Smith v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 24 October 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1:93CV0143.
• Citation: 908 F. Supp. 590
• Parties: Sandra A. SMITH, individually and as the natural mother and legal custodian of Marc W. Brown, a minor child deceased, Cory W. Brock, a minor child deceased, and Benjamin R. Brock, a minor child deceased, and as legal guardian and natural mother of Jeramie D. Watkins, a minor child; Patti S. Gasper and Kenneth Gasper, individually and as the natural parents and legal custodians of Nick J. Gasper, a minor child, deceased, and as legal custodians and natural parents of Luke D. Gasper, minor child, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

908 F. Supp. 590

Sandra A. SMITH, individually and as the natural mother and legal custodian of Marc W. Brown, a minor child deceased, Cory W. Brock, a minor child deceased, and Benjamin R. Brock, a minor child deceased, and as legal guardian and natural mother of Jeramie D. Watkins, a minor child; Patti S. Gasper and Kenneth Gasper, individually and as the natural parents and legal custodians of Nick J. Gasper, a minor child, deceased, and as legal custodians and natural parents of Luke D. Gasper, minor child, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. 1:93CV0143.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

October 24, 1995.

Sherrill W. Colvin, Cynthia Rockwell, John O. Feighner, Haller and Colvin, Fort Wayne, IN, Daniel J. Sigler, Zwick and Sigler, Decatur, IN, for Sandra A. Smith.

W. Scott Montross, Townsend Hovde and Montross, Indianapolis, IN, for Patti S. Gasper, Kenneth Gasper.

Mark A. Garvin, Richard E. Steinbronn, Barnes and Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, Kathleen M. Anderson, Barnes and Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, Donald H. Dawson, Jr., Kathleen A. Clark, Plunkett and Cooney, Detroit, MI, for Ford Motor Company.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

On September 7, 1995, this Court entered an Order which, inter alia, denied defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Summary Judgment.¹ Taking issue with that decision, Ford filed "Defendant's Motion For Certification Of Interlocutory Decision Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) Or, In The Alternative, To Reconsider Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And/Or To Clarify The Court's Decision of September 8, 1995" on September 14, 1995. Plaintiffs responded to that motion on September 19, 1995 to which defendant replied on September 28, 1995. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Decision will be denied. The motion to Reconsider Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will likewise be denied. To the extent that defendant is of the view that this Court's prior ruling on its motion for summary judgment was either obtuse or cryptic, this Memorandum of Decision and Order will serve to clarify that earlier decision.

Discussion

For present purposes, the facts underlying this litigation may be summarized briefly. These facts will be expanded upon later as necessary.

On March 20, 1993, a 1985 Ford F-150 XLT caught fire the result of which proved horrific: four children were burned to death. Immediately prior to the fire, plaintiff Patti Gasper was driving the extended cab pickup truck along Interstate 69. Along with Gasper, the cab was occupied by plaintiff Sandy Smith and teenagers Jeramie Watkins and Luke Gasper. In the bed of the vehicle (which was covered by an after-market camper shell) were Smith's three youngest, Ben, Cory and Marc, and Gasper's son Nick.

Around mile marker 32 in Delaware County, Indiana, Gasper's attention was caught by a passing motorist. Looking back, Gasper saw flames and pulled to the median. As Gasper and Smith exited the cab, the vehicle erupted, killing the four children who were in the bed of the truck.

As a result of the foregoing events, plaintiffs filed this products liability suit against Ford Motor Company. After thorough discovery, Ford moved for summary judgment being of the view that plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently establish that there was a defect in the F-150 XLT attributable to Ford so as to present the question to the jury. This Court disagreed and denied the motion leading to the present motion to reconsider or alternatively for leave to take an interlocutory appeal.

Ford's motions are interrelated and advance three separate arguments. First, Ford argues that this Court's Order erroneously places upon Ford the burden of proving that the admitted possible causes of the fire not attributable to Ford are likely or reasonably possible. Second, Ford claims that after concluding that the affidavit of Franklin did not establish Franklin's expertise in the area of automotive design of fuel systems, the court erred by accepting opinions from Franklin that clearly require such expertise. Third, and finally, Ford asserts that in admitting the Ford documents offered by plaintiffs, the court erroneously equated authentication with admissibility. Each of those arguments will be considered in turn.²

I. Motion To Reconsider

A. This Court's Order Did Not Improperly Place on Ford The Burden of Disproving Plaintiffs' Product Liability Claim Nor Did This Court Ignore Controlling Law

At the core of Ford's motions is its contention that this Court "erroneously placed upon Ford the burden of proving that the admitted possible causes of the fire not attributable to Ford are likely or reasonably probable." (Def.Br. p. 3). This Court disagrees with that argument.

In the September 8, 1995 decision, this Court thoroughly overviewed the standards governing a motion for summary judgment writing, in part:

In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 at 249-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505 at 2511 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).... Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.... To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 at 1356 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. If doubts remain, however, as to the existence of a material fact, then those doubts should be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and summary judgment denied. Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989).

(Rec. 105, pp. 9-10). Since this is a diversity action, this Court then turned to Indiana substantive law for guidance in determining whether plaintiffs had forwarded sufficient evidence of a possible defect in the Ford F-150 to warrant submission of the case to a jury. Further, this Court turned for guidance to cases from outside this jurisdiction which had similar factual patterns where, as here, the product in question was virtually destroyed. In doing so, however, this Court did not impose upon Ford the burden of proving that the admitted possible causes of the fire not attributable to Ford are likely or reasonably probable.

As the parties to this litigation recognize, and this Court pointed out in the September 8, 1995 decision, "the Gasper truck was substantially damaged by the fire; the entire fuel system was destroyed." (Rec. 105, p. 14). Because of that plaintiffs were forced to rely on circumstantial evidence to prove their case. Certainly proof of a defect via circumstantial evidence is allowable under Indiana law.

In SCM Corp. v. Letterer, 448 N.E.2d 686 (Ind.App.1983), testimony linked a Proctor-Silex toaster-oven manufactured by SCM with a fire that substantially destroyed the Letterer's home. At trial, an engineer testified that his examination of the debris in the house and the burn patterns revealed that the fire originated in the kitchen counter next to the refrigerator where the toaster-oven had been located. That testimony contradicted a fire department witness who testified that the fire originated behind the stove.

On appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals, SCM argued that judgment on the evidence should have been granted because there was no evidence in the record to show that the original toaster-oven³ was defective and the engineer could not testify to a specific malfunction in the toaster-oven. While testifying that he could discover no one specific cause for the fire, "he did not testify there was no defect." Id. at 691. Part-and-parcel of the problem the engineer encountered in determining the precise cause of the defect was that the toaster-oven was burned in the fire.

Recognizing products can be destroyed in a products liability case, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted "direct evidence is not required if there is evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn as to a defect proximately causing the injury." 448 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ind.App.1983) (quoting Senco Products, Inc. v. Riley, 434 N.E.2d 561, 568, n. 11 (Ind.App.1982)). The court further wrote:

The courts would obviously prefer, even in a strict liability case, to have proof of a specific defect causing the harm. But this is not always possible, especially in cases where the product has been destroyed due to its malfunction.

Most often the failure to produce the product will have a bearing only on the reliability of the circumstantial evidence of causation. If there is sufficient other evidence that harm was caused by some unspecified defect and no other cause likely, the plaintiff ordinarily has made a submissible cause.

SCM, 448 N.E.2d at 691 (quoting 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 11.013A, 217) (emphasis added).

The notion that a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove a defect in an Indiana products liability case was recently reaffirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir.1995). There the Court wrote: "we find that under the Indiana...