Smith v. Feneley
| Citation | 215 N.W. 353,240 Mich. 439 |
| Decision Date | 03 October 1927 |
| Docket Number | June Term.,No. 32,32 |
| Parties | SMITH v. FENELEY. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Mackinac County; Frank Shepherd, Judge.
Suit by Mamie Smith against George A. Feneley. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before the Entire Bench.A. L. Sayles, of Newberry, and Warner & Sullivan, of Sault Ste. Marie, for appellant.
Prentiss M. Brown, of St. Ignace, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Mackinac county, Mich., quieting the plaintiff's title to certain land in that county. The land involved consists of 47 acres in the township of Portage, Mackinac county, Mich. The plaintiff and her husband went into possession of this land under certain tax deeds which they acquired in 1901 and 1902. The necessary statutory notice was not served upon all of the owners. The husband, Walter Smith, died. The plaintiff and those in privity of title with her have remained in possession from 1907 until the time of this suit in 1926. In June, 1912, she obtained a quitclaim deed from Mr. Buell, one of the owners of the record title.
In 1907, Mr. Buell and wife gave a power of attorney to T. B. Meyers, authorizing him to sell and convey all land owned by him in Michigan. Under authority of this power of attorney, Meyers deeded the land in question to the defendant, George A. Feneley, on the 24th of September, 1925, for a consideration of $150. It is by virtue of this deed that the defendant claims title. On the hearing the circuit judge found that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession and entered a decree granting the relief asked for in her bill. The defendant has appealed.
If the plaintiff has any title, it was derived from adverse possession for the statutory period. It is undisputed that she was in occupancy of the land for more than 15 years prior to the commencement of this suit, but the defendant contends that her possession was not adverse during all of that period; that she was not in adverse possession prior to her deed from Mr. Buell in 1912; that, if she had been, its continuity was interrupted by thus dealing with the owner and accepting a deed from him in recognition of his superior title.
It is argued by the defendant that there was no adverse holding before the plaintiff got her deed from Buell in 1912, because she did not ‘believe in her title;’ and that, ‘if one occupies property with the idea in mind that somebody else has superior title thereto, such possession is not adverse and will not ripen into ownership, however long continued.’
Apparently counsel for the defendant has been misled by the language of some of the reported cases, and the sometimes inaccurate use of the terms ‘claim of title’ and ‘claim of rights.’ In Compau v. Lafferty, 43 Mich. 429, 5 N. W. 647, it is stated, quoting from the syllabus, that ‘an adverse holding cannot exist if the holder does not believe in his title.’ The syllabus does not, in this respect, correctly interpret the holding of the court, though some language is sued in the opinion which would seem to justify it. It is apparent, however, that the court did not intend to so hold, for, in connection with the statement and a part of it, it was said:
‘There is no doubt a possession may be maintained long enough by an undisturbed and defiant trespasser to bar an ejectment.’
The belief or knowledge of the adverse claimant is not as important as his intentions. The intention is the controlling consideration and it is not the knowledge or belief that another has a superior title, but the recognition of that title that destroys the adverse character of possession. Claim of title or claim of right is essential to adverse possession, but it is not necessary that an adverse claimant should believe in his title, or that he should have any title. He may have no shadow of title and be fully aware of that fact, but he must claim title. He may go into possession without any claim of title, but his possession does not become adverse until he asserts one; and he may assert it by openly exercising acts of ownership, with the intention of holding the property as his own to the exclusion of all others.
‘Claim of title is where one enters and occupies land, with the intent to hold it as his own, against the world, irrespective of any shadow or color or right or title.’ 2 C. J. § 324, p. 168.
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...1 RCL, p 706, Sec. 18.' " Walker v. Bowen, supra, 313 Mich. pp. 20-21, 52 N.W.2d 574, quoting in part from Smith v. Feneley, 240 Mich. 439, 441-442, 215 N.W. 353 (1927). We find direct support for our conclusion in a decision from the Arkansas Supreme Court which addressed the plaintiff's c......
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... ... Bitoni v. Co. (W. Va.) 120 S.E. 908; ... McAllister v. Hartzell (Ohio) 53 N.E. 715; ... Headerick v. Fritts (Tenn.) 24 S.W. 11; Smith v ... Feneley (Mich.) 215 N.W. 353; Roper v. Cedar Works ... (N. C.) 84 S.E. 523; Ripley v. Miller (Mich.) ... 130 N.W. 345; Meyers v. Hope ... ...
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