Smith v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 49 Conn. Sup. 43 (CT 7/8/2004)
Decision Date | 08 July 2004 |
Docket Number | File No. CV-03 0399542S. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | ROBERT F. SMITH, JR., ET AL. <I>v.</I> GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION. |
Gallagher Law Firm, for the plaintiffs.
Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, for the defendant.
General Statutes § 49-8 (c) provides that when a mortgagee fails, after request, to release a mortgage that has been paid, the mortgagee "shall be liable for damages to any person aggrieved . . . up to a maximum of five thousand dollars . . . ." The issue before the court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment is whether this limit may be multiplied where there is more than one aggrieved person. The court holds that it may not.
The facts are not in dispute. On December 14, 2000, the plaintiffs, Robert F. Smith, Jr., and Jeanette L. Mockalis, obtained a home equity line of credit from the defendant, GMAC Mortgage Corporation, and executed an open-end mortgage securing the line of credit. The mortgage was recorded on the land records. On December 26, 2001, the plaintiffs paid off the loan and provided the defendant with a signed copy of their request to release the mortgage securing the line of credit. The defendant deposited the plaintiffs' check, but did not provide them with a release of the mortgage.
On January 13, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint. The first count is based on § 49-8 (c) and seeks $10,000 in damages, $5000 for each of the plaintiffs. The second count alleges a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and is not now before the court.
The defendant has moved for partial summary judgment on the first count of the complaint on the ground that pursuant to § 49-8 (c), "the plaintiffs together are entitled to a total sum of $5,000 plus a reasonable attorney's fee to be established by the court plus costs." The defendant has stipulated that it failed "to execute and deliver a release of the mortgage alleged in the complaint after receiving full payment . . . and a request for release." It argues, however, that its liability for statutory damages is limited to $5000. The plaintiffs have also moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that each of them is aggrieved, and, therefore, entitled to the maximum statutory amount of $5000, or a total of $10,000, plus costs and attorney's fees.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222, 237, 842 A.2d 1089 (2004). Here, there are no issues of fact; the issue is purely one of statutory construction, a question of law. See Grondin v. Curi, 262 Conn. 637, 649, 817 A.2d 61 (2003).
Preliminarily, it is helpful to review the statutory antecedents to § 49-8 (c). The origin of § 49-8 (c) dates back to the nineteenth century when mortgagors could file "a petition in chancery to redeem the mortgaged premises.. . ." (Citations omitted.) Gordon v. Tobias, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 438895 (June 28, 2001) (Blue, J.), aff'd, 262 Conn. 844, 817 A.2d 683 (2003). They could also assert "a common law cause of action [for damages] in the nature of a breach of contract based upon [their] covenant or agreement contained in the mortgage." Skorpios Properties, Ltd. v. Waage, 172 Conn. 152, 155, 374 A.2d 165 (1976). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Tobias, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 438895.
The provision that the person failing, upon payment and written request, to release a mortgage pay "to any person aggrieved five dollars for each week" of such failure remained in the statute until 1969. General Statutes (Rev. to 1958) § 49-8. In 1969, the legislature raised the penalty to fifty dollars per week "but not exceeding in the whole the sum of one thousand dollars." Public Acts 1969, No. 595. In 1979, the legislature increased the weekly payment to $100 "but not exceeding in the whole the sum of five thousand dollars . . . ." Public Acts 1979, No. 79-10. The 1979 act also confirmed that a common law action for damages survived, as the court had held previously in Skorpios Properties, Ltd. v. Waage, supra, 172 Conn. 156. In 1989, the legislature increased the weekly payment to $200 and removed the cap of $5000 as the maximum statutory amount. Public Acts 1989, No. 89-347, § 18. In 1995, the legislature reimposed the $5000 cap. Public Acts 1995, No. 95-102, § 1 (c).
As amended in 1995, subsection (c) of § 49-8 now provides: 1 (Emphasis added.)
In an effort to access readily what it considers legislative history helpful to its cause, the defendant invokes State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 816 A.2d 562 (2003), in which the Supreme Court eschewed the "plain meaning rule" of statutory construction, the rule that courts will not look to sources of legislative intent beyond the text of the statute in question where the meaning of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The rule in Courchesne, however,2 was promptly overturned by the General Assembly in Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, which provides:
"Since it is competent for the legislature to provide rules for the construction of statutes, a statute governing the construction of statutes will be given effect." 82 C.J.S. 390, Statutes § 308 (1999); see, e.g., General Statutes §§ 1-1 through 1-1g. Therefore, pursuant to Public Act 03-154, the court first determines whether the meaning of § 49-8 (c) is plain and unambiguous. "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 134 n.19, 848 A.2d 451 (2004).
The plaintiffs focus on the words "any person" in the phrase "any person aggrieved" in § 49-8 (c) and argue that those words connote that any one of several persons may seek the statutory payment provided by the statute, each one to the maximum of $5000. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that all mortgagors must be treated as one for purposes of the $5000 limit and that as a group they are entitled to payment "up to a maximum of five thousand dollars . . . ."
(Citations omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 117, 779...
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