Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist.
| Citation | 349 F.Supp.2d 521 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 03-4404.,CV 03-4404. |
| Parties | Alfred SMITH, Plaintiff, v. HALF HOLLOW HILLS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Board of Education Half Hollow Hills Central School District, Dr. Kevin McGuire, Individually and as Superintendent of Schools, Half Hollow Hills Central School District; Selena Isles Smith, Individually and in her capacity as Principal, West Hollow Middle School, Half Hollow Hills Central School District, and Thomas O'Rourke, Individually and in his capacity as Guidance Counselor, West Hollow Middle School, Half Hollow Hills Central School District, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Harriet A, Gilliam, Esq., Riverhead, NY, for Plaintiff.
Ingerman, Smith, L.L.P. by Susan E. Fine, Esq., Northport, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiff commenced this action claiming that he was injured while attending school in the Defendant school district. Specifically, it is claimed that injuries suffered by Plaintiff in a middle school cafeteria are attributable to the negligence of Defendants who failed to provide a safe school environment. Named as defendants are the Half Hollow Hills Central School District (the "School District"), the School District's Board of Education, Dr. Kevin McGuire, the Superintendent of the School District during the relevant time period, Selena Isles Smith, the middle school principal, and Thomas O'Rourke, a guidance counselor employed at the middle school during the relevant time period (collectively "Defendants").
Plaintiff was injured in 1997 and commenced a federal case in 1998. That case, which was assigned to a different judge in this district, alleged both federal and state law claims. In an order dated June 26, 2002, the court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's federal claims. Plaintiff's state law negligence claims were preserved with the right to pursue such claims in state court. After dismissal, Plaintiff relocated and became a resident of the State of North Carolina. He thereafter commenced this action in pursuit of his remaining state law negligence claims. Federal jurisdiction is now based upon diversity of citizenship.
Shortly after this diversity case was commenced, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When ruling on that motion, this court noted that Defendants relied on matters outside of the pleadings including documents generated in the course of the School District's business as well as deposition testimony. The court elected to treat the motion as one for summary judgment and gave all parties additional time in which to present all material "made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." FRCP 12(b)(6); Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2000). The parties were given leave to take discovery and were directed to enter into a final and expedited discovery and briefing schedule.
Having completed discovery, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is now properly before the court. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
I. Factual Background
The facts set forth below are gleaned from the deposition and documentary testimony presented by the parties and are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
Plaintiff was a middle school student in the Defendant School District in 1997. The incident forming the basis of the complaint took place on September 16, 1997, while Plaintiff was eating lunch at the middle school cafeteria. Plaintiff alleges that on that day he was attacked by Baarik Hogan, a fellow student ("Hogan"). According to Plaintiff, Defendants were aware of Hogan's propensity for violence, yet did nothing to protect Plaintiff prior to the attack or intervene in any way to stop the attack.
The alleged failure to protect Plaintiff forms the basis for his first cause of action for negligently failing to provide a safe academic environment. Plaintiff's complaint also sets forth a second cause of action. This claim alleges that defendants failed to take "appropriate corrective measures before and after the assault ... and continued to allow an unsafe educational environment to exist, causing plaintiff physical and emotional harm and causing him to transfer to a private educational institution." Among the damages allegedly suffered by Plaintiff are emotional harm as well as physical injuries to his neck, back and shoulders.
Presently before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The motion argues that, after completing discovery, Plaintiff has come forward with no facts supporting a finding of either breach of the school's duty to supervise or proximate cause between any alleged breach and the claimed injuries. After outlining relevant legal principles the court will turn to the merits of the motion.
A motion for summary judgment is granted only if the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no issue of fact exists. McLee v. Chrysler Corp. 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.1997). However, when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it bears the burden of proof, summary judgment will be granted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The party resisting summary judgment must not only show a disputed issue of fact, but it must also be a material fact in light of the substantive law. Only disputed facts that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When a moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Summary judgment is not defeated by vague assertions of unspecified disputed facts. Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1990).
New York law imposes upon schools the duty to provide adequate supervision for its students and holds schools liable for injuries proximately caused by the failure to provide such supervision. Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375, 637 N.E.2d 263 (1994); Speight v. City of New York, 309 A.D.2d 501, 765 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1st Dep't 2003). Imposition of this duty does not make schools insurers of the safety of their students, "for they cannot be reasonably expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students....". Mirand, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 375, 637 N.E.2d 263; see also Convey v. City of Rye Sch. Dist. 271 A.D.2d 154, 710 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (2d Dep't 2000). To prevail in a case alleging liability for negligent supervision, plaintiff must establish a breach of the duty and that such breach was the proximate cause of the injury. See generally Mirand, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 375, 637 N.E.2d 263.
In a case alleging liability stemming from the violent act of one student toward another, breach of duty is established only by showing that the defendant school had specific, prior knowledge of the danger that caused the injury, "that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated." Mirand, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 375, 637 N.E.2d 263. Injuries caused by sudden, impulsive acts that are not preceded by prior conduct cannot give rise to a finding of breach of the duty to supervise. Morman v. Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist., 297 A.D.2d 788, 747 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (2d Dep't.2002).
The proximate cause prong of plaintiff's cause of action is satisfied only by showing that the "chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the school's negligence." Mirand, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 375, 637 N.E.2d 263. Where an assault occurs so suddenly that it could not have been prevented by any amount of supervision, proximate cause is not established and plaintiff cannot prevail. Sanzo v. Solvay Union Free Sch. Dist., 299 A.D.2d 878, 750 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (4th Dep't 2002).
New York courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment to school districts in cases where the district makes a prima facie showing of a lack of notice and/or proximate cause and plaintiff fails to come forward with factual evidence to the contrary. Many of those cases have been decided on facts strikingly similar to those here.
In Sanzo v. Solvay Union Free Sch. Dist., 299 A.D.2d 878, 750 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (4th Dep't 2002), for example, plaintiff alleged a claim in negligent supervision arising from an assault by a fellow student in a high school cafeteria. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, holding that the school district met its burden of showing lack of specific knowledge of the danger that caused the injury. Sanzo, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 253. Although the principal in Sanzo was aware of prior verbal taunts between the students at issue, there was no evidence that either student had previously engaged in violent behavior that would give rise to a duty to supervise. Id. The court further held that the case was properly dismissed on proximate cause grounds because the assault took place so suddenly as to make its prevention impossible by any additional supervision. Id.
Similarly, in Nocilla v. Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 302 A.D.2d 573, 757 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d Dep't 2003), plaintiff alleged a lack of supervision after being assaulted in a hallway by a...
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