Smith v. Fletcher

• Decision Date: 08 May 1918
• Docket Number: 14381. [*]
• Citation: Smith v. Fletcher, 102 Wash. 218, 173 P. 19 (Wash. 1918)
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. FLETCHER.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

173 P. 19

102 Wash. 218

SMITH et al. v. FLETCHER. No. 14381. ^[*]

Supreme Court of Washington

May 8, 1918

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Hugo E Oswald, Judge.

Action by Lizzie Smith and Nelson M. Smith against George W Fletcher. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendant appealed. Defendant dying pending appeal, his executor was substituted. Affirmed.

E. H Belden and E. C. Hale, both of Spokane, for appellant.

Berkey & Cowan and Samuel R. Stern, all of Spokane, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

The respondents in May, 1916, took a conveyance of certain lands in the state of Idaho from George W. Fletcher, a resident of that state. A cash payment of $4,500 was made on the execution of the conveyance, and a promissory note for $10,000 taken for the remainder of the purchase price, secured by mortgage on the land purchased. The deed included certain water rights for the irrigation of the land, comprising a two-ninths interest in a reservoir and the full ownership of a ditch carrying the water therefrom. In August, 1916, the respondents began an action in the superior court of Spokane county, state of Washington, for the cancellation of their note and mortgage and the recovery of the portion of the purchase price paid on the land, basing their action on the alleged fraudulent representations of the vendor that the reservoir and ditch furnished sufficient water to irrigate the whole tract of 160 acres for the production of hay, grain, and fruit, and afforded a surplus of water for sale to adjacent landowners. Jurisdiction of the person of the appellant, Fletcher, was acquired, and the cause proceeded to trial before the court without a jury. Findings and conclusions were made, and judgment entered in favor of respondents, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted. Pending the appeal in this court the appellant, George W. Fletcher, died. Upon proper showing made, his executor was by this court ordered substituted as party appellant.

By demurrer to the complaint in the trial court, and by argument here, the appellant raises the objection that the superior court of Spokane county had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, for the reason that it seeks to subject lands located in another state to the judgment of a court of this state; that any judgment rendered here could not operate extraterritorially, and hence would be ineffective to grant the relief sought by the respondents. There is no claim that the court did not have jurisdiction of the person of the appellant, who was a nonresident of the state. The action brought was the equitable one of rescission on the ground of fraud, praying the cancellation of a note and mortgage given by respondents on the purchase price of land lying in another state and the refund of moneys paid; a deed being tendered, reconveying the land from the respondents to the appellant. It did not seek to subject land in a foreign jurisdiction to the judgment of a court of this state, but was merely designed to operate against an individual; in other words, a remedy in personam, and not one in rem, was sought.

It is a universal rule that the courts of one state cannot pass judgment on the title to land in another state. But, where the action is aimed at the personal relations of parties in connection with property beyond the jurisdiction, it is well recognized that courts may afford relief. This court, in the case of Rosenbaum v. Evans, 63 Wash. 506, 115 P. 1054, held that the courts of this state had jurisdiction to reform a deed to land in another state, and took occasion to review a number of decisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction incidentally affecting lands in another state. The opinion shows that such jurisdiction has been frequently exercised, where extraterritorial lands were involved, to compel the execution or cancellation of deeds, the specific performance of contracts relating to real property, the reformation of deeds, the enforcement of trusts in real property, the avoiding of a deed and ordering reconveyance of land, and the foreclosure of mortgages without the jurisdiction of the court. The principle upon which courts assert jurisdiction in such cases is stated in Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50 N. J. Law, 636, 15 A. 379, 1 L. R. A. 79, 7 Am. St. Rep. 802, in the following language:

'Ever since Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444, it has been established law that in cases of contract, trust, or fraud the equity courts of one state or country, having jurisdiction of the parties, are competent to entertain a suit for specific performance, or to establish a trust, or for a conveyance, although the contract, trust, or fraudulent title pertains to lands in another state or country. The principle upon which this jurisdiction rests is that chancery, acting in personam, and not in rem, holds the conscience of the parties bound without regard to the situs of the property. It is a jurisdiction which arises when a special equity can be shown which forms a ground for compelling a party to convey or release, or for restraining him from asserting a title or right in lands so situated, and is strictly limited to those cases in which the relief decreed can be obtained through the party's personal obedience. If it went beyond that, the assumption of jurisdiction would not only be presumptuous, but ineffectual. * * * The decree in a suit of this aspect imposes a mere personal obligation, enforceable by injunction, attachment, or like process, against the person, and cannot operate ex proprio vigore upon lands in another jurisdiction to create, transfer, or vest a title.'

See, also, Lindsley v. Union, etc., Min. Co., 26 Wash. 301, 66 P. 382.

The appellant cites the case of Olympia Min. & M. Co. v. Kerns, 64 Wash. 545, 117 P. 260, where this court sustained the conclusion of the trial court refusing to assume jurisdiction on the ground of comity over an action on a contract in which was involved the title to land in Idaho, and relegating the parties to an action within the jurisdiction of the situs of the property. While the courts of one state may well refuse to exercise jurisdiction in such cases on the ground of comity, their action in so doing amounts to no more than a matter of discretion. In the case cited it appeared, not only that the action involved the title to land in Idaho, which this court had no jurisdiction to determine, but also that the action did not permit of the rendition by the court of this state of an enforceable judgment in personam for damages, or any alternative relief. That case in no wise departs from the rule announced in the Rosenbaum Case, but is a tacit recognition of it.

The decree in the case before us was as follows:

'It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that plaintiffs recover of the defendant the sum of $4,500, with interest thereon from May 1, 1916, and that the defendant herein surrender to the plaintiffs that certain note now in his possession, dated May 1, 1916, in the sum of $10,000, signed by the plaintiffs, and that he deliver to said plaintiffs that certain mortgage given to secure said note, and which said mortgage is now of record in the office of the county recorder of Elmore county,

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