Smith v. Goostrey

• Decision Date: 12 December 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-753
• Parties: BOBBY J. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN GOOSTREY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

BOBBY J. SMITH, Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN GOOSTREY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-753

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

December 12, 2022

OPINION

PHILLIP J. GREEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action by filing his complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. By order entered on August 17, 2022 (ECF No. 4), the Eastern District of Michigan transferred the matter to this Court for further proceedings. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 7.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 9.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997);

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McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings.

“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

2

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to the action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

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(1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Acting Inspector Unknown Goostrey, Inspector Unknown Johnson, Assistant Deputy Wardens T. Page and Unknown Brege, and Corrections Officers Unknown Ward and Unknown Shine. He sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

In Plaintiff's complaint, he alleges that on September 30, 2021, Defendant Goostrey “called Plaintiff out to inquire about the Plaintiff's legal mail from his attorney.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff states that Defendant Goostrey's “tampering with Plaintiff's legal mail is a federal violation . . . for opening Plaintiff's legal mail without Plaintiff being present.” (Id.) On October 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding “a violation” that occurred on September 30, 2021. (Id., PageID.5.)^[2]

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Subsequently, on October 19, 2021, Plaintiff was stabbed, and he spoke to a prison counselor in late October or early November to request a transfer to another prison. Plaintiff states that Prisoner Counselor Short (not a party) sent an email to Defendant Johnson expressing Plaintiff's concern for his safety. Defendant Johnson indicated that Plaintiff had to give her some information regarding who was bringing drugs into the prison in exchange for assistance. Plaintiff states that he did not have any information to provide, so Defendant Johnson refused to help. Prisoner Counselor Short saw that Plaintiff continued to be housed on Baldwin Unit where Prisoner Counselor Short worked and could watch over him.

On December 8, 2021, Defendants Goostrey and Johnson had Plaintiff moved to another unit against Plaintiff's wishes. Less than five hours after Plaintiff was moved, while Plaintiff was on the phone, he was attacked by another prisoner. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was moved to segregation and all his property was stolen from his cell. Plaintiff claims that this was the direct result of the failure to follow prison policy and secure Plaintiff's property by Defendants Ward and Shine. Plaintiff states that Defendants Ward and Shine work under the supervision of Defendants Goostrey and Johnson.

While in segregation, Corrections Officer Shabazz (not a party) reviewed the surveillance camera footage and determined the identity of two of the inmates that had stolen Plaintiff's property and reported it. However, none of Plaintiff's property was recovered. Plaintiff's legal work was later found in the unit shower and was turned over to Defendants Goostrey and Johnson, who went through the material.

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On December 13, 2021, at 11:40 a.m., Defendants Goostrey and Johnson had Plaintiff brought into the office and attempted to question him about who was bringing drugs into the prison. Plaintiff again stated that he did not have any information, so Defendants Goostrey and Johnson told him that he would not be released from segregation and would eventually be transferred to a prison so far away that his family would have difficulty visiting.

On December 15, 2021, Defendant Brege went to Plaintiff's cell in segregation and reiterated that Plaintiff would be kept in segregation until he could be transferred. On December 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance on Defendants Goostrey and Johnson for keeping him in segregation. On January 3, 2022, Defendant Page called Plaintiff to the office and asked Plaintiff if he would sign off on the grievance against Defendants Goostrey and Johnson. Plaintiff refused and Defendant Page smiled and said that Plaintiff should have done so.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants engaged in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment, and violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants violated state law. Further, liberally construing Plaintiff's complaint, as the Court is required to do, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to raise an access to the courts claim and a claim regarding the interference with his legal mail. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

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II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at...