Smith v. Heimgarder, 107,688.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 107,688.,107,688. |
| Citation | 283 P.3d 841 |
| Parties | Todd Carlton SMITH, Appellant, v. James HEIMGARDER, Warden, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Butler District Court; John E. Sanders, Judge.
Todd Carlton Smith, appellant pro se.
Julie St. Peter, legal counsel, of El Dorado Correctional Facility, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., GREEN and LEBEN, JJ.
Todd Carlton Smith was convicted in a prison disciplinary proceeding of the theft of some brownies at El Dorado Correctional Facility. The hearing officer found that Smith obtained the brownies from the prison food cart in violation of K.A.R. 44–12–203. Smith was sanctioned to 10 days of disciplinary segregation and a $10 fine, but the sanctions were suspended for 180 days. Smith has appealed to this court, contending that he was denied due process during the disciplinary process and that the Department of Corrections violated his equal-protection rights by treating him differently than other inmates based on race.
But the right to due process—and court review—applies only when an inmate is deprived of some constitutionally protected interest. Here, since the sanctions (which included a fine) were suspended and not imposed, no due-process rights are involved and Smith has no right to have a Kansas court review his case. And Smith has not provided sufficient facts to make a potentially valid equal-protection claim. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment, which dismissed Smith's K.S.A. 60–1501 petition.
Smith is an inmate at the El Dorado Correctional Facility. Smith is serving a Florida sentence, and he was transferred to Kansas under the Interstate Corrections Compact.
On November 10, 2011, a food-service employee brought a disciplinary complaint against Smith by filing a disciplinary report. According to the report, a review of a videotape from November 8 showed Smith opening a metal baker's box and taking an unknown number of brownies from the prison food cart. The report charged Smith with taking without permission under K.A.R. 44–12–204, a class II prison offense. According to later testimony, the report was given to Smith on November 10.
At 7:40 a.m. on November 14, an additional disciplinary report amended the charge to theft under K.A.R. 44–12–203, a class I offense. Smith acknowledged receipt of the amended report and initialed a form “waiv[ing] time limits or other procedure(s)” with no further explanation. According to the documents in our record, a hearing was conducted 5 minutes later—at 7:45 a.m. Smith testified that while working he asked another inmate named Silis if he could have a brownie. According to Smith, Silis opened the baker's box and gave him brownies. Smith stressed that he did not “take” the brownies—they were given to him. Silis agreed with Smith's testimony and stated that he gave Smith brownies. The hearing officer reviewed the video and concluded that the video showed that Smith and Silis were at the brownie cart and that Silis gave Smith an unknown number of brownies. The hearing officer found Smith guilty of theft by a preponderance of the evidence and sanctioned Smith to 10 days of disciplinary segregation and a $10 fine, both of which were suspended for 180 days. Smith also reports that he was fired from his job with the prison food-service provider; Smith says that he was employed there before this incident.
Smith appealed the hearing officer's decision, arguing that (1) the facts in the disciplinary report were not supported by the video and testimony; (2) the hearing officer failed to provide factual reasons for amending the charge to theft; and (3) Smith was being racially discriminated against. The Secretary of Corrections upheld the decision, finding that the decision was based on “some evidence” and that K.A.R. 44–13–202 allowed amendment of the charge.
On December 19, 2011, Smith filed a habeas petition under K.S.A. 60–1501 arguing the same three issues. The district court summarily dismissed his petition, finding that there was some evidence to support the conviction and that no due-process rights were implicated because the sentence and fine were suspended.
Smith has appealed to this court.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether Kansas or Florida law controls this case. Smith is serving a Florida sentence in Kansas under the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), K.S.A. 76–3001 et seq. The ICC provides for the transfer of prisoners among states and makes clear that prisoners transferred under the ICC remain under the jurisdiction of the state in which the convictions originated—the receiving state acts solely as the agent for the sending state. K.S.A. 76–3002, art. IV(a); Fla. Stat. § 941 .56, art. IV(a) (2006). The ICC, as adopted by participating states including Kansas and Florida, provides in Article IV(e) that inmates generally retain any rights they would have had if confined in the sending state:
K.SA. 76–3002, art. IV(e); Fla. Stat. § 941.56, art. IV(e).
Similarly, Article IV(f) of the ICC provides that any hearings the inmate is entitled to may be held in either state:
K.S.A. 76–3002, art. IV(f); Fla. Stat. § 941.56, art. IV(f).
But the ICC does not require the application of the sending state's disciplinary rules and regulations to a transferred prisoner. See Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1991) (). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained: 924 F.2d at 141. The Eighth Circuit held that the prisoner had no liberty interest or equal-protection right entitling him to the sending state's disciplinary rules. 924 F.2d at 141.
Under the ICC, the receiving state is not required to apply custody classification or other policies of the sending state. Blevins v. Werholtz, No. 09–3033–SAC, 2009 WL 539913, at *3 (D.Kan.2009) (unpublished opinion) (citing Garcia v. Lemaster, 439 F.3d 1215, 1220 [10th Cir.2006]; Stewart, 924 F.2d at 141;Cranford v. Iowa, 471 N.W.2d 904 [Iowa App.1991]; Glick v. Holden, 889 P.2d 1389, 1393 [Utah App.1995];). As the United States District Court for the District of Kansas has said: “It is only common sense that the authorities having daily physical custody of an ICC inmate must determine the inmate's appropriate security classification and concomitant level of privileges, programs, and conditions of confinement.” Blevins, 2009 WL 539913, at *3 (citing Jaben v. Moore, 788 F.Supp. 500, 504 [D. Kan.1992] ). Therefore, “ICC inmates are subject to all laws and regulations applicable to inmates in the receiving state, and their entitlement is to be treated equitably with those inmates.” Blevins, 2009 WL 539913, at *3. Although Florida retains jurisdiction over Smith, Florida's jurisdiction relates to transfer decisions and matters concerning his Florida conviction and sentence. See Garcia, 439 F.3d at 1220 (); Leach v. Dahm, 277 Neb. 452, 455–56, 763 N.W.2d 83 (2009) ().
Smith cites Lynn v. Simmons, 32 Kan.App.2d 974, 95 P.3d 99 (2003), and Meyer v. Moore, 826 So.2d 330 (Fla.Dist.App.2002), to argue that Florida law applies. But those cases are easily distinguished from our situation. In Lynn, the prisoner was arguing that he was serving an illegal sentence and had been involuntarily transferred to Oklahoma. In Meyers, the Kansas prisoner in Florida was seeking to be transferred back to Kansas.
Here, Smith is not challenging a transfer decision or his underlying Florida conviction and sentence. Instead, Smith is challenging a disciplinary proceeding in a Kansas facility. Accordingly, we analyze Smith's case as we would any other K.S.A. 60–1501 petition under the laws of Kansas.
b. None of the Sanctions Imposed or Claimed to Have Been Imposed Here Implicate a Liberty or Property Interest Protected by Due Process.
We review a district court's summary dismissal of a petitioner's K.S.A. 60–1501 claim independently, without any required deference to the district court. Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, 649, 215 P.3d 575 (2009). In determining whether a K.S.A. 60–1501 ...
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