Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 23 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-71688.,03-71688.
• Citation: 338 F.Supp.2d 775
• Parties: Willie SMITH, Sr., Plaintiff, v. DETROIT ENTERTAINMENT L.L.C. d/b/a MOTOR CITY CASINO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

338 F.Supp.2d 775

Willie SMITH, Sr., Plaintiff, v. DETROIT ENTERTAINMENT L.L.C. d/b/a MOTOR CITY CASINO, et al., Defendants.

No. 03-71688.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

September 23, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Willie Smith, Pro Se, Newton Falls, OH, for plaintiff.

John B. Farrell, Esq., Detroit, MI, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING, WITH SUPPLEMENTATION, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The above-captioned case is presently before the Court on the August 30, 2004 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Donald A. Scheer recommending that the Court (1) grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment, (2) deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and (3) dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has timely filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

Having completed its review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff's objections, and the entire file of this action, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation, and for the further reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted and this case should, accordingly be dismissed in its entirety.

II. PERTINENT FACTS

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation sets forth in detail the pertinent facts of this case which the Court adopts and incorporates herein. Briefly, Plaintiff Willie Smith was a gambling patron at the Motor City Casino. On the evening of October 11, 2001, he went to the cashier window to cash in his chips where he was only given $8,323.00. Plaintiff disputed the amount claiming that he was short-changed by the cashier and entitled to $200.00 more than what he was given. Plaintiff was eventually escorted away from the cashier's window by casino security officers and taken to the security office to fill out an incident report where he was advised that the dispute had to be resolved by the Michigan State Police and the Michigan Gaming Control Board. Plaintiff was detained by casino security officers in the security office to await the State Police. Two State Police officers arrived a short while later and questioned Smith about the events of the evening. One of the State Police officers, Detective Frank Little, allegedly told Mr. Smith that he had reviewed the surveillance video of the cashier's window and he thought that Smith had taken two chips away from the counter presenting his winnings. Smith denied that claim and maintained that the casino had cheated him out $200. After a brief period of further questioning, Plaintiff was allowed to leave. Based on these events, Plaintiff sued Motor City Casino and security officer Oscar Brown under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation contains a detailed legal analysis of Plaintiff's claims and the Court adopts and incorporates that analysis herein. The Court supplements that analysis with the following discussion.

To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege that he was deprived of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law." Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1992). Where, as here, the defendant is a private party, the "state action" element of a § 1983 claim turns upon "whether the party's actions may be fairly attributable to the state." Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

As the Magistrate Judge found, Plaintiff has failed to identify a viable theory of state action under any of the three tests articulated by the Supreme Court. These tests include: (1) the public function test, (2) the state compulsion test, and (3) the symbolic relationship or nexus test. See Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335.

1. The Public Function Test

Under the "public function" test, state action may be found "in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally reserved to the State." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352, 95 S.Ct. 449, 454, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). As Magistrate Judge Scheer noted, "The public function test has been interpreted narrowly," and "[o]nly functions like holding elections, exercising eminent domain, and operating a company-owned town fall under this category of state action." See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 833-34 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted).

The Sixth Circuit's en banc decision in Chapman poses for Plaintiff a considerable obstacle to establishing his claim under this theory of state action. Chapman, like this case, involved allegations of illegal search and seizure by a private security guard. Specifically, plaintiff Lynette Chapman was detained and strip searched by a security guard at a department store, based on a suspicion that she had shoplifted merchandise from the store. The Sixth Circuit found that these allegations did not satisfy the public function test. In so ruling, the Court elected to follow the rulings of several other circuits, reading these decisions as uniformly holding "that the mere fact that the performance of private security functions may entail the investigation of a crime does not transform the actions of a private security officer into state action." Chapman, 319 F.3d at 834 (citing cases from the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits). In particular, the Court quoted with approval from a Fifth Circuit decision holding that the detention of a suspected shoplifter is not an exclusive state function:

A merchant's detention of persons suspected of stealing store property simply is not an action exclusively associated with the state. Experience teaches that the prime responsibility for protection of personal property remains with the individual. A storekeeper's central motivation in detaining a person whom he believes to be in the act of stealing his property is self-protection, not altruism. Such action cannot logically be attributed to the state.

Chapman, 319 F.3d at 834 (quoting White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir.1979)).

Plaintiff's appeal in this case to the "public function" test runs afoul of this aspect of the ruling in Chapman. As the Magistrate Judge found, Plaintiff was detained by casino security personnel on suspicion of an attempted fraud. Under Chapman, such self-interested "private security functions" do not satisfy the "public function" test.

The Court is aware that there are other cases in which private security officers were found to have possessed police powers traditionally vested in the state alone. In one such case, Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 184 F.3d 623, 628-30 (7th Cir.1999), the Seventh Circuit held that two security guards employed at a private medical center in Chicago were state actors under the "public function" test. The guards in question were "special police officers" under a Chicago ordinance, which provided that such officers (i) must be licensed and appointed by the city, (ii) were subject to character investigation by the superintendent of police, (iii) were required to wear badges issued by the police superintendent, (iv) were subject to all rules and regulations governing Chicago police officers, (v) possessed the powers of regular police officers within their places of employment, and (vi) were required to report in person to the superintendent of police as he directed. Payton, 184 F.3d at 625. The Court viewed this city ordinance as vesting "broad powers and responsibilities" in the defendant security guards, and concluded that "this ordinance delegates police powers otherwise exclusively reserved to the state, thus making those who act pursuant to it potentially liable under § 1983." Payton, 184 F.3d at 630.

In so ruling, the Court distinguished Payton from its earlier decision in Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905-06 (7th Cir.1996), which held that the private security guard in that case was not a state actor under the "public function" test. In Wade, the defendant security guard, Oscar Byles, was employed by a private security firm, T Force Security, which in turn had contracted with the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") to provide security in the lobbies of housing projects owned by CHA. CHA was a state governmental entity, and maintained its own police force which, while on CHA property, possessed all of the powers of city or state police officers. In contrast to the broad authority vested in this CHA police force, the powers and duties of the T Force security personnel were much more limited:

The T Force guards wore uniforms with patches identifying their employer. The guards were armed with handguns and were authorized by T Force to use deadly force only in self-defense. The primary responsibility of T Force guards was to control access to CHA buildings by monitoring the identification of people entering and leaving the buildings. Guests who did not show proper identification or sign in were not allowed to enter the buildings, and T Force guards would ask such people to leave. If a person refused to leave, the guards would call the police, and either wait for the police to remove the person or arrest the person for criminal trespass pending the arrival of the police. Other guard duties included aiding people in the lobby, signing criminal complaints, and appearing in court when needed.

When on duty, T Force guards were responsible only for maintaining security within the immediate lobby areas of CHA buildings. According to T Force policy, guards were not allowed to pursue individuals outside the lobby. Rather, guards were obligated to remain in the lobby area until properly relieved. Moreover, private security guards did not participate in "sweep"...