Smith v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.

Citation429 N.E.2d 700,384 Mass. 758
PartiesWilliam M. SMITH v. DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, et al. 1
Decision Date17 December 1981
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Harvey S. Shapiro, Brighton, for plaintiff.

Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., George J. Mahanna and Paul J. Molloy, Asst. Attys. Gen., for Division of Employment Security.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

In December, 1976, a review examiner of the Division of Employment Security issued a decision denying the appellant's request for unemployment benefits. The review examiner found that the appellant had been discharged for drinking alcoholic beverages during company time in violation of a work rule, and that the discharge was "attributable solely to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest within the meaning of (G.L. c. 151A) Section 25(e)(2)." A judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston affirmed that decision. On appeal, we reversed and remanded the proceeding to the Division of Employment Security for a finding whether the Smith discharge was, as he alleged, arbitrary and capricious in that other similarly situated employees had been given warnings rather than being discharged. Smith v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 376 Mass. 563, 382 N.E.2d 199 (1978).

On remand, before the review examiner, the parties offered further argument but made no request that the review examiner take additional evidence. Based upon the evidence admitted at the hearing held on November 29, 1976, the review examiner (after making subsidiary findings which will be discussed below) found that Smith was discharged for violating "a company rule of which (he) was aware; that the evidence does not establish that this was not a strictly enforced rule or that the employing unit acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner by discharging (Smith); (and) that the rule was reasonably applied"; the board of review agreed with the review examiner's findings and denied unemployment benefits to Smith. A judge of the Municipal Court of the Roxbury District affirmed the decision of the board of review. Smith has again appealed to this court. We uphold the judgment of the Municipal Court.

As we noted when we remanded this case to the Division of Employment Security, an employee's discharge for violation of a work rule does not necessarily bar that employee from eligibility for unemployment benefits. The statute requires the director to deny benefits where the claimant's discharge is "shown ... to be attributable solely to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest." G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2). The purpose of this subsection "is to deny benefits to a claimant who has brought about his own unemployment through intentional disregard of standards of behavior which his employer has a right to expect." Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 94, 97, 384 N.E.2d 642 (1979). Accord, Johnson v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 229, 230, 385 N.E.2d 975 (1979).

The critical issue in determining whether an employee's acts which resulted in his discharge were performed wilfully or intentionally is the employee's state of mind at the time he performed those acts. Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, supra. See Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 375 Mass. 434, 437, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978). The employee here has argued, in essence, that his violation of the work rule was not "in wilful disregard" of his employer's interest because the employer consistently failed to enforce the rule and hence had no real interest in its strict enforcement.

At the hearing on remand, Smith simply failed to persuade the hearing examiner that the employer had applied its work rule arbitrarily and capriciously. Smith presented, at the earlier hearing, evidence...

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10 cases
  • Cantres v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1985
    ...60 Wis.2d 591, 602, 211 N.W.2d 448 (1973). Our holding expressly limits the broad statement in Smith v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 384 Mass. 758, 761, 429 N.E.2d 700 (1981), that the claimant "bears the burden of persuasion on issues affecting his eligibility for unemployment ......
  • McKenzie v. Maine Employment Sec. Com'n
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1982
    ...on issues affecting eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits is on the claimant. Smith v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 384 Mass. 758, 429 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1981); Thomas v. Rutledge, 280 S.E.2d 123, 130 (W.Va.1981); Duenas-Rodriguez v. Industrial Commission, 606......
  • Torres v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 23, 1982
    ...mind at the time of his misconduct. Smith v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 376 Mass. 563, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2395, 2397, 429 N.E.2d 700, and cases cited. We have emphasized the necessity of findings to the proper exercise of our appellate function in these cases. Smith v. D......
  • Glasser v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1984
    ...the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. Smith v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 384 Mass. 758, 761, 429 N.E.2d 700 (1981). Sohler v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 785, 788 n. 1, 388 N.E.2d 299 (1979). I......
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