Smith v. Davis
| Docket Number | 4-20-0440 |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Citation | 2022 IL App (4th) 200440 U |
| Parties | PAUL SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GINGER DAVIS and JENNIFER SMITH, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County No. 18MR115 Honorable Jennifer H. Bauknecht, Judge Presiding.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was proper under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) for failure to state a claim when he was informed he would be charged for copies of his medical records in excess of 50 pages. Further, the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment against defendant Smith was a proper exercise of its discretion.
¶ 2 Plaintiff, Paul Smith, is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections and housed at Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac) who claims he was being overcharged for copies of his medical records. He filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and unspecified compensatory and punitive damages, as well as fees and costs. Named as defendants were Department of Corrections employee Ginger Davis, who served as a health care administrator at Pontiac, and Medical Records Director Jennifer Smith, an employee of Wexford Health Services, Inc., who also worked at Pontiac. Smith's appearance was delayed after there was some question about service of process and whether the Office of the Attorney General (AG) would be representing her as well as Davis. Plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment as to Smith, which was denied by the trial court. Both defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)), arguing the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motions, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and this appeal follows.
¶ 4 After a request by plaintiff for two separate sets of records from his medical file in May 2018, he was informed by way of a responsive memorandum that inmates were entitled to the first 50 copies of pages from their medical record free of charge each year. For additional pages requested within any given year, the inmate would be charged $0.15 per page. The memo informed plaintiff that since his request exceeded the free 50-page limit, he was required to resubmit his request with a signed authorization for payment. He was also advised if funds were not available, his request would have to be submitted to the warden. Because one of plaintiff's claims relates to the propriety of the trial court's denial of his motion to default Smith, we are compelled to discuss the pleading chronology in detail.
¶ 5 In July 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Livingston County circuit court, which he characterized as a "civil rights action" against the two named defendants for violating what he described as his "Constitutional [sic] protected Right To Copies of [his] Medical Records." He sued the named defendants in both their individual and official capacities, claiming they improperly refused his requests for medical records they contend are not in his file, and for refusing to provide copies of other records which he maintains would not exceed the 50-page limit. Plaintiff further contended the page-limit policy was an unlawful "custom and practice" and that Davis "intentionally discriminat[ed] against Plaintiff due to the large volume of complaints made against Davis and the health care staff." Plaintiff further contended the policy violated the Illinois Administrative Code as well as other state statutes. He claimed no adequate "remedy of law" and an ongoing violation of his constitutional rights unless the policy was enjoined. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief and "actual, consequential, compensatory and punitive damages" in an unspecified amount, along with reasonable fees and costs.
¶ 6 The court file reflected service on defendants in August 2018, and an entry of appearance by the AG on behalf of Davis the same day the Sheriff's Return was filed on August 24, 2018. Davis's counsel requested two extensions of time to file responsive pleadings on her behalf and on November 15, 2018, the trial court allowed both defendants "an additional 60 days leave to file an entry of appearance and responsive pleading." The next day, plaintiff filed a "request for entry of default" and "request for entry of default judgment" along with various supporting documents. Plaintiff then sought leave to file an amended complaint in November 2018, and in January 2019, the AG filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint under section 2-615, along with a supporting memorandum. Two months later, plaintiff responded to the motion after receiving an extension of time to do so. From a review of the docket entries, it appears the trial court believed the AG was representing both Davis and Smith from the outset, and after being made aware no appearance or formal pleading had been filed on Smith's behalf, the trial court continued the matter to determine the status of the parties. The AG advised the court in September 2019 it would not be representing Smith due to her employment with Wexford Health Sources, Inc., a contractual health care service, which placed her outside the scope of their representation. Plaintiff sought an "expedited hearing" on his motion to default her.
¶ 7 In October 2019, plaintiff filed a request for a supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court ordering the trial court to default Smith, which does not appear to have been addressed. Counsel for Smith entered their appearance on November 1, 2019, and filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss similar to the one filed by Davis and still pending before the court. Plaintiff filed a response, contending the motion should be stricken due to his pending motion to default Smith, which motion must be entered, defendant contended, "as a matter of law."
¶ 8 In January 2020, by way of a docket entry, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to strike Smith's motion to dismiss as well as plaintiff's motion for an expedited hearing. The court accepted Smith's late appearance and late filing "without prejudice to either party." Plaintiff was given 45 days to respond to the section 2-615 motions and defendants 21 days thereafter. All other motions were continued generally pending the outcome of the motions to dismiss.
¶ 9 In July 2020, the trial court found plaintiff failed to properly plead a cause of action for declaratory relief and granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a timely motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Plaintiff has elected to appeal from the trial court's ruling rather than seek to replead.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 A. Standard of Review-Dismissal ¶ 13 Fillmore v. Taylor, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 35, 137 N.E.3d 779.
¶ 16 Both Davis and Smith filed motions to dismiss under section 2-615, contending the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint did not properly plead a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Davis noted plaintiff's complaint failed to identify a cause of action, intentional wrongdoing, or legal authority for his claimed "right" to free copies of his medical records as alleged.
¶ 17 Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages, all within the confines of what he described as a "civil rights action." According to count I, plaintiff requested copies of pages from his medical records from Davis but was told some of the requested pages were not in his medical file, and for requested pages contained in the file he would be charged a copying fee of "$0.15 per page after 50 pages." He does not claim either defendant intentionally removed or destroyed the missing pages. Obviously, defendants said they cannot be held liable simply because they are unable to copy and produce records they do not have. Plaintiff further claimed that by imposing the copying charge the State was "intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff due to the large volume of complaints made against [Defendant] Davis and the Health Care Staff" and that defendants have "created an unlawful policy, custom and practice" by limiting plaintiff to one copy of his medical records not exceeding 50 pages per year. Defendants argued plaintiff does not allege anywhere in count I facts supporting his conclusory allegations or the authority supporting his claim the facility's practice of charging for copies more than 50 pages per year is unlawful. Davis pointed out that none of these allegations stated a cause of action against either defendant. Smith's motion also said plaintiff failed to identify a cause of action in count I...
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