Smith v. FW Morse & Co., Civ. No. 90-361-M.
| Decision Date | 24 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 90-361-M. |
| Citation | 901 F. Supp. 40 |
| Parties | Kathy SMITH, Plaintiff, v. F.W. MORSE & CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Raymond P. Blanchard, Taylor, Keane, Blanchard, Lyons & Watson, Portsmouth, NH, for defendant.
Debra Weiss Ford, Ford, Ford & Weaver, Portsmouth, NH, for plaintiff.
This matter was tried before the court. Plaintiff, Kathy Smith, brought breach of contract and sexual discrimination (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)) claims against her employer, F.W. Morse & Co. The court dismissed plaintiff's breach of contract claim but tried her discrimination claim. Plaintiff alleges that F.W. Morse & Co. ("F.W. Morse") discriminated against her based on pregnancy and an expressed intent to have additional children in the future.
On December 23, 1988, F.W. Morse purchased Damar Plastic and Metal Fabrications, Inc. ("Damar"). As a "contract manufacturer," Damar built custom components for a variety of industries, including telephones, computers, and medical instruments.
Plaintiff's brother started Damar, and she had been employed there in various capacities since 1975. At the time of defendant's acquisition, plaintiff served as Damar's scheduler. Her duties included tracking and expediting customer orders. Soon after the acquisition plaintiff approached Christopher Bond ("Bond"), F.W. Morse's president, and informed him that she was pregnant and would be requesting maternity leave. Bond assured plaintiff that she would be given maternity leave and he assured her that neither pregnancy nor maternity leave would cause her to lose her job, and that she was considered a valued employee performing a valuable function.
As the new owner, F.W. Morse naturally conducted its own general assessment of Damar's operations and concluded that it Damar was burdened with a highly inefficient management structure. Led by Maryann Guimond ("Guimond"), who was brought in as the new general manager, F.W. Morse almost immediately embarked upon a complete overhaul of Damar's management structure. Within a month Guimond eliminated the positions of production and shipping managers, and promoted plaintiff to a newly created position of "Materials Manager," to fill the void created by the two managerial eliminations. As the new materials manager plaintiff retained her scheduling duties, and took on additional responsibilities for production/inventory control, purchasing, shipping, and receiving. Plaintiff was awarded pay raises of 13.3% in January and 11.11% in March, which increased her weekly salary from $381.60 per week to $480.77 per week by March of 1989.
Plaintiff met with Guimond in mid-March, before going on maternity leave, at which time Guimond told her that she would be promoted again upon her return, and that either Ron Paradise or Marc Shevenell, mechanical and sheet metal experts respectively, would be let go. Guimond also said that the Engineering Manager, Gary Bickford, would likely be demoted. Guimond also asked plaintiff to assume some of the Engineering Manager's duties upon her return.
On April 7, 1989, plaintiff began her maternity leave. She gave birth approximately two weeks later. Plaintiff originally intended to resume work on Monday, May 22, 1989, however, on May 1, 1989, she visited the plant and asked Guimond if she could return one week earlier than planned. Guimond approved the earlier return date. During the course of that conversation, Guimond asked plaintiff whether she planned to have additional children. Plaintiff responded that she did. Guimond did not indicate why she asked the question and she registered no outward sign of pleasure or displeasure with plaintiff's response.
The following day, Guimond approached plaintiff's co-worker (and sister), Karen Vendasi ("Vendasi"). Guimond also asked Vendasi about plaintiff's plans to have additional children. Vendasi was uncomfortable with the question and soon thereafter telephoned plaintiff to let her know that Guimond had inquired about her plans for future children. Vendasi also told plaintiff of a rumor circulating among the employees that plaintiff was not returning to work because she wanted to stay at home with her children.
Plaintiff immediately called Guimond, demanding to know the source of the rumor and whether her job was in jeopardy. Guimond assured plaintiff that her job was secure and that she was unaware of any such rumor. On May 4, 1989, plaintiff again saw Guimond and received similar assurances.
One week later, on May 11, 1989, Guimond telephoned to tell plaintiff that her job was going to be eliminated in a further reorganization. Guimond asked plaintiff if she wanted people to be told that she had unilaterally decided to stay home with her infant child, rather than that she had been terminated. Plaintiff refused to allow Guimond to tell the company's customers the "story" that she decided to stay home. However, soon thereafter Elaine Nadeau ("Nadeau"), one of defendant's employees, did tell some customers that plaintiff had chosen to remain at home with her child. Guimond asserted and the court finds that Nadeau's comments were not authorized; that Nadeau merely assumed that was the case; and that Nadeau received a disciplinary warning as a result of her conduct.
The decision to eliminate plaintiff's job, and terminate her employment was entirely Guimond's; she had the authority to hire and fire without Bond's approval.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, states in pertinent part:
The 1978 enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended the definitional section of Title VII, providing in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
An employee plaintiff is not required to "identify the precise causal role played by the legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she challenges." Fields v. Clark University, 966 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1992); quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1785-86, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). Instead "a plaintiff can establish a violation of Title VII under a `mixed motives' theory by showing that gender discrimination played a role in the challenged employment decision." Tolefree v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 980 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1992).
Upon proving gender played a motivating role in an employer's decision, "the employer may avoid liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258, 109 S.Ct. at 1795. At the same time though "an employer may not ... prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision." Id. at 252, 109 S.Ct. at 1791.
Job elimination is a legitimate reason for an employer to terminate an employee. Employees are legitimately terminated where "`business considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more positions within the company.'" LeBlanc v. Great American Insurance Co., 6 F.3d 836, 846 (1st Cir.1993); (quoting) Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.1990). Employees, however, are not legitimately "`eliminated as part of a work force reduction when ... replaced after ... discharge.'" Id. While job elimination followed by replacement hirings is impermissible, employers may redistribute the terminated employee's duties within the company. See Id. ()
Under the Price Waterhouse analysis, the fact finder must first decide whether plaintiff has proven that gender discrimination was a factor in defendant's decision. See Id. If so, the burden then falls upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff would have been terminated without regard to gender considerations.
The evidence establishes that the downsizing of Damar's "top heavy" management structure began immediately upon its acquisition by F.W. Morse. Only four days after F.W. Morse took over it eliminated the position of Control Manager. One month later the Shipping Manager's position was...
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Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 95-1556
...been flattened by the downsizing steamroller. The district court agreed and entered judgment accordingly. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 901 F.Supp. 40, 45 (D.N.H.1995) (Smith II ). This appeal II. THE TITLE VII CLAIM The crown jewel of the appellant's asseverational array is her contention......