Smith v. Des Moines Public School System
| Decision Date | 01 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-98-CV-90368.,4-98-CV-90368. |
| Citation | 153 F.Supp.2d 1044 |
| Parties | Ronald SMITH, Plaintiff, v. DES MOINES PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Elizabeth A. Flansburg, West Des Moines, IA, for plaintiff.
Philip H. Dorff, Des Moines, IA, for defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial filed April 3, 2000. Plaintiff filed his Resistance on April 14, 2000. Both parties have submitted post-trial briefs in support of their respective positions. The matter is submitted.
Following a four-day trial in this defamation case,1 a twelve person jury found that Defendant Des Moines Public School System ("the District") committed slander per se against Plaintiff Ron Smith ("Smith"), and awarded Smith $250,000 in compensatory damages. At the close of Plaintiff's case-in-chief, and again before the case was submitted to the jury, the District moved for judgment as a matter of law, which motion the Court denied. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The District now renews its motion and asks the Court to enter judgement in its favor notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively to order a new trial. In support of its motion, the District argues that the slander per se claim should not have been given to the jury; that the District's qualified privilege has not been defeated; and that the alleged defamatory statements are true or substantially true as a matter of law. Smith argues that the verdict fully accords with the evidence adduced at trial and all reasonable inferences that may have been drawn therefrom.
To give context to the Court's opinion, the Court will briefly highlight the facts of this case and view them in a light most favorable to Smith as the non-moving party. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (8th Cir.1997).
The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred from July 1995 (when Smith was hired by the District) to August 1996 (when Smith ended his employment with the District). Smith was hired by the District on July 3, 1995 to serve as its technology director. He was to oversee implementation of the district's multi-million dollar computer plan and make recommendations regarding what type of computers and software the district should purchase.
The evidence presented at trial included the testimony of several district employees and school board members as well as extensive documentary items. The evidence showed discord between Smith and those who worked with him, including Superintendent Gary Wegenke ("Wegenke"), Assistant Superintendent Pat Moran ("Moran"), and several district secretaries. "Secret files" were ordered kept on Smith and two of his close associates. Amidst the infighting, the technology department which Smith took over was experiencing major problems. Witnesses testified, for example, that computers were missing, stolen, or unaccounted for; inventory controls for computer hardware or software were lacking; teachers were illegally taking computers home; and software licensing restrictions were being violated. Smith's plans for immediate and sweeping changes in the way the District would handle technology matters were not well received by others in the District. His style of leadership was also not favored.
Relations between Smith and his colleagues festered. On July 2, 1996, the situation came to a head. Smith and a District secretary Linda Dinsdale ("Dinsdale") had a physical confrontation in the office. As Smith attempted to retrieve "secret files" that were contained in a file cabinet near Dinsdale's desk, Dinsdale quickly came over to wrest the files away from Smith. As Dinsdale tried to grab the files away, Smith raised his left arm and pushed Dinsdale away, causing a lemonsize bruise to form on Dinsdale's arm.
On July 4, 1996 Dinsdale filed a complaint with the Des Moines Police Department alleging Smith had assaulted her. On July 9, 1996, Plaintiff was charged with assault and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He eventually turned himself and later released on bond.
On July 10, 1996, school board member Suzette Jensen ("Jensen") wrote to Wegenke and formally requested an audit of the technology department to assess accountability and controls issues for the management of hardware and software in the district. (Jensen was Smith's closest ally on the board). The Board eventually approved the internal audit and asked the District's internal auditor Reba Job ("Job") to perform the audit.
While the criminal charges against Smith were pending, the district demanded that Smith either resign his position or face immediate termination. In late August 1996, Smith agreed to resign his position. Dinsdale decided not to press charges against Smith. The criminal assault charges were dismissed without prejudice on August 23, 1996.
On August 26, 1996, Smith signed a document called "General Release and Separation Agreement" ("Agreement"). Among other things, the Agreement embodied the terms of Smith's resignation from the District. Smith's resignation was approved by the school board on August 27, 1996. At this board meeting, Wegenke stated: .... This statement is one of the bases for Smith's slander claim against the District.
In November 1996, Job finished her audit and announced her findings. Job's summary was broadcast on Channel 11 to the city of Des Moines. Job's findings outlined financial and accounting inadequacies of the technology department. Job's audit did not mention Smith by name.
Wegenke's statements at the August 27, 1996 school board meeting and Job's audit form the basis for Smith's slander per se claim against the District.
The relevant statute is set forth in Rule 50 of the Federal Civil Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 50(a)(1) provides in relevant part that:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
Rule 50(b) provides that the "movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment-and may alternatively request a new trial ... under Rule 59."
More than a "scintilla" of evidence is required to establish a "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for the existence of a jury question to avoid judgment as a matter of law; the Court must determine if there is "substantial evidence" supporting a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Cowell Steel Structures, Inc., 991 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir.1993); McGriff v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 1410. (11th Cir.1997). In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, the Court must review the evidence "in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party" and "must not engage in a weighing or evaluation of the evidence or consider questions of credibility." Porous Media Corp., 110 F.3d at 1337-38. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is "susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Id. As another authority put it, Wright & Miller, 9A Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 2524 n. 14 (1995) (quoting Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 Minn. L.Rev. 903, 921 (1971)). "The general statements ordinarily adopted by the courts are simply a way of stating that the fundamental tent of [judicial] control must be one of minimum interference." Id.
At trial, Plaintiff had the burden to prove slander per se by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 507, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). Borrowing from Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 2100.2, the Court set forth the elements of slander per se in Instruction No. 15:
In order for the Plaintiff to recover on the claim for slander per se in this case, the Plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the following propositions:
1. The Defendant made the statements.
2. The Defendant communicated the statements to someone other than Plaintiff.
3. The statements would reasonably be understood to be an expression which would (a) attack a person's integrity or moral character, (b) expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, (c) deprive the person of the benefits of public confidence and social dealings, OR (d) injure the Plaintiff in the maintenance of his business.
4. The Defendant made the statements with "actual malice." The definition of actual malice is contained in Instruction No. 16.
If, however, you find the Defendant has proven the "defense of truth" as that phrase is defined in Instruction No. 17, then that will be a complete defense to the claim of slander per se.
Citing Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 2100.5, Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510, 512 (Iowa 1996), and Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98,...
To continue reading
Request your trial