Smith v. Highland Cmty. Coll.

Decision Date24 January 2023
Docket Number22-CV-02048-JAR-ADM
PartiesB.J. SMITH, BRADFORD ZINN, AND JERED ROSS, Plaintiffs, v. HIGHLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE, HIGHLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, RUSSELL KARN, DEBORAH FOX, and BRYAN DORREL, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas

B.J. SMITH, BRADFORD ZINN, AND JERED ROSS, Plaintiffs,
v.

HIGHLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE, HIGHLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, RUSSELL KARN, DEBORAH FOX, and BRYAN DORREL, Defendants.

No. 22-CV-02048-JAR-ADM

United States District Court, D. Kansas

January 24, 2023


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JULIE A. ROBINSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs B.J Smith, Bradford Zinn, and Jered Ross filed this action against Defendants Highland Community College (“HCC”), the HCC Board of Trustees (“the Board”), Russell Karn, Deborah Fox, and Bryan Dorrel, alleging numerous violations of their constitutional and statutory rights stemming from their suspension and eventual termination as coaches of HCC's women's basketball team. Before the Court is Defendants' Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 20) on the following causes of action: Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims against HCC for deprivation of their property and liberty interests pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II); Plaintiffs Zinn and Ross' race discrimination claims against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III); Plaintiffs' retaliation claim against all Defendants under § 1981 (Count IV); and Plaintiffs' Failure to Protect claim against the Board and Karn under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count IX).[1] For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part Defendants'

1

motion with respect to the official capacity claims against Fox and Dorrel in Counts III and IV, and denies the motion in all other respects.

I. Legal Standard

The Court reviews a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) motion under the same standard that governs a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion.[2] To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”[3] “[T]he complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”[4] The plausibility standard does not require a showing of probability that a defendant has acted unlawfully, but requires more than “a sheer possibility.”[5] “[M]ere ‘labels and conclusions,' and ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”[6] Finally, the Court must accept the nonmoving party's factual allegations as true and may not dismiss on the ground that it appears unlikely the allegations can be proven.[7]

The Supreme Court has explained the analysis as a two-step process. For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court “must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [but]

2

we ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'”[8] Thus, the Court must first determine if the allegations are factual and entitled to an assumption of truth, or merely legal conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth.[9] Second, the Court must determine whether the factual allegations, when assumed true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”[10] “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[11]

If matters outside the pleadings are reviewed, the Court generally must convert a Rule 12(c) motion to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 motion for summary judgment.[12] However, the Court may consider documents that are attached to or referenced in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff's claim and the parties do not dispute the documents' authenticity.[13]

Finally, “[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings ‘should not be granted unless the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'”[14]

II. Evidence Considered

Before turning to the facts and merits of Defendants' motion, the Court considers Plaintiffs' objection to the Court's consideration of the attachments to HCC's Answer, that is,

3

Smith's and Zinn's employment contracts and an offer letter to Ross.[15] Plaintiffs argue that it is error to consider these matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. HCC responds that the Court has broad discretion to consider such matters without conversion to a Rule 56 motion because attachments to the answer may be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), which provides that “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”

Plaintiffs do not attach the employment contracts for Smith or Zinn to their Complaint, though the Complaint references that they each had employment contracts with HCC and were each told that their contracts would not be renewed.[16] Because Smith's and Zinn's employment contracts are both referenced in the Complaint and central to their claims, the Court may refer to these documents in resolving this motion without converting it to a motion for summary judgment.

The Complaint also states that Ross had a contractual relationship with HCC regarding his employment and that he was told his contract would not be renewed.[17] HCC contends that Ross was an at-will employee without an employment contract and asks the Court to consider another attachment to the Answer, which purports to be an offer letter from HCC to Ross.

There appears to be a split in authority regarding whether documents attached to the answer but not referenced in or attached to the complaint may be considered on a Rule 12(c) motion without converting to a Rule 56 motion. Some Circuit Courts of Appeal have concluded that the attachments incorporated in the answer are within the record for Rule 12(c) motions

4

pursuant to the language of Rule 10(c).[18] Other courts have found that attachments to an answer are not properly before the court on a Rule 12(c) motion.[19] The Tenth Circuit has not squarely addressed the question, but has held that reliance on a settlement agreement attached to defendant's answer was not proper in resolving a motion under Rule 12(c) because it was evidence of an affirmative defense and not “central” to the plaintiff's claim.[20]

In the District of Kansas, Judge Vratil has interpreted the standard as allowing consideration of attachments to an answer.[21] The court cautioned that “[m]ere attachment of such documents, however, does not render such exhibits dispositive,” as in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must consider plaintiff's well-pleaded facts to be true and draw all inferences in his favor.[22] Other district courts within the Tenth Circuit have also expressly or implicitly allowed consideration of attachments to an answer.[23] Given this precedent from the District of Kansas allowing consideration of attachments to an answer, and given the lack of Tenth Circuit precedent expressly disallowing such consideration, the Court finds it proper to consider the offer letter attached to HCC's answer in ruling on this Rule 12(c) motion. Although the offer

5

letter is not referenced in the Complaint, it is central to Ross' § 1983 due process claim that he has a protectable property interest in continued government employment.[24]

III. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the Complaint, and the employment contracts and offer letter considered with the Complaint, and are assumed to be true for the purposes of deciding this motion.

The Parties

HCC is a public, two-year junior college located in Highland, Kansas. It is a member of the National Junior College Athletic Association (“NJCAA”), and its athletic teams compete in the Kansas Jayhawk College Community Conference (“KJCCC”). The Board is the statutory governing body for HCC, and Defendant Russell Karn is a long-serving member of the Board. Defendant Deborah Fox has served as the President of HCC since 2019. Defendant Bryan Dorrel is the Athletic Director at HCC, and he primarily directs student-athlete recruitment, conduct, and eligibility.

Plaintiffs B.J. Smith, Bradford Zinn, and Jered Ross are former coaches of HCC's women's basketball team, the Scotties. Smith served as Head Women's Basketball Coach since August 2011 until his termination, effective June 2020. Zinn joined Coach Smith's staff in 2017 as an Assistant Coach. His primary duties included “skill development, strength conditioning, and recruiting.”[25]

6

Both Smith's employment contract[26] and Zinn's employment contract[27] state that they are for the contract year beginning July 1, 2019 and ending June 30, 2020. Both contracts state that “[w]hile the contract year covers a 12-month period, this position is a 10-month position with the specified work period of August 1, 2019, thru [sic] May 31, 2020.”[28] Both contracts further state that

[T]he College may terminate this contract prior to the above stated termination date in the event the Employee fails or refuses to abide by and/or comply with the rules and regulations set forth in the Staff Policy Handbook or the requests and directions made and/or given by the President of Highland Community College.[29]

Coach Smith hired Ross as an Assistant Coach in June 2019. Ross “had primary responsibility for helping players with their academics.”[30] In his offer letter, Ross is referred to as an “at-will employee.”[31]

Smith coached the Scotties to numerous record-breaking seasons. During Smith's first season at HCC, he led the Scotties to their first winning season in over fifteen years. He then led the Scotties to the five best seasons in school history, including a 35-1 finish in the 2017-18 season-the highest record for the Scotties to date. Over Smith's...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT