Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 15-0161 (ABJ)

• Decision Date: 15 December 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-0161 (ABJ)
• Parties: Gregory Smith, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

149 F.Supp.3d 128

Gregory Smith, Plaintiff,

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-0161 (ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed December 15, 2015

Brendan James Klaproth, Klaproth Law PLLC, David Akulian, Law Office of David H. Akulian, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Alicia Marie Cullen, Michael K. Addo, Office of Attorney General/DC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON

, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Gregory Smith has brought this action against the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Warden William J. Smith, and unknown employees of the Department of Corrections, alleging that defendants unlawfully detained plaintiff in the District of Columbia Jail from March 18, 2014 to April 10, 2014, after he had been ordered to be released. Compl. [Dkt. # 1-1]. He asserts Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

, as well as claims for false imprisonment and negligence. Compl. ¶¶ 27–43. Defendant Warden Smith has moved to dismiss the claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def. William J. Smith's Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 19] (“Def.'s Mot.”).¹ Because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support a plausible claim against the warden, individually or in his official capacity, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss defendant Smith from this case. The Court notes, though, that the District of Columbia is still a party to this matter, and plaintiff's claims against the District will proceed.

BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2014, plaintiff was arrested in the District of Columbia and held at the District of Columbia Jail. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 17–18. On March 18, 2014, a judge of the Superior Court ordered that plaintiff be released from custody. Id. ¶ 18. However, plaintiff was not freed until April 10, 2014, after a hearing in which the same Superior Court judge was compelled to order again that plaintiff be released. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly told the corrections officers at the jail that his release had been ordered by the Superior Court, and he demanded to be released, but these demands were ignored. Id. ¶ 20. One unidentified corrections officer allegedly told plaintiff, “[i]f you're here, they know you're here and you're supposed to be here.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he was imprisoned in a cell with “a dangerous prisoner who, upon information and belief, had been found guilty of possession of a loaded fire arm and possession of narcotics with an intent to distribute.” Compl. ¶ 22. He also states that he was terminated from his job as a result of the overdetention. Id. ¶ 24. The charges against plaintiff were dismissed on September 8, 2014. Id. ¶ 23.

Plaintiff initiated this action in Superior Court on November 14, 2014, and it was removed to this Court on February 2, 2015. Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1] ¶ 1. Plaintiff brings three counts against all defendants: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I); False Imprisonment (Count II), and Negligence (Count III). Compl. ¶¶ 27–43. On August 14, 2015, defendant Smith filed the pending motion to dismiss, Def's Mot.; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 19] (“Def.'s Mem.”), and plaintiff opposed the motion on August 31, 2015. Pl.'s Mem. of Opposing P. & A. to Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 20] (“Pl.'s Opp.”). On October 2, 2015, with leave of Court, see Min. Order (Oct. 2, 2015), defendant Smith filed a reply in support of his motion. Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Opp. [Dkt. # 22] (“Def.'s Reply”).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)

] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id., quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” id., quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

, the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff's favor, and the Court should grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. See id. ; see also

Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave

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Schmidt v. Chao , 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002), citing E

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v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C.Cir.1997).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against defendant Smith are duplicative of his claims against the District of Columbia.

Plaintiff sues defendant Smith in both his individual and official capacity. See Caption, Compl., at 1. Defendant Smith has moved to dismiss the official-capacity claims against him as duplicative of plaintiff's claims against the District of Columbia.

Def.'s Mem. at 3–4. In his opposition, plaintiff states that he “agrees with Defendant Smith that the official capacity suit against him is duplicative of the claim against the District of Columbia.” Pl.'s Opp. at 4 n.1. Thus, plaintiff has conceded this point, and his official-capacity claims against defendant Smith will be dismissed. See Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)

(“Official-capacity suits ... ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ”), quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; see also

Price v. District of Columbia , 545 F.Supp.2d 89, 93 (D.D.C.2008) (dismissing constitutional and tort claims against defendant warden in his official capacity as “duplicative of the claims lodged against the District of Columbia”).

II. Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against defendant Smith in his individual capacity.

Defendant Smith has also moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

to dismiss the individual-capacity claims against him, resting almost exclusively on the argument that “Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Smith was the Warden at the time of his alleged over-detention.” Def.'s Mem. at 4; see also Def.'s Reply at 2 (“Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that Defendant Smith was the Warden at the time of Plaintiff's alleged over-detention or otherwise plead facts to show that he bears personal responsibility for the claims raised against him.”). Plaintiff maintains that defendant Smith is improperly asking the Court to “look beyond the factual allegations contained in the Complaint” by accepting his representation that he was not the warden at the time plaintiff was detained. Pl.'s Opp. at 5.

Plaintiff is correct that it would be improper for the Court to treat defendant's representation as fact in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, since the Court is limited at this stage to assessing the sufficiency of the factual matter contained in the complaint. See

Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. But there is a distinction between the Court making a factual finding of whether defendant Smith was the warden in March and April of 2014, and the Court observing that such a factual allegation is absent from the complaint. Plaintiff does allege that defendant Smith “is” the warden at the D.C. Jail, and he claims that Smith “is” responsible for overseeing the corrections officers, establishing customs, policies, and practices, and supervising inmate releases. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 12. But he does not allege that defendant Smith “was” the warden during the relevant time period, and none of the other factual allegations relating to plaintiff's overdetention pertain specifically to actions taken by the defendant himself during the time period in question. This omission is fatal to plaintiff's individual-capacity claims against defendant Smith.

And in any event, even if the Court were to construe the complaint as alleging that defendant Smith was the responsible official at the time of plaintiff's alleged overdetention, plaintiff has still failed to state a plausible claim against him. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims will be granted.

A. Plaintiff's section 1983

claims against defendant Smith will be dismissed.

In Count I, plaintiff alleges that defendant Smith violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and deprived him of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by detaining him after he was ordered released.

Compl. ¶¶ 27–34. Because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against defendant Smith for any constitutional violation, Count I...