Smith v. Durden

• Decision Date: 05 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 32,594.,32,594.
• Parties: Walter F. SMITH, III, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Will DURDEN, Denise Durden, William A. DeVries, and Marion DeVries, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

276 P.3d 943

2012 -NMSC- 010

Walter F. SMITH, III, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Will DURDEN, Denise Durden, William A. DeVries, and Marion DeVries, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 32,594.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 5, 2012.

William G. Gilstrap, P.C., William G. Gilstrap, Daymon B. Ely, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Emily A. Franke, Jane A. Laflin, Butt, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees.

Hal Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for Amici New Mexico Press Association and New Mexico Broadcasters Association.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} Plaintiff Walter F. Smith, III, a former priest of St. Francis Episcopal Church in Rio Rancho, New Mexico, brought this defamation action against Will Durden and William DeVries, St. Francis Vestry members, and Denise Durden and Marion DeVries, members of the parish (Defendants). The issue before the Court is whether New Mexico requires a showing of injury to one's reputation to establish liability for defamation. We hold that it does, as injury to reputation is the very essence of the tort of defamation. Evidence of humiliation and mental anguish, without evidence of actual injury to reputation, is insufficient to establish a cause of action for defamation. We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff initiated this defamation action in 2006 after the publication of a packet of documents which, among other things, alluded to alleged sexual misconduct involving Plaintiff and minor parishioners. Defendant Will Durden had originally compiled the packet for a presentation before the Standing Committee of the Diocese of the Rio Grande by certain vestry members (lay leaders of the parish) who desired the removal of Plaintiff from his position. The packet included documentation related to financial problems at St. Francis, an alleged lack of leadership shown by Plaintiff, and personal attacks against Plaintiff. One of the documents was an anonymous letter accusing Plaintiff of several acts of pedophilia. After the presentation before the Standing Committee, and at the recommendation of the Episcopal Bishop of the Diocese of the Rio Grande, Plaintiff disclosed a summary of the allegations to the congregation during a Sunday service.

{3} At some point after Plaintiff's disclosure to the congregation, one or more of Defendants offered to make copies of the packet for inquiring parishioners. Plaintiff subsequently filed this defamation claim. Over a year after the filing of the complaint, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for defamation because he was unable to demonstrate that he had suffered any actual injury to his reputation as a result of the publication of the material by its distribution. Plaintiff responded that falsely accusing a religious leader of pedophilia is always defamatory and that personal humiliation and mental anguish, as defined in the damages instruction for defamation claims (UJI 13–1010 NMRA), qualified as the requisite actual injury. The district court granted Defendants' motion, finding that Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate actual injury to his reputation because he was never suspended from his position, nor did he suffer any “adverse employment consequences” or other related losses from distribution of the anonymous letter. The district court also found that Plaintiff improperly looked to UJI 13–1010 as defining the requisite actual injury, without first establishing the prima facie case pursuant to UJI 13–1002 NMRA (1991) (amended 2008), which requires a showing of actual injury to reputation. See UJI 13–1002(B)(8).

{4} Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that UJI 13–1002(B)(8), the subsection requiring a plaintiff to prove actual injury to reputation as one element of the prima facie case for defamation, is an inaccurate statement of law because evidence of mental anguish and humiliation is sufficient to establish actual injury for liability purposes. Smith v. Durden, 2010–NMCA–097, ¶¶ 11–12, 15, 148 N.M. 679, 241 P.3d 1119. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{5} We apply a de novo standard of review to the district court's granting of Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See City of Rio Rancho v. AMREP Sw. Inc., 2011–NMSC–037, ¶ 14, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 1–056 NMRA. We view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of a trial on the merits. See Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010–NMSC–035, ¶ 7, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280. The moving party “has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment by presenting such evidence as is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted.” City of Rio Rancho, 2011–NMSC–037, ¶ 14, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Once the moving party has made the prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such facts are those which, under the guiding substantive law, are “necessary to give rise to a claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

{6} In order to gain insight into the jurisprudential development of defamation, we first briefly discuss the historical underpinnings of the tort. Defamation actions in England “developed according to no particular aim or plan.” William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 737 (4th ed. 1971). Slander (oral communication) was historically proscribed in order to clear the slandered party's name and “protect the soul of the slanderer,” while libel (written communication) was later “created primarily as a means of protecting government from the power of the printing press.” David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 747, 774 (1984); see Afro–Am. Publ'g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 659 (D.C.Cir.1966) (en banc).

{7} In the early Middle Ages, “reputation was amply protected in England by the combined secular and spiritual authorities.” Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 Colum. L.Rev. 546, 546–47 (1903). Slander was at one time handled by manorial courts where the slanderer was required to vindicate the defamed party in front of those who heard the slanderous remarks. See Afro–Am. Publ'g Co., 366 F.2d at 659; Veeder, supra, at 549. Slander later fell within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts—which viewed defamation as a sin punishable by penance. Prosser, supra, at 737. The ecclesiastical courts redressed slander by bringing the slanderer before clergymen to confess and apologize to the person defamed. See Afro–Am. Publ'g Co., 366 F.2d at 659 n. 26.

{8} By the sixteenth century, common law courts began accepting slander actions, but only when temporal damages (damages related to business or money) could be shown, as without these damages slander remained the province of the church. Prosser, supra, at 754. In the seventeenth century, the concept of libel also emerged in common law courts as a way of suppressing and criminally punishing printed political attacks. Id. at 738; see Anderson, supra, at 774. Nonpolitical libel was also eventually recognized and made actionable in common law courts. Id. Unlike slander, libel was actionable without proving damages, which were presumed. See Afro–Am. Publ'g Co., 366 F.2d at 659; Prosser, supra, at 762.

{9} Following in these ancient footsteps, libel and slander are still commonly recognized and discussed as separate causes of action. Libel was established as a greater wrong, perhaps due to “the reverence of an illiterate nation for the printed word,” Prosser, supra, at 751–52, or perhaps due to a perception that slanderous remarks are “often spoken in heat, upon sudden provocations, and are fleeting and soon forgotten.” Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 46 P. 103, 104 (1896) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Libel, on the other hand, was perceived as “more deliberate and more malicious, more capable of circulation in distant places....” Id. These distinctions led not only to separate causes of action for libel and slander but also to the development of defamation as actionable per se or per quod. Defamation classified as “per se” historically has been actionable without proof of harm, as injury is presumed based on the nature of the communication. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 796 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). Defamation classified as “per quod,” on the other hand, is not defamatory on its face, and therefore extrinsic facts must be shown to prove its defamatory nature before recovery is allowed. Id.

{10} As this Opinion will discuss, actions for defamation have evolved in many ways due to both the tort's maturing constitutional infrastructure and reform aimed to eliminate the unnecessary distinctions and nuances which linger from eras past. At a fundamental level, defamation has shifted away from the obsolete considerations discussed above to a focus that “serve[s] a more legitimate purpose—compensating individuals for injury to reputation.” Anderson, supra, at 774. Courts have long recognized that “damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). Pursuant to its origins, however, defamation historically focused on the wrong rather than the injury, Anderson, supra, at 747, and injury to reputation was therefore typically a presumed harm, s...