Smith v. Farmstand
| Decision Date | 14 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-cv-9147 |
| Parties | ROBERT SMITH, Plaintiff, v. ROSEBUD FARMSTAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants' motions to amend the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) [315] and for a new trial or reduction of damages through remittitur [316]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendants' motion to amend [315] and grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for a new trial or remittitur [316].1
For Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Claim 1), the Court reduces Plaintiff's compensatory damages to $50,000 and vacates any punitive damages award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). For Plaintiff's racial harassment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Claim 2), the Court remits Plaintiff's compensatory damages to $80,000 and his punitive damages award to $160,000. For Plaintiff's retaliation claim (Claim 3), the Court remits Plaintiff's compensatory damages to $60,000 and his punitive damages award to $120,000. For Plaintiff's Illinois Gender Violence Act claim (Claim 4), the Court remits the jury's damages award against Defendant Roque Mendoza to $1,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages and the award against Defendant Carlos Castaneda to $1,500 incompensatory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiff must file on the docket a statement indicating whether he accepts or rejects remittitur. If Plaintiff accepts remittitur, the parties' joint submission on attorney's fees under Local Rule 54.3 will be due seven days after Plaintiff has so advised the Court and opposing counsel. If Plaintiff does not accept remittitur within 14 days of this order, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for a new trial on damages only and will defer consideration on attorney's fees until after the new trial.
Defendant Rosebud Farmstand operates a grocery store on the south side of Chicago. Plaintiff Robert Smith worked as a butcher in Rosebud's meat department from 2003 through 2008. Plaintiff is African American, and many of Rosebud's other employees are Latino. Most of the workers in the grocery store are paid minimum wage. In 2011, Plaintiff sued Rosebud Farmstand, alleging that Rosebud employees sexually harassed and racially discriminated against him during his employment. He also alleged that Rosebud retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR"), and their retaliatory conduct forced him to quit his job. Plaintiff further alleged that two of Rosebud's employees, General Manager Carlos Castaneda and Assistant Manager Roque Mendoza, committed acts of gender violence against him.
Plaintiff filed a six-count complaint, asserting claims for sexual harassment, racial harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a violation of the Illinois Gender Violence Act ("IGVA"), and racial harassment and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981. [1.] In November 2012, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII racial harassment and constructive dischargeclaims, but otherwise denied the motion. [30.] In December 2014, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants Castaneda and Mendoza for Plaintiff's Section 1981 claims. [165] In November 2015, the Court granted Defendant Rosebud's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's IGVA claim. [224.] After running this gauntlet, Plaintiff's Title VII sexual harassment claim, Section 1981 racial harassment claim, Title VII retaliation claim, and Section 1981 retaliation claims survived to be pursued against Rosebud and his IGVA claim survived to be pursued against Castaneda and Mendoza.
Because Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages and equitable relief through his claims, the Court bifurcated the trial such that Phase I would be a jury trial covering liability on all claims and Phase II would be a bench trial covering equitable relief. In December 2015, the parties proceeded to trial. After seven days, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on all counts and awarded $2,407,500 in damages. [246.] The jury's verdict broke down as follows:
Compensatory Punitive Sexual Harassment (Title VII) $250,000.00 $500,000.00 Racial Harassment (Section 1981) $250,000.00 $500,000.00 Retaliation (Title VII & Section 1981) $250,000.00 $500,000.00 IGVA - Castaneda $50,000.00 $100,000.00 IGVA - Mendoza $2,500.00 $7,500.00 Subtotals $802,500.00 $1,605,000.00 Grand Total $2,407,500.00
Following the jury trial, the Court held a two-day bench trial on Plaintiff's requests for equitable relief. In September 2016, the Court denied Plaintiff's motions for judgment as a matter of law [237, 238, 242, 243], awarded Plaintiff $69,761.80 in back pay and $19,894.77 inprejudgment interest, and denied the remainder of Plaintiff's requests. [See 293; 297; 310; 311.] Defendants have moved to amend the Court's Phase II findings of fact and conclusions of law [315], and requested a new Phase I trial or remittitur of the jury's damages awards [316].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 52(b) permits a court to "amend its findings—or make additional findings—and * * * amend the judgment accordingly" upon a motion by a party. A Rule 52(b) motion is "intended to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly-discovered evidence." U.S. ex rel. Russo v. Attorney Gen. of Ill., 780 F.2d 712, 716 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986). The moving party "must raise questions of substance by seeking reconsideration of material findings of fact or conclusions of law to prevent manifest injustice or reflect newly discovered evidence." 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 2582 (2017). The "primary purpose" for such a motion is to "enable the appellate court to obtain a correct understanding of the factual issues determined by the trial court as a basis for the conclusions of law and the judgment entered thereon." Id. It is not to relitigate arguments lost, advance new theories, or present new evidence that could have been presented before. Id. "Trial courts do not grant motions to amend when the amendment would be futile." Id.
A motion for a new trial is governed by Rule 59(a), which directs that "[a] new trial is appropriate if the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial was in some way unfair to the moving party." Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir. 2014). When considering whether the jury's verdict goes against the manifest weight of the evidence, the Court analyzes the "general sense of the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial." Mejia v. Cook Cnty., 650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). But "[a] verdict will be set aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if 'no rational jury' could have rendered the verdict."Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2006)). "Jury verdicts deserve particular deference in cases with 'simple issues but highly disputed facts.'" Id. (quoting Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Before turning to the substance of Defendants' motion to amend the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law [315], the Court addresses Plaintiff's two threshold arguments that the Court should disregard Defendants' motion.
First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated the Court's "order" limiting "posttrial motions" to 25 pages and Defendants' briefs should be stricken. [322, at 1-2.] The Court entered no such order. The Court did grant Defendants' motion for leave to file a longer memorandum "in support of [their] motion for new trial and remittitur pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59" [303, at 1 (capitalization altered)]. [See 305.] That request did not speak to any motion other than a Rule 59 motion, and nothing in the Court's order purported to cap the total number of pages for all posttrial motions or preclude a separate Rule 52 submission. Defendants' Rule 52(b) motion is eight pages and did not require prior leave of the Court. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 7.1. Plaintiff's "motion to strike" [322, at 1] is denied.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' motion is untimely because it was filed more than 28 days from September 9, 2016. [322, at 2.] Plaintiff skips over the fact that the Court "vacated" its September 9 order and entered a "new final judgment order" to "incorporate[] both the matters tried to the Court and the matters tried to the jury [the prior] December (which were inadvertently omitted from the [September 9] final judgment order)." [297.] That order set the deadline to file any Rule 59 motions at October 14, 2016—28 days from the judgment. Id. Plaintiff essentially argues that the Court reset the deadline for Rule 59 motions, but not Rule 52motions. Both rules have the same "hard" deadlines. Coldwate v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., 587 F. App'x 315, 317 (7th Cir. 2014). Neither can be moved. It would make little sense for the 28-day clock to run against the vacated September 9 order for Rule 52(b) motions, but not for Rule 59 motions, and Plaintiff does not offer any basis in the Federal Rules that could support such a result. Defendants' Rule 52(b) motion—like their Rule 59 motion—is timely.
Defendants argue that the Court's Phase II opinion contained two "errors of law that should be corrected for the appellate court." [315, at 2.] Both legal "errors" relate to the Court's back pay decision. The Court held...
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