Smith v. District of Columbia

• Citation: 399 A.2d 213
• Decision Date: 21 February 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12119.,No. 12120.,12119.,12120.
• Parties: Sidney SMITH, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Appellees. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER et al., Appellants, v. Sidney SMITH, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

Page 213

399 A.2d 213

Sidney SMITH, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Appellees.

WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER et al., Appellants, v. Sidney SMITH, Appellee.

No. 12119.

No. 12120.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 7, 1978.

Decided February 21, 1979.

A. Palmer Ifill, Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 12119 and appellee in No. 12120.

Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom John R. Risher, Jr., Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., at the time the case was briefed and argued, and Richard W. Barton, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees District of Columbia, et al., in No. 12119.

Hal H. Thurston, with whom J. Joseph Barse, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for Washington Hospital Center, et al., appellees in No. 12119 and appellants in No. 12120.

Before GALLAGHER and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges, and MOULTRIE, Chief Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.^*

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge:

Sidney Smith sued the Washington Hospital Center (WHC) and three of its employees — Sergeant Joseph Brock, Nurse Nona Dickson and Nurse Doreen Dixon — for slander and for procuring his false arrest and false imprisonment. He also sued the District of Columbia and one of its employees — Officer James Trainor — for assault and battery and for false arrest and false imprisonment.¹ At trial the court granted the motion on behalf of the District of Columbia and Trainor for a directed verdict on the issue of assault and battery. The jury then returned the following verdicts and awards for plaintiff: (1) against Sgt. Brock for slander — $750; (2) against Nurse Dickson for slander — $750; (3) against WHC for slander (respondeat superior) — $750; and (4) against Brock, Dickson and WHC for procuring his false arrest and imprisonment — $4,500. The jury rendered verdicts in favor of the remaining defendants on all counts. Upon motion, however, the court then granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Brock on the slander count and to Brock, Dickson, and WHC on the false arrest and imprisonment counts² Consequently, final judgment for plaintiff was in the amount of $750 on the slander count against Nurse Dickson and WHC.³ Smith appeals the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the various defendants, as well as the directed verdict and jury verdict in favor of the District of Columbia and Trainor. WHC and Dickson cross-appeal from the court's denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the slander counts.⁴

We must review: (1) the rulings of the trial court on the motions for (a) the directed verdict in favor of D.C. and Trainor on the assault and battery count, and (b) judgment notwithstanding the verdict (and the alternative motions for a new trial) on various other counts; and determine (2) whether the jury verdict in favor of D.C. and Trainor on the false arrest and imprisonment counts should stand.⁵

Turning to the contested directed verdict in favor of the District of Columbia and Officer Trainor on the assault and battery count, it is axiomatic that we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party appealing its grant. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. James G. Davis Construction Corp., D.C.App., 350 A.2d 751, 752 (1976). If we find evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the appealing party, we must reverse the grant of the directed verdict. See Lee v. Fisco Enterprises, Inc., D.C.App., 233 A.2d 44, 45 (1967); Birchall v. Capital Transit Co., D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 624, 625 (1943).

All witnesses agree that, in making the arrest, a pushing and shoving match developed between the officer and appellant. There is no dispute that appellant initially offered resistance, though there is conflict on the degree of resistance to the arrest.

The officer was of course entitled to use reasonable force to effect and maintain the arrest. Wade v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 857, 862 (1973) (en banc). Our review of the record leads us to conclude the trial court did not err as a matter of law in directing the verdict for the District of Columbia and Officer Trainor on the assault and battery count.

On the remaining issues, the trial court issued a well-reasoned, comprehensive memorandum opinion (105 Wash.D.L.Rptr. 753, May 3, 1977) which we agree with and adopt. (See Appendix A.)⁶

Affirmed.

APPENDIX A

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 9310-75

Sidney Smith, plaintiff,

v.

District of Columbia, et al., defendants.

OPINION

This matter is before the Court upon defendants' motions for judgment non obstante veredicto and, alternatively, for a new trial.

Plaintiff Sidney Smith is now and was at the time of this incident an employee of the Washington Hospital Center, Inc. Defendants are Nona Dickson, Assistant Director of Nursing Services, Sgt. Joseph Brock, a security officer, both employees of the Washington Hospital Center, and the Hospital Center itself.

The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $750.00 against Nurse Dickson and Sgt. Brock upon plaintiff's claim that each of them had uttered slanderous statements concerning him. The jury awarded plaintiff a like amount against the defendant Hospital Center apparently concluding upon the principle of respondeat superior that either Nurse Dickson or Sgt. Brock was acting within the scope of his or her agency at the time one of the alleged slanderous statements was made.

Each of these defendants was also charged by plaintiff with false arrest and imprisonment. Upon this count too the jury's verdict was in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00.

Defendants' motions for judgment n. o. v. or for a new trial are aimed at all of the jury's verdicts.¹ Defendants' judgment n. o. v. motions assert the jury verdicts are erroneous as a matter of law.

In considering these motions this Court must, of course, be guided by the oft-quoted fundamentals which require that the evidence and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, District of Columbia v. Jones, D.C.App., 265 A.2d 594 (1970). A judgment n. o. v. is appropriate only where "the evidence is so one-sided as to leave no room for doubt . . .". McWilliams v. Shepard, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 335, 127 F.2d 18, 19 (1942); Howard v. Safeway Stores, Inc., D.C.App., 263 A.2d 656 (1970). If upon the evidence so considered reasonable men might differ the jury verdicts must stand. If, however, no reasonable man could conclude in favor of plaintiff, the motions for judgment n. o. v. must be granted. Such motions, then, raise only questions of law, Reading v. Faucon, D.C.Mun.App., 134 A.2d 376 (1957), and only if plaintiff has failed to make his case, may this Court grant the motions. District of Columbia v. Jones, supra at 595.

Defendants' alternative motions for a new trial urge that the jury verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence and excessive as a matter of law. "Although the cases are not consistent in usage, some cases using the phrase `clear weight' and others using the phrase `overwhelming weight' or `overwhelming evidence', it seems clear that the jury's verdict[s] must at least be against the great weight of the evidence before a new trial may be granted." Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1968). Otherwise, the role of the jury as the principal trier of fact is destroyed. Firemen's Fund Insurance Company v. Aalco Wrecking Company, Inc., 466 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1972).

The evidence adduced at trial, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff reveals the following occurrences.

I.

On September 23, 1975 plaintiff was employed as an orderly at the defendant Hospital Center located here in the District of Columbia. On that date, at about 4 A.M., he was summoned by nurse Doreen Dixon² to come to Ward 4D on the fourth floor of the hospital to pick up a patient's clothing and personal valuables. Plaintiff responded and received from nurse Dixon a paper bag containing the patient's clothes and other valuables. Attached to the bag was an inventory sheet listing all items contained in the bag. The slip listed the patient's property as including a purse containing seven one dollar bills and one dollar and sixty-six cents in change.

Plaintiff was directed by nurse Dixon to take the personal belongings of the patient to the receiving and storage room on the second floor. When plaintiff arrived at this destination he delivered the bag and its contents to defendant Nona Dickson, the Assistant Director of Nursing Services at the Hospital Center. He then returned to the orderly room.

Mrs. Dickson and a second nurse on duty with her promptly checked the contents of the bag against the inventory sheet. The money allegedly in the purse was no longer there. Nurse Dickson and her associate nurse promptly communicated with nurse Dixon on Ward 4D and were informed by nurse Dixon and another nurse named Ross that when plaintiff received the paper bag from them the money was in the purse.

As a consequence, plaintiff was called on the hospital's speaker system and directed to report to defendant nurse Dickson. When he arrived, according to his testimony, both nurses, Dickson and Dixon, accused him of stealing the patient's money. In his testimony, plaintiff acknowledged that he had had sole possession of the patient's property from the time he received it from nurse Dixon until he delivered it to nurse Dickson.

Defendant Sgt. Brock, one of the hospital's security officers was also on the scene. According to plaintiff, either Sgt. Brock or nurse Dickson told him to empty his pockets on to the counter.³ Mrs. Dickson told plaintiff to "go ahead and put the money back and nothing will happen"; that "no registered nurse took the money".

After this confrontation Sgt. Brock told plaintiff to return...