Smith v. Hooey, No. 198
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Writing for the Court | STEWART |
Citation | 21 L.Ed.2d 607,89 S.Ct. 575,393 U.S. 374 |
Parties | Richard M. SMITH, Petitioner, v. Fred M. HOOEY, Judge, Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas |
Docket Number | No. 198 |
Decision Date | 20 January 1969 |
v.
Fred M. HOOEY, Judge, Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas.
Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., for petitioner.
Joe S. Moss, Houston, Tex., for respondent.
Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1, this Court held that, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
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Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial1 is enforceable against the States as 'one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.' Id., at 226, 87 S.Ct. at 995. The case before us involves the nature and extent of the obligation imposed upon a State by that constitutional guarantee, when the person under the state criminal charge is serving a prison sentence imposed by another jurisdiction.
In 1960 the petitioner was indicted in Harris County, Texas, upon a charge of theft. He was then, and still is, a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.2 Shortly after the state charge was filed against him, the petition r mailed a letter to the Texas trial court requesting a speedy trial. In reply, he was notified that 'he would be afforded a trial within two weeks of any date (he) might specify at which he could be present.' 3 Thereafter, for the next six years, the petitioner, 'by various letters, and more formal so-called 'motions," continued periodically to ask that he be brought to trial. Beyond the response already alluded to, the State took no steps to obtain the petitioner's appearance in the Harris County trial court. Finally, in 1967, the petitioner filed in that court a verified motion to dismiss the charge against him for want of prosecution. No action was taken on the motion.
The petitioner then brought a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Texas, asking for an order to show cause why the pending charge should not be dismissed. Mandamus was refused in an informal and unreported order of the Texas Supreme Court. The petitioner then sought certiorari in this Court. After invit-
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ing and receiving a memorandum from the Solicitor General of the United Sates, 390 U.S. 937, 88 S.Ct. 1057, 19 L.Ed.2d 1127, we granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions this case presents. 392 U.S. 925, 88 S.Ct. 2288, 20 L.Ed.2d 1384.
In refusing to issue a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court of Texas relied upon and reaffirmed its decision of a year earlier in Cooper v. State, 400 S.W.2d 890.4 In that case, as in the present one, a state criminal charge was pending against a man who was an inmate of a federal prison. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in the Texas trial court, praying that he be brought before the court for trial, or that the charge against him be dismissed. Upon denial of that motion, he applied to the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus. In denying the application, the court acknowledged that an inmate of a Texas prison would have been clearly entitled to the relief sought as a matter of constitutional right,5 but held that 'a differ-
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ent rule is applicable when two separate sovereignties are involved.' 400 S.W.2d, at 891. The court viewed the difference as 'one of power and authority.' Id., at 892. While acknowledging that if the state authorities were 'ordered to proceed with the prosecution * * * and comply with certain conditions specified by the federal prison authorities, the relator would be produced for trial in the state court,' id., at 891, it nonetheless denied relief because it thought '(t)he true test should be the power and authority of the state unaided by any waiver, permission or act of grace of any other authority.' Id., at 892. Four Justices dissented, expressing their belief that 'where the state has the power to afford the accused a speedy trial it is under a duty to do so.' Id., at 893.
There can be no doubt that if the petitioner in the present case had been at large for a six-year period following his indictment, and had repeatedly demanded that he be brought to trial, the State would have been under a constitutional duty to try him. Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U.S., at 219, 87 S.Ct., at 991. And Texas concedes that if during that period he had been confined in a Texas prison for some other state offense, its obligation would have been no less. But the Texas Supreme Court has held that because petitioner is, in fact, confined in a federal prison, the State is totally absolved from any duty at all under the constitutional guarantee. We cannot agree.
The historic origins of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial were traced in some detail by The Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court in Klopfer, supra, 386 U.S., at 223-226, 87 S.Ct., at 993—995, and we need not review that history again here. Suffice it to remember that this constitutional guarantee has universally6 been thought essential to pro-
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tect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: '(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to limit the possiblities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.' United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627. These demands are both aggravated and compounded in the case of an accused who is imprisoned by another jurisdiction.
At first blush it might appear that a man already in prison under a lawful sentence is hardly in a position to suffer from 'undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial.' But the fact is that delay in bringing such a person to trial on a pending charge may ultimately result in as much oppression as is suffered by one who is jailed without bail upon an untried charge. First, the possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.7 Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the duration of his present imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions under which he must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by the pendency of another criminal charge outstanding against him. 8
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And while it might be argued that a person already in prison would be less likely than others to be affected by 'anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation,' there is reason to believe that an outstanding untried charge (of which even a convict may, of course, be innocent) can have fully as depressive an effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large. Cf. Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U.S. at 221—222, 87 S.Ct. at 992—993. In the opinion of the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
'(I)t is in their effect upon the prisoner and our attempts to rehabilitate him that detainers are most corrosive. The strain of having to serve a sentence with the uncertain prospect of being taken into the custody of another state at the conclusion interferes with the prisoner's ability to take maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities. His anxiety and depression may leave him with little inclination toward self-improvement.'9
Finally, it is self-evident that 'the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself' are markedly increased when the accused is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. Confined in a prison, perhaps far from the place where the offense covered by the outstanding charge allegedly took place, his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to
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keep track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired. And, while 'evidence...
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People v. Litmon, No. H031348.
...be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Barker, 407 U.S., at 532, 92 S.Ct., at 2193; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-379, 89 S.Ct. 575, 576-578, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969);, United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).......
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Greenberger v. Superior Court, No. B047792
...Court of Wisconsin.... 'We will not put a price tag upon constitutional rights.' (Citation omitted.)" (Smith v. Hooey, Judge (1969) 393 U.S. 374, 380, fn. 1, 89 S.Ct. 575, 578, fn. 1, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, italics added.) Yet this is exactly what the majority does in the instant case. It sacrific......
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Brown V. State Of Ala. Appeal From Talladega Circuit Court (CC-01-290), CR-07-1332
...evidence.' Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. 2182, and citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-79, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1966)). 'Of these forms......
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Gaston v. State, CR–15–0317
...520 [ (1992) ] (quoting Barker [v. Wingo ], 407 U.S. [514,] 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 [ (1972) ], and citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377–79, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed. 2d 607 (1969) ; United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed. 2d 627 (1966) ). ‘Of these for......
-
People v. Litmon, No. H031348.
...be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Barker, 407 U.S., at 532, 92 S.Ct., at 2193; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-379, 89 S.Ct. 575, 576-578, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969);, United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).......
-
Greenberger v. Superior Court, No. B047792
...Court of Wisconsin.... 'We will not put a price tag upon constitutional rights.' (Citation omitted.)" (Smith v. Hooey, Judge (1969) 393 U.S. 374, 380, fn. 1, 89 S.Ct. 575, 578, fn. 1, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, italics added.) Yet this is exactly what the majority does in the instant case. It sacrific......
-
Brown V. State Of Ala. Appeal From Talladega Circuit Court (CC-01-290), CR-07-1332
...evidence.' Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. 2182, and citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-79, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1966)). 'Of these forms......
-
Gaston v. State, CR–15–0317
...520 [ (1992) ] (quoting Barker [v. Wingo ], 407 U.S. [514,] 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 [ (1972) ], and citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377–79, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed. 2d 607 (1969) ; United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed. 2d 627 (1966) ). ‘Of these for......
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The Supreme Court of the United States, 1968-1969
...thef t, was required to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring the prisoner to trial in a state court. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.374; 89 S. Ct. 575. The opinion was by Justice Stewart and the vote was In a case where several veniremen were excused for cause apparently because they voiced......