Smith v. Engel
| Decision Date | 12 December 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 45883,45883 |
| Citation | 477 P.2d 937,206 Kan. 298 |
| Parties | Ronald L. SMITH, Appellant, v. Edna A. ENGEL, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Summary judgment may be entered as a matter of law for the moving party under K.S.A. 60-256(c) if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
2. In a damage action arising from personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident the trial court sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding there was no evidence in the record presenting a genuine issue of fact as to the defendant driver's negligence. On appeal the trial court is affirmed and it is held: A disputed question of fact which is immaterial to the issue of the defendant driver's negligence does not preclude summary judgment.
3. Under K.S.A. 8-570(a) no driver of a motor vehicle upon a highway outside of a business or residence district shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway.
C. Bruce Works, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Arthur E. Palmer, of Goodell, Casey, Briman, Rice & Cogswell, Topeka, argued the cause, and Ernest J. Rice, Topeka, was with him on the brief for appellee.
This is an appeal in a damage action arising from personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident wherein the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The trial court held there was no evidence in the record presenting a genuine issue of fact as to the defendant appellee's negligence.
Ronald L. Smith (plaintiff-appellant) was a passenger in an automobile driven by Monte P. Bowen when it collided with a vehicle driven by Edna A. Engel (defendant-appellee). Bowen was proceeding north in his automobile on U. S. Highway No. 75 south of Topeka, Kansas, on the 9th day of December, 1966, while Mrs. Engel was proceeding in the same direction ahead of the Bowen car. The accident occurred after 6 p.m. in an hour of darkness. Mrs. Engel had her headlights on, signalled with her blinker light for a left turn, and pulled her vehicle to a stop in the median strip on the highway. The Engel car had been stopped for twenty to thirty seconds waiting for oncoming traffic to clear before completing the left turn, when it was struck from the rear by the Bowen car.
Smith sued both drivers, Bowen and Engel, and after completing discovery both defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Both motions were sustained by the trial court, but Smith appeals to this court only from the summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Engel.
The appellant claims Mrs. Engel was negligent in not pulling clear off the roadway to turn left. He claims no other negligence on the part of Mrs. Engel.
Summary judgment may be entered as a matter of law for the moving party under K.S.A. 60-256(c) if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
In Secrist v. Turley, 196 Kan. 572, 412 P.2d 976, upon which the appellant relies, the trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment and this court reversed, saying:
'The purpose of the rule is to obviate delay where there is no real issue of fact. It should do much to eliminate nuisance litigation and save time and expense. However, a summary judgment should never be granted for the single purpose of saving the time and expense of a trial, or be used for the purpose of depriving litigants of a jury trial. The manifest purpose of the rule is to eliminate sham claims which might otherwise cause needless and time consuming litigation.
'In the final analysis a court should not determine the factual issues on a motion for summary judgment but should search the record for the purpose of determining whether a factual issue exists. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a material fact a motion for summary judgment will not lie. No matter how the explanation of the rule is phrased we always return to the language of the rule, there must be left 'no genuine issue of any material fact." (p. 575, 412 P.2d p. 979.)
What constitutes a 'genuine issue as to any material fact' appears to account for most of the voluminous opinions on the question.
It may be said an issue of fact is not genuine unless it has legal controlling force as to a controlling issue. A feigned or imaginary issue is not a genuine issue. A disputed question of fact which is immaterial to the issue does not preclude summary judgment. If the disputed fact, however resolved, could not affect the judgment, it does not present a genuine issue of a material fact. It has been said before summary judgment is granted the court must be convinced that the issue is not genuine or that there are only immaterial or imaginary factual issues. (See 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1231, et seq., p. 94; and 3 Vernon's Kansas Statutes Annotated, Code of Civil Procedure, § 60-256, p. 358.)
K.S.A. 8-570 pertains to the stopping, standing or parking of motor vehicles outside of business or residence districts and reads in part as follows:
'(a) Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway, * * *' (Emphasis added.)
In applying the foregoing law to the facts, the appellant argues there was a genuine issue as to a material fact as to whether Mrs. Engel had sufficient space to remove her vehicle from the traveled portion of the roadway, and whether the rear of her...
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Hiett v. Brier, 50515
...issue do not preclude summary judgment. Bowen, Administrator v. Lewis, 198 Kan. 605, Syl. P 1, 426 P.2d 238 (1967); Smith v. Engel,206 Kan. 298, 300, 477 P.2d 937 (1970); In re Estate of Messenger, 208 Kan. 763, 768, 494 P.2d 1107 There is no genuine issue as to the material facts. The fina......
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Force By and Through Force v. City of Lawrence, Kan.
...fact, however resolved, could not affect the judgment, it does not present a genuine issue of a material fact." Smith v. Engel, 206 Kan. 298, 299-300, 477 P.2d 937 (1970). The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to the benefit of all inferenc......
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Phillips v. Carson, 58561
...a street to construct a manhole, had failed to give proper warning or was guilty of any actionable negligence. Smith v. Engel, 206 Kan. 298, 477 P.2d 937 (1970), was a personal injury action arising out of an automobile collision. The defendant was properly making a left turn when her vehic......
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Rothwell v. Transmeier
...Prairie State Bank, 200 Kan. 263, 436 P.2d 402.) The most recent case defining 'a genuine issue as to any material fact' is Smith v. Engel, 206 Kan. 298, 477 P.2d 937. Here the appellant is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts under considera......