Smith v. Frac Tech Serv.
| Decision Date | 11 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:09CV00679 JLH,4:09CV00679 JLH |
| Parties | DAVID SMITH, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. FRAC TECH SERVICES, LLC DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
This is a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action with fifty-six plaintiffs and nearly as many pending motions. With apologies to the parties for allowing some of the motions to linger too long, the Court, in this Opinion and Order, will decide all of them.
Frac Tech Services, LLC, a Texas limited liability corporation, 1 engages in oil and gas well stimulation using hydraulic fracturing. It operates in at least ten districts in various locations in the United States. The plaintiffs are current or former employees of Frac Tech. All of them were paid a salary rather than an hourly wage. They allege that their hours fluctuated from week to week and ranged from 75 hours per week to 120 hours per week. None of them was paid overtime. All of them allege that Frac Tech engaged in a common practice, policy, or plan of refusing to compensate all hours worked and refusing to pay overtime.2 Frac Tech contends that all of the plaintiffs are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA, under one or more of the exemptions providedin section 213 of Title 29 of the United States Code. The plaintiffs contend that Frac Tech misclassified them as exempt employees. The parties agree that Frac Tech's liability under the FLSA turns on whether the plaintiffs are exempt under one or more of the exemptions contained in section 213.
Initially, David Smith and Adam Sheedy, who were employed by Frac Tech as service supervisors, brought this action "on behalf of [themselves] and on behalf of all other Frac Tech employees, whether past, present or future, who are classified as salaried employees but in reality are or will be non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Document #1, Compl. ¶ 1. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint adding an additional eighteen named plaintiffs, including twelve additional service supervisors, three field coordinators, and three field engineers. A third amended complaint named more service supervisors, field coordinators, and field engineers as named plaintiffs. Shortly after the third amended complaint was filed, the Court granted initial certification to the class of service supervisors, pursuant to section 216(b) of Title 20 of the United States Code, allowing the named plaintiffs to provide notice and the opportunity to opt into the action to other similarly situated service supervisors. Smith v. Frac Tech Servs., Ltd., No. 4:09CV00679, 2009 WL 4251017, at *7-8 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 24, 2009). Next, a fourth amended complaint was filed adding a large number of named plaintiffs including a safety coordinator; health, safety and environment manager; facility manager; and electronics manager. Thereafter, the Court granted initial certification to the class of field engineers. Smith v. Frac Tech Servs., Ltd., No. 4:09CV00679, 2010 WL 743296, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 26, 2010). Some monthslater, the Court granted permission for the plaintiffs to file a fifth amended complaint.3 The fifth amended complaint added a number of named plaintiffs but no new categories of employee positions.
Once discovery closed, both sides filed a slew of motions. Some of the motions were uncontested and reduced the number of plaintiffs.4 Fifty-six plaintiffs are still standing, all of whom are named as plaintiffs in the fifth amended complaint. The class of service supervisors has thirty-nine members. There are fourteen members in the class of field engineers. Nine plaintiffs have individual claims as field coordinators.5
Frac Tech moves the Court to decertify the service supervisor class and sever the resulting individual actions. In the alternative, Frac Tech moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the class of service supervisors is exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. The plaintiffs also move for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the class of service supervisors is exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA.
Frac Tech also moves to decertify the field engineer class and sever the resulting individual actions. The plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment as to the field engineers.
Frac Tech has moved for partial summary judgment as to whether David Dunn and Chris Giles as field coordinators are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. The plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment as to whether Patrick Berry, Jeff Davis, Chris Giles, Ken Martineau, and Jeffery Martinez as field coordinators are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA.
Frac Tech moves for partial summary judgment asking the Court to rule as a matter of law that the fluctuating work week method of calculating damages is to be used to determine the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed in the event Frac Tech is found liable to any of the plaintiffs under sections 203 and 207 of the FLSA. The plaintiffs have also filed a motion in limine and a motion to compel. The defendants have filed a motion to strike certain exhibits.
For the reasons explained below, Frac Tech's motion to decertify the class of service supervisors will be granted. As a result, both Frac Tech's and the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment as to the service supervisors will be denied as moot. Frac Tech's motion to decertify the class of field engineers will be denied. The plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to the field engineers will be granted on the issue of whether field engineers are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA and denied on the issue of whether Frac Tech's violation of the FLSA was willful. Frac Tech's motion for partial summary judgment as to whether David Dunn as field coordinator is exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA will be denied. Frac Tech's motion for partial summary judgment as to whether Chris Giles as field coordinator is exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA will be granted. The plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to whether Patrick Berry, Jeff Davis, Ken Martineau, and Jeffery Martinez as fieldcoordinators are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA will be denied as to the executive exemption but granted as to all other exemptions.
Frac Tech's motion for partial summary judgment regarding the application of the fluctuating work week method will be granted. Frac Tech's motion to sever will be denied pending a Rule 16 conference to discuss case management. The plaintiffs' motion in limine will be granted in part and denied in part. Finally, the plaintiffs' motion to compel will be denied as moot.
The FLSA authorizes similarly situated employees to proceed collectively to recover damages for violations of the FLSA's overtime and recordkeeping provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). "These collective actions are intended to serve the interests of judicial economy and to aid in the vindication of plaintiffs' rights." In re Pilgrim's Pride FLSA Litig., No. 1:07CV01832, 2008 WL 4877239, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 13, 2008) (citing Hofmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 110 S. Ct. 482, 107 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1989)).
As explained in the Court's prior opinion certifying the class of service supervisors, most district courts in the Eighth Circuit use a two-step process for certifying a class to proceed as a collective action. Frac Tech, 2009 WL 4251017, at *1. Adopting this approach, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motions for collective actions at the notice stage and authorized notice to potential class members of the opportunity to "opt-in" to the action. Id. at 7-8; Frac Tech, 2010 WL 743296, at *4. Now that discovery is complete, Frac Tech has moved for decertification, thereby triggering the second stage of the certification process. See Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 4:08CV00342 JLH, 2009 WL 5066759, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2009) (). "Tomaintain an opt-in class action[, the plaintiffs] bear the burden to show that they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions." Id.; see also Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996).
At the notice stage, this burden was lenient. See Frac Tech, 2009 WL 4251017, at *4 (citing Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (W.D. Ark. 2003)). However, at the second stage, the court applies a stricter standard and must make a factual determination regarding whether the putative class members are similarly situated. Ford v. Townsends of Ark., Inc., No. 4:08CV00509, 2010 WL 1433455, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 9, 2010) (). "Courts will consider three factors at this second stage: (1) the employment and factual settings of the plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to the defendants; and (3) considerations of fairness, procedure, and manageability." Id. (quoting Helmert, 2009 WL 5066759, at *3). Of course, to "be similarly situated,... class members need not be identically situated." Kautsch v. Premier Commc'ns, 504 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 (W.D. Mo. 2007).
A court should enter summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Cheshewalla v. Rand & Son...
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