Smith v. Gen. Motors
| Decision Date | 03 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-562-MTS |
| Parties | DARIUS SMITH, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Doc. [51], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on Plaintiff's four-count Petition, Doc. [5], asserting claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion.
Before addressing the several procedural and substantive issues raised in this Motion, the Court notes Plaintiff's failure to litigate. Plaintiff failed to “set forth specific facts” or any evidence at all in opposition to summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Instead throughout his Opposition, Plaintiff relied exclusively on unsupported factual allegations in support of his claims. See, e.g., Doc. [59] at 11, 14, 15 () (emphasis added). Plaintiff “may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations” but must, on a motion for summary judgment, “substantiate” his allegations with “sufficient probative evidence” that would permit a finding in his favor. Reed v. City of St. Charles 561 F.3d 788, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff's Opposition provides the Court with a handful of broad-sweeping legal propositions[1]from which he summarily concludes his claims are sufficiently actionable under the MHRA. “Evidence, not contentions, avoids summary judgment.” Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., 447 F.3d 569, 578 (8th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence upon which this Court can rely to justify denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Moreover, both in his Opposition, Doc. [59], and so-called “fact” section, Doc. [57], Plaintiff did not incorporate facts from or citations to the evidentiary record. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c), (e) (requiring facts be supported by evidentiary record); L.R. 4.01(E) (same). Sometimes, Plaintiff even argued completely new (and unsupported) facts that were never raised in his charge of discrimination, prior pleadings, discovery, or deposition. And more egregiously, Plaintiff repeatedly relied on facts he flatly denied in his own sworn deposition testimony.
Plaintiff also failed to controvert Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this District. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1); L.R. 4.01(E); see Doc. [57]. In fact, Plaintiff completely failed to respond to 100 of Defendant's 140 factual assertions.[2]Accordingly, as both the Federal and Local Rules provide, the Court deems Defendant's facts as admitted.[3]Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly . . . address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”); L.R. 4.01(E) (); see also Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 881 (8th Cir. 2014) (); Benford v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 4:19-cv-550-MTS, 2021 WL 3033346, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 19, 2021) (), aff'd, 21-2717, 2022 WL 97108 (8th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022); Jenkins v. N. Cnty. Gen. Surgery, 4:20-cv-01415-SRC, 2022 WL 3107231, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 4, 2022) (). The Court will thus set out the undisputed and relevant factual background as supplied by Defendant in its Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material Facts.
This case arises from Plaintiff Darius Smith's employment with Defendant General Motors (“Defendant or “GM”) and his allegations of unlawful discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment based on Plaintiff's race, as well as retaliatory conduct by GM employees. Plaintiff is an African American who currently works at GM as a material handler in a GM assembly plant. In his position at GM, Plaintiff drives a forklift, works on the dock, and unloads trucks carrying parts being delivered to the plant.
Since his employment began in 2015, Plaintiff has complained on numerous occasions about workplace conduct he believed to be discriminatory and/or harassing. Plaintiff explained the first time he experienced any form of harassment at GM was on May 15, 2017, when Plaintiff asked Laura, another hourly union co-worker, for a box cutter, and Laura allegedly said that she would ask her friend to fire Plaintiff if he asked her again for a box cutter. Doc. [52] ¶¶ 39-44. Later, in 2018,[4] Plaintiff described two separate incidents of harassment that involved his Group Leader, Tracy Cook (“Tracy”), throwing a safety vest at him and later, where Tracy “gave him the middle finger.” Id. ¶¶ 45-68. Plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination and harassment also include more generic allegations about times he was asked to perform job-related tasks that he felt were “unfair.”[5]See, e.g., id. ¶ 88.
Plaintiff's retaliation claim is based on his reporting of a swastika.[6]Doc. [5] ¶ 42 (). Plaintiff explained that a co-worker pointed out a swastika scratched in the paint of one of the facility doors. Doc. [52] ¶ 70. Plaintiff took a picture of the swastika and reported it to his supervisor, Gerald Thornhill (“Thornhill”). Id. ¶ 71. Plaintiff did not believe the swastika was directed to him in any way, but he knew “it was something bad and it wasn't supposed to have been on the door inside the plant.” Id. ¶¶ 73-74 (quoting Doc. [52-20] at 125-26 (125:16-126:7)). Plaintiff alleged his various supervisors, principally Thornhill and Dan Bold (“Bold”), retaliated against him for “snitching” when he reported the swastika. See Doc. [52] ¶¶ 69, 75, 99. The alleged retaliatory acts included an increased workload, verbal warnings, excessive monitoring, cussing, and public admonishing. See, e.g., id. ¶ 78 (Thornhill asked Plaintiff to haul empty containers alone on one occasion following reporting of swastika);[7] id. ¶ 104 (); id. ¶ 99 (); id. ¶¶ 90-99 ();[9] Doc. [52-20] at 249-51 (249:9-251:16) (Plaintiff explaining Thornhill and Bold “dual supervised” him).
Plaintiff was never disciplined as a result of reporting any workplace conduct or concerns to GM. Doc. [52] ¶ 138. In fact, Plaintiff's employment record has no discipline noted on it at all. Id. Plaintiff was never demoted or transferred to a position with lesser pay and he has continued to receive all compensation and benefits due to him. Id. ¶¶ 139-40.
On June 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”)[10] with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which was dually filed with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”). Doc. [52-13]; Doc. [52] ¶ 125. In March 2020, Plaintiff filed a four-count action against GM under the MHRA for harassment (Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), employment discrimination (Count III), and retaliation (Count IV).
Doc. [5]. In the current Motion, GM moves for summary judgment on all four counts. Doc. [51].
A claim of unlawful discrimination may be established through direct or indirect evidence. Because Plaintiff's claim is not based on any direct evidence of discrimination, the Court will apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.3 (); Eivins v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 166 (Mo.Ct.App. 2021) (“Like federal courts, Missouri courts use the burdenshifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas . . . to evaluate proof in discrimination cases where disparate treatment is alleged.”). When deciding a case under the MHRA, courts are guided by Missouri law and federal employment discrimination case law consistent with Missouri law. Lampley v. Mo. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Mo. banc 2019) (“When reviewing cases under the [MHRA, courts] are guided by both Missouri law and any federal employment discrimination (i.e., Title VII) case law that is consistent with Missouri law.”).
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework Plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination; then the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action; finally, if Defendant offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Eivins, 636...
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