Smith v. Hatcher

• Decision Date: 19 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2:19-CV-167,2:19-CV-167
• Citation: 516 F.Supp.3d 1369
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
• Parties: Tracy D. L. C. SMITH and Candace A. Smith, Plaintiffs, v. Chris HATCHER, Andrea Browning, Georgia Department of Human Services, E. Neal Jump, Michael Heath, Randy Austin, Stephanie Shuman, and Glynn County, Georgia, Defendants.

516 F.Supp.3d 1369

Tracy D. L. C. SMITH and Candace A. Smith, Plaintiffs,

v.Chris HATCHER, Andrea Browning, Georgia Department of Human Services, E. Neal Jump, Michael Heath, Randy Austin, Stephanie Shuman, and Glynn County, Georgia, Defendants.

No. 2:19-CV-167

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division.

Signed January 19, 2021

James A. Yancey, Jr., James a. Yancey, PC, Brunswick, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Richard K. Strickland, Steven G. Blackerby, & Watkins, LLP, Brunswick, GA, for Defendants Chris Hatcher, E. Neal Jump, Michael Heath, Stephanie Shuman, Georgia Glynn County.

Patrick T. O'Connor, Stuart Fallin Sumner, Oliver Maner, LLP, Savannah, GA, for Defendant Randy Austin.

ORDER

LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Andrea Browning and the Georgia Department of Human Services (collectively, "Defendants"). Dkt. No. 53. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED .

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an alleged contractual agreement to assume legal custody of a minor child between Plaintiffs Tracy D. L. C. Smith and Candace A. Smith ("Plaintiffs") and the parents of the child. Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 8. Plaintiffs took physical custody of the child but never obtained legal guardianship over the child. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. Soon thereafter, the minor child's mother indicated to Chris Hatcher, an officer of the Glynn County Police Department, that she had attempted to regain custody of the child but that Plaintiffs refused to bring the child back or tell the mother where the child was located. Id. ¶ 22. Consequently, these allegations led to the arrest of Plaintiffs on two separate occasions based on grand jury indictments and bench warrants for interstate interference with custody issued by the Glynn County Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 31-34, 50-52. Both indictments were subsequently dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 42, 90. Plaintiffs contend they were wrongly arrested and that the indictments and subsequent prosecutions against them were illegally and unconstitutionally initiated and pursued. Id. ¶¶ 26, 92. Plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations arising from the arrests and ensuing prosecutions in the Glynn County Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 102, 128, 136, 144, 152. Plaintiffs also bring state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 132, 140, 148, 156, 169.

Defendants Andrea Browning ("Browning") and the Georgia Department of Human Services (the "DHS") are two of seven named defendants. Plaintiffs assert claims against Chris Hatcher, a Glynn County Police Department Sergeant; Andrea Browning, a Department of Family and Children Services ("DFCS") case manager; the DHS; E. Neal Jump, Glynn County Sheriff; Michael Heath, a Glynn County jail administrator; Randy Austin, a Glynn County detention captain; and Stephanie Shuman, a Glynn County detention lieutenant. Id. at 1-2. In response, Defendants Browning and DHS filed the present Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 53.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the following conduct by Defendants resulted in violations of certain protections guaranteed to them by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and constituted false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law:

DEFENDANT BROWNING[ ] assisted DEFENDANT HATCHER and Assistant District Attorney BARNHILL [a nonparty] in the first prosecution of [Plaintiffs] which included going to Idaho to take physical custody of [the minor child].

Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 47.

DEFENDANT BROWNING continued to construct a case for the prosecution of [Plaintiffs].

Id. ¶ 48.

[Despite] her knowledge of the dismissal of the previous indictment for its failure to allege a violation of the law ..., DEFENDANT BROWNING, as the prosecutor, initiated and sustained a second prosecution of [Plaintiffs] for the same conduct alleged in the first indictment.

Id. ¶ 49.

DEFENDANT GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES is liable ... for its respective failures to property [sic] train its personnel and ... for condoning the policy and practices of its employees ... in the reckless institution of criminal actions against innocent parties such as [Plaintiffs].

Id. ¶ 169-70.

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 53. Defendant Browning contends that she should be dismissed because she is afforded prosecutorial immunity for the federal claims asserted against her. Dkt. No. 53-1 at 6. Further, Defendant Browning maintains that the state law tort claims also fail because only a state entity may be sued under the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"). Id. Defendant DHS contends it should be dismissed because it has Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the federal and state claims asserted against it. Id. It also maintains that it is shielded from the state law claims pursuant to the express language of the GTCA. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A complaint is plausible on its face when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

It is important to note that while the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are to be considered true at the motion to dismiss stage, the same does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in the complaint.

Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Lastly, the Court notes that exhibits attached to pleadings become part of a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The Court can consider public records when deciding a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 177 F. App'x 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) ("A district court may take judicial notice of certain facts without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Public records are among the permissible facts that a district court may consider.").

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Browning

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Browning violated Plaintiffs' legal and constitutional rights under both federal and state law. Dkt. No. 44 at 2.

A. Federal Law Claims

First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Browning committed false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, and malicious prosecution, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ Id. ¶¶ 127-154. However, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest² , and malicious prosecution under federal law.

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

An unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment can give rise to a viable constitutional tort cognizable under section 1983. However, not every unlawful arrest or imprisonment by a public officer violates a constitutional right. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment "consist[ ] of detention without legal process. " Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). As such, when detention is pursuant to a form of legal process, such as a warrant, a cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment is improper. Washington v. St. Lawrence, No. CV4:12-062, 2012 WL 2792319, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 19, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV4:12-062, 2012 WL 2792317 (S.D. Ga. July 9, 2012). Instead, "unlawful detention forms part of the damages for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; see also, Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasizing the distinction between malicious prosecution and false arrest claims).

Plaintiffs concede that they were arrested pursuant to bench warrants issued after grand jury indictments. Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 31-33, 50-52. Because Plaintiffs were arrested pursuant to legal process, i.e., two bench warrants, they have stated no facts supporting a false imprisonment or false arrest claim against Defendant Browning.

2. Malicious Prosecution

Accordingly, only Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim remains to permit relief in this context. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) ("[U]nlike the related cause of action for false arrest or...