Smith v. Flinkfelt
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 13-01-GFVT |
| Parties | TERRI SMITH, Individually and as ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH H. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. DAN FLINKFELT, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants, Henry County Animal Control, Henry County Fiscal Court and Dan Flinkfelt, in his official and individual capacities. [R. 3.] They seek summary judgment dismissing the claims of the Plaintiff, Terri Smith, individually, and as Administratrix of her deceased husband, Kenneth Smith's, estate. [Id. at 1.] Smith objects to the dismissal of her claims and those of the estate. [R. 5.] For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.
Flinkfelt, a senior officer for Henry County Animal Control, searched Plaintiff's property investigating reports of animal cruelty. Based on his observations, Flinkfelt, with help from a group of Henry County employees and volunteers, removed approximately 200 animals from Plaintiffs' property. They were subsequently charged with over 200 counts of animal cruelty.1
The United States Marshal's Office arrested Mr. Smith in LaGrange, Kentucky. Mrs. Smith was arrested in Bullitt County, Kentucky. Prior to adjudication of Mr. Smith's charges, he committed suicide. Mrs. Smith executed a plea agreement allowing her to plead to one count of animal cruelty in the second degree. She was also required to forfeit all of her animals to the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
At the end of 2012, Mrs. Smith filed two separate actions in Henry County Circuit Court. She filed one suit on her own behalf, Smith v. Flinkfelt, et al., 13-CV-02-GFVT, and the other, Smith v. Flinkfelt, et al., 13-CV-01-GFVT, individually and as Administratrix of her husband's estate. In her Complaint, she requests damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the violation of her constitutional rights, the infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and the egregious conduct of the Defendants. [R. 1-2, 13-CV-02-GFVT.] In her role as Administratrix, and in her individual capacity, she seeks damages based on the deprivation of Mr. Smith's constitutional rights in violation of section 1983 and for defamation, loss of consortium, and the infliction of emotional distress. [R. 1-3.]
Because Defendants' instant motion for summary judgment comes in the early stages of this litigation, the Administratrix argues that it should be considered under the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. She contends that converting it to a motion for summary judgment without either party receiving sufficient notice from the Court and without an adequate period of discovery is improper. [R. 5, at 15.] The Court rejects this argument.
There is no prohibition against a party submitting a motion for summary judgment before any discovery has been conducted. Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providesthat "[u]nless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). In Short v. Oaks Correctional Facility, 129 Fed. App'x 278 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment prior to the taking of any discovery. There, the defendants filed motions for dismissal and summary judgment on sovereign and qualified immunity grounds. Id. at 279. The plaintiff objected to the motions arguing that they were premature and that she deserved an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to any rulings. Id. at 280. Notwithstanding her objections, she failed to submit additional motions or file an affidavit explaining her need for additional discovery. Id. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment without permitting an opportunity for discovery. Id. The court noted in its opinion that Rule 56(f) "provides a mechanism for a plaintiff and the courts to give effect to the well-established principle that 'the plaintiff must receive 'a full opportunity to conduct discovery' to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.' " Id. at 281 (quoting Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 714, 719 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted)). The court also emphasized the importance of avoiding cursory requests for more discovery. In doing so, it noted that "a plaintiff opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot simply argue that it needs more discovery-instead, the plaintiff must file a Rule 56(f) affidavit or a motion that indicates to the district court" what material evidence it seeks to uncover "by the additional discovery requested." Id. Based on the facts and review of prior case law, the court concluded the following:
we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the motions for summary judgment without permitting [plaintiff] to engage in discovery. The [plaintiff] did not file an affidavit or motion asking for additional discovery,[] and while her response did generally indicate her need for discovery and why discovery had not yet taken place, it did not "state how any discovery would have shed further light on the issue" of deliberate indifference. Ball, 385 F.3d at 721. In the face of the motions for summary judgment-which were supported by affidavits and other evidentiary documentation-the [plaintiff] was required to come forward with more than a general and conclusory statement regarding the need for discovery.
Id. at 282. The court also opined that the district court's decision to rule on the summary judgment motions without the taking of any discovery was "further justified . . . because the motions raised the threshold issue of qualified immunity." Id. at 283.
The circumstances encountered here are identical to those present in Short. The motion for summary judgment was filed prior to the taking of any discovery; the Defendants have raised sovereign and qualified official immunity as threshold questions; and the Administratrix has failed to raise anything more than a cursory request for discovery. [R. 3; R. 5.] Based on that court's rulings, review of the instant motion under the summary judgment standard is proper. After all, "questions of qualified immunity should be resolved 'at the earliest possible stage in litigation' or else the 'the driving force' behind immunity - avoiding unwarranted discovery and other litigation costs - will be defeated." Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). "A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, andthus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows 'that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Olinger v. Corp. of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated otherwise, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its burden by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate there is a genuine issue. Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover, Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (internal citations omitted).
Finally, the trial court is under no duty to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact," and "the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).
Defendants identify three causes of action in Plaintiff's Complaint. The first cause of action alleges that the Defendants failed to "hire, properly train, and supervise," and "implement appropriate policies and procedures to prevent unnecessary inflammatory statements and incorrect statements [from] being issued to the media," causing Mr. Smith to suffer severe emotional distress resulting in his untimely death. [R. 1-3, at 8.] The second cause of action is asserted by the Administratrix in her individual capacity and she alleges claims for loss of consortium and "mental and emotional suffering" resulting from the Defendants' conduct. [Id. at 9.] In the third cause of action, the Administratrix, in her individual capacity, and on...
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