Smith v. Governor for Ala.
| Decision Date | 02 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-02583-RDP-RRA,No. 13-11173,13-11173 |
| Parties | TONY LEE SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOVERNOR FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TERRANCE MCDONNELL, Associate Commissioner for the Alabama Department of Corrections, GRANTT CULLIVER, Associate Commissioner for the Alabama Department of Corrections, JAMES DELOACH, Associate Commissioner for the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of AlabamaBefore TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Tony Lee Smith is an Alabama prison inmate currently incarcerated in the St. Clair Correctional Facility in Springville, Alabama. He is a practitioner of Odinism, an ancient pre-Christian faith grounded in ancient Icelandic sagas and runic mysticism.1 In February 2001, while he was incarcerated in the Limestone Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama, he requested the Religious Activities Review Committee (RARC) of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) to recognize Odinism as a religion and, among other things, to designate a place in the prison compound for the worship of Odinism and the performance of its rites and to provide an outdoor fire pit for that purpose. The RARC granted Smith's request for the recognition of Odinism as a religion, but denied his Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d1255, 1261 (11th Circuit 2007) (abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011).2
On August 15, 2007, during his current incarceration in the St. Clair Correctional Facility, Smith presented the RARC with a request that, in addition to recognizing Odinism as a religion, the Alabama prison regulations be amended to include a list of items needed to practice the religion, including a designated outdoor place of worship with a fire pit.3
On May 13, 2010, the RARC issued a response. Although the prison regulations were not amended as Smith requested, the RARC approved his possession of several of the items he purportedly needed to practice Odinism. The RARC denied Smith's request for a designated outdoor place of worship with a fire pit.4 The next day, May 14, Smith, proceeding pro se, filed the instant lawsuitagainst the Governor of Alabama, the Commissioners of ADOC, other state officials, and employees of the St. Clair Correctional Facility. Smith's complaint sought legal and equitable relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the defendants' alleged violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (RLUPIA), in imposing substantial burdens on his practice of Odinism by, among other things, requiring him to produce documents to support his requests for recognition of Odinism as an established religion, denying him religious items that other religious groups are permitted to have, confiscating religious books and art, operating faith-based dorms, retaliating against him for his religious beliefs and for filing lawsuits, and for discriminating against him because of his adherence to a non-Christian religion.
The defendants moved the District Court to dismiss Smith's complaint, contending, in the main, that a responsive pleading could not reasonably be framed because the complaint's allegations were so ambiguous that it was impossible to determine which allegations applied to which defendants. The court granted their motions and gave Smith leave to amend.5 Smith filed an amended complaint, andthe court, after receiving it, entered an Order for Special Report directing the defendants to file a special report—under oath or accompanied by affidavits—in response to the amended complaint's allegations for consideration as a motion for summary judgment. The same order informed Smith that he should file counter affidavits if he wished to rebut the representations of fact made in the defendants' special reports and oppose the entry of summary judgment. The defendants filed their special reports by December 15, 2011; Smith filed a response to their reports on January 24, 2012.
The District Court referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge, and, on February 13, 2013, he issued a report recommending that the District Court grant the defendants summary judgment. On March 14, 2013, the District Court, afterconsidering and rejecting Smith's objections to the report, granted the defendants summary judgment.
Smith now appeals the judgment, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his discovery requests, and in rejecting some of the claims he presented in his amended complaint. We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's discovery ruling and no error in its summary rejection of the claims at issue in this appeal; we therefore affirm the court's judgment.
Smith argues that the District Court erred in denying his requests for discovery. After the court ordered the defendants to submit a special report in lieu of a response to Smith's amended complaint, it ordered that all discovery cease unless a party sought leave of court to conduct discovery. As applied to Smith, the order required him to specify in his discovery motion the nature of the discovery sought and the reason why the disclosures in the defendant's special reports and his response were inadequate. Smith sought leave on several occasions. Each time the court denied relief because his motion failed to explain why the disclosures in the special reports were inadequate. The same was true regarding Smith's motions to compel production. Smith argues that the court's rulings prejudiced his case. For example, he sought copies of his religion-based requests to the RARC, which included the items such as a quartz crystal and a sacred box that he needed topractice Odinism, to bolster his claim that the defendants violated his RLUIPA rights by imposing a substantial burden on his practice of Odinism.
A district court has broad discretion under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to compel or deny discovery; we therefore review such rulings for abuse of discretion. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). "Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law." Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will not set aside a district court's discovery ruling unless the court has made a clear error of judgment or has applied the wrong legal standard. Id. at 1307. Even then, we will not grant relief unless the appealing party has shown that the denial of discovery resulted in substantial harm to his case. Id.
Judicial intervention in discovery should limit the scope to the reasonable needs of the action. Id. Where a significant amount of discovery has been obtained, and it appears that further discovery would not be helpful in resolving the issues, a request for further discovery is properly denied. Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).
We conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in denying Smith's discovery requests. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1306; see also Iraola, 325 F.3d at 1286. None of Smith's motions for leave to conduct discovery or to compelproduction met the requirements the court set—specifically, the motions either did not explain why the disclosures in the defendants' special reports were inadequate or specify the exact nature of the information being sought. In sum, we find no merit in Smith's discovery challenge.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). 6 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quotation omitted). In making this determination, we view "the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and resolve "all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant." Id.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shallbe liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was "deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999).
Smith argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim, as the record discloses that the defendants imposed a substantial burden on his practice of Odinism.7 Specifically, he challenges the decision by the RARC to deny his requests for four items for religious use: a sacred container for runes, a leather folder for study...
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