Smith v. Corrigan

• Decision Date: 24 November 1924
• Citation: 126 A. 680
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. CORRIGAN.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

126 A. 680

SMITH et al.

v. CORRIGAN.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 24, 1924.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Action by Helen W. Smith and husband George F. Corrigan. On defendant's rule to show cause. Rule made absolute.

Argued May term, 1924, before GUMMERE, C. J., and PARKER and KATZENBACH, JJ.

Heine, Bradner & Laird, of Newark (M. Casewell Heine, of Newark, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Wall, Haight, Carey & Hartpence, of Jersey City (Albert C. Wall, of Jersey City, of counsel), for defendant.

KATZENBACH, J. This case is before us on a defendant's rule to show cause. The plaintiffs, Helen W. Smith and Fred M. Smith, her husband, instituted this action against Dr. George F. Corrigan, a physician, alleging malpractice in the treatment of Mrs Smith. The jury returned a verdict of $500 in favor of Mrs. Smith and $2,000 in favor of Mr. Smith.

The testimony shows that on January 8, 1921, Mrs. Smith bruised the calf of her leg between the tire of an automobile and the street pavement. A lump about as large as a goose egg appeared on the inside of the shin bone at the point of injury. This lump became badly discolored. Mrs. Smith was treated at a hospital and at home by a Dr. Huberman, until February 2, 1921. On that day Dr. Huberman examined her leg The appearance of the lump had changed. It was smaller and had turned to a light yellow color. Dr. Huberman advised Mrs. Smith to stay in the house. Mrs. Smith disliked this advice. She thought another "physician would give her advice more to her liking, so she called in the defendant. She informed him of the accident. He examined her leg, pronounced the injury a hematona—that is, a blood tumor—and advised that it be opened. Mrs. Smith says that Dr. Corrigan said the opening would be nothing more than a "pin prick incision." Dr. Corrigan had no instruments with him. He asked for a safety razor blade. The blade was furnished, the incision made, and the wound dressed. Mrs. Smith thought it more than a pin prick incision, but paid Dr. Corrigan $5 for the operation. He promised to return, but did not do so. Dr. Huberman was then summoned. He was somewhat perturbed over what had happened, but consented, upon the dismissal of Dr. Corrigan, to continue treating Mrs. Smith. The wound became infected. Mrs. Smith was taken to the hospital. Another operation was performed. This consisted of opening the leg and draining it. The openings were slow in healing and when healed left Mrs. Smith with a scarred and shriveled leg. This condition of her limb caused her much mortification. She was unable to conform to the prevailing fashion of bathing without stockings. She was obliged, owing to her unsightly leg, to wear stockings. On one occasion in California while bathing in stockings she was asked to leave the pool because other bathers were suspicious that she had an infected leg and apparently had reported their fears to the management, who requested her to leave the pool. It was humiliating to be both unfashionable and suspected.

The defense to the action was that the infection had already set in when the defendant was called by Mrs. Smith, and that the defendant took every precaution to insure asepsis by washing his hands, cleaning his nails, boiling the razor blade, and using an antiseptic solution. The plaintiff and a friend who was with her during the opening of the leg denied Dr. Corrigan used these precautions.

The case presents the usual features and contradictory testimony of a malpractice case. It was, we think, properly submitted to the jury. There were, however, certain rulings of the trial court upon evidence and certain portions of the court's charge to the jury to which exceptions were duly taken which require consideration During the progress of the trial the defendant was asked what he considered his fair net worth in money was. This question and the questions leading up to it were objected to. The objections were overruled, exceptions taken and the defendant was compelled to answer and testified that he was worth over $100,000. The complaint demanded punitive damages. The trial court proceeded upon the theory that if punitive damages were demanded in the complaint that evidence of the pecuniary worth of the defendant was proper. The trial court in its ruling referred to the case of Weiss v Weiss, 95 N. J. Law, 125, 112 A. 184. The principle laid down in the Weiss Case is not applicable to the present case. That case was an action for slander in an action for slander the words hurt the individual slandered more if spoken by a man of wealth in the community than if uttered by the village drunkard. For that reason the evidence of pecuniary worth in a slander suit is admissible. Moreover, one who speaks defamatory words of another wrongfully intends to injure the person defamed. There is present a wrongful motive. Malice exists. Where malice or a wrongful motive exists, punitive damages may be recovered. Proof of facts showing the existence of malice lays a foundation for punitive damages Outside of these exceptional cases where wealth is necessarily involved in determining the damages sustained, evidence of wealth is inadmissible unless there be proof of malice. It is a cardinal principle of our jurisprudence that the rich and poor stand alike in courts of justice. Neither the wealth of the one nor the poverty of the other is permitted to affect the administration of the law. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 98 N. Y. 64.

The question at issue in ...