Smith v. Hernandez
Decision Date | 03 November 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 3:20-cv-00033-JKS,3:20-cv-00033-JKS |
Parties | BILLIE DEAN SMITH, Petitioner, v. ARNALDO HERNANDEZ, Superintendent, Spring Creek Correctional Center |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
[Re: Motions at Docket Nos. 12, 13]
and
MEMORANDUM DECISIONBilly Dean Smith, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Smith is in the custody of the Alaska Department of Corrections ("DOC") and incarcerated at Spring Creek Correctional Center. Respondent has answered, and Smith has replied. Also pending before Court is Smith's renewal of his request for the appointment of counsel, Docket No. 13, and his motion for an oral hearing on his Petition, Docket No. 12.
Smith was charged in 1998 with the first-degree murders of Harold Enzler and Nancy Bellamy, along with three counts of tampering with evidence, after he was arrested forpossession of cocaine. In connection with that arrest, Smith was interviewed several times and eventually confessed to the murders. He later moved to suppress the statements, which was denied, and proceeded to a jury trial. On direct appeal of his conviction, the Alaska Court of Appeals laid out the following facts underlying the charges against Smith and his suppression motion:
Smith v. State, No. A-8735, 2009 WL 792800, at *1-2 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2009).
At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury convicted Smith as charged of two counts of first-degree murder and three counts of tampering with physical evidence. The Alaska Superior Court sentenced Smith to an aggregate term of 129 years' imprisonment with 30 years suspended.
Through counsel, Smith appealed his conviction, arguing that he confessed only because the police agreed to give him a job as an undercover drug informant, which would guarantee a lenient sentence and a full pardon, and that the police continued to question him after he had requested an attorney. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment against Smith in a reasoned, unpublished opinion issued on March 25, 2009. Smith, 2009 WL 792800, at *5. In so deciding, the appellate concluded that the record supported the trial judge's finding that the police did not make the alleged agreement, and that Smith voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Id. Smith filed a petition for hearing in the Alaska Supreme Court, which was denied without comment on September 21, 2009.
Smith then filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief. After he requested and was appointed counsel, Smith filed an amended application that claimed that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. According to Smith, his trial counsel should have moved for reconsideration of the trial court's factual finding that the troopers had not accepted Smith's offer to work as an informant in exchange for leniency, based on statements Investigator Belden made at the evidentiary hearing on Smith's suppression motion and at trial. The superior court denied post-conviction relief in a reasoned, unpublished opinion issued on April 15, 2016. Smith appealed the denial to the Alaska Court of Appeals, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Smith's post-conviction relief application by summary disposition issued on July17, 2019. The Alaska Supreme Court summarily denied Smith's petition for hearing on November 27, 2019.
Smith timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court dated February 11, 2020. Docket No. 1 ("Petition"); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1),(2).
In his pro se Petition before this Court, Smith argues, as he did on direct appeal and by post-conviction relief application in the state courts, that: 1) his confession was coerced; 2) he was deprived of his privilege against self-incrimination; and 3) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). The term unreasonable is a common term in the legal world. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the range of reasonable judgments may depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule argued to be clearly established federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) () .
The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).
To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) ( ). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism...
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