all efficacy from the verdict. It is true this court ordered a judgment to be entered upon it in favor of the defendant, but that was not upon the ground that the verdict showed title in the defendant, but because it showed there was none in the plaintiff. The judgment for the defendant followed as a matter of course. It was, in effect, a judgment veredicto non-obstante, or of nonsuit. Instead of giving the findings its sanction, and resting upon them as its foundation, the judgment denied their efficacy and repelled them as immaterial. This suit was brought upon an after-acquired title. The causes of action in the two cases are as distinct from each other as if the latter were brought to recover a different tract of land.

In the leading case of the Duchess of Kingston,⁴ Lord Chief Justice De Grey said:

'From a variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true: First, that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive between the same parties, upon the same matter directly in question in another court; secondly, that the judgment of the court of exclusive jurisdiction directly upon the point, is in like manner conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent nor exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred from argument.'

The authority of this case it is believed has never been controverted. But what in such cases is 'directly upon the point,' 'what came collaterally in question,' and what was 'incidentally cognizable,' are questions upon which the adjudications are...