Smith v. Hope Village, Inc.
Decision Date | 12 April 2007 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-633 (RBW). |
Citation | 481 F.Supp.2d 172 |
Parties | Carol SMITH, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Erika Smith, Plaintiff, v. HOPE VILLAGE, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Stuart H. Newberger, Aryeh S. Portnoy, John L. Murino, Laurel Pyke Malson, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Craig Stephen Brodsky, Goodell, Devries, Leech & Dann, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Donald M. Temple, Dhamian A. Blue, Temple Law Office, Washington, DC, George Samuel Mahaffey, Jr., Goodell, Devries, Leech & Dann, LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Carol Smith brings this action against Hope Village, Inc. ("the defendant" or "Hope Village"), a privately-operated facility that "provide[s] halfway house services to offenders in the District of Columbia," for compensatory and punitive damages arising from the murder of her daughter, Erika Smith, by Anthony Kelly, a convicted felon and former Hope Village resident. Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 7. On July 26, 2006, the Court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of the complaint, the plaintiff's wrongful death claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(c). Order at 6. Currently before the Court is the defendant's motion ("Def.'s Mot ")1 for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative for summary judgment, on the plaintiffs remaining claim, a survival action filed on behalf of her daughter's estate. Def.'s Mot. at 1. Also before the Court is the plaintiffs motion ("Pl.'s Mot.") to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which asks the Court to reconsider its July 26, 2006 Order dismissing the plaintiffs wrongful death claim. Pl.'s Mot. at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment and grants the plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment.
The plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of her complaint.2 In August 1996, Anthony Quentin Kelly was convicted "for pointing a loaded gun at the head of a woman, threatening to kill her and her husband, and driving a stolen car," Pl.'s Opp. at 4; see also Compl. ¶ 8; Pl.'s Opp., Exhibit ("Ex.") 3 (Presentence Report for Anthony Kelly) ("Presentence Report") at 2, and sentenced to a ten year and six month term of incarceration in federal prison, Pl.'s Opp. at 4. Kelly is a repeat offender with a long and checkered criminal history, including an arrest for escaping from a halfway house, an indictment for making felony threats, and multiple prior convictions for, inter alia, burglary and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.3 Pl.'s. Opp. at 5; see also Presentence Report at 3-6 (detailing Kelly's criminal record); Pl.'s Opp., Ex. 8 ( )("Britton Memo") at 2-3 ( ); Pl.'s Opp., Ex. 9 (Affidavit of Dr. Mario Paparozzi, Ph.D.) ("Paparozzi Aff.") ¶ 50 ( ); Pl.'s Opp., Ex. 25 (June 27, 2001 decision of United States Parole Commission) ("Parole Decision") at 1 ( Kelly's prior convictions)4 On December 12, 2001, after serving approximately five years of his sentence, Kelly was transferred from prison to Hope Village, a halfway house located in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 9; Def.'s Mem. at 3; Pl.'s Opp. at 4.
Hope Village is a private facility that contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), among other entities, to provide transitional services and housing to various correctional populations, including felons such as Kelly who have been convicted of violent crimes. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10; see also Pl.'s Opp. at 4 ( ); Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 16 ( ). According to the plaintiff, "[t]he purpose of programs like [Hope Village] [is] to provide an opportunity for offenders to demonstrate, while under constant scrutiny, that they might safely be returned to the community ... without reasonable fear for the safety of local citizens." Pl.'s Opp. at 9; see also Pl.'s Opp., Ex. 6 (BOP January 2000 Comprehensive Sanctions Center Statement of Work) ("SOW") at 0 ( ); Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 16 ( ). In order to accomplish these goals, halfway houses such as Hope Village are required, upon the admission of each resident, to "review available documents[] [such as] Judgment/Commitment Order[s] from the sentencing [c]ourt[s], criminal records, [and] presentence investigation reports[] for any indication that an offender has a history of ... violent or escape behavior." SOW at 36; see also Pl.'s Opp. at 8; Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 26 ( ). While at Hope Village, Kelly remained an inmate under the care and custody, if not the direct supervision, of the BOP. Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 19 ( ); see also SOW at 0 ( ); Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 17 ( ).
Kelly resided at Hope Village from December 2001 until March 2002. Def.'s Mem. at 3; Pl.'s Opp. at 5. During this four-month period, the plaintiff alleges (1) that Hope Village was negligent in its supervision of Kelly, "failing to review or take into account [his] history of violence and escape," Pl.'s Opp. at 8, and overlooking or disregarding his numerous violations of the conditions of his confinement there; and (2) that through this negligence and inaction, Hope Village was ultimately responsible for Kelly's improper and untimely release into the community, where he was free to commit violent criminal acts. Id. at 5-19; Compl. ¶¶ 10-12. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that during Kelly's tenure at Hope Village, he "openly violated the terms of his conditional release to [Hope Village] by failing to secure employment as required, submitting to [Hope Village] facially false (and inadequate) documentation to facilitate his release to the community, and spending his days of `confinement' roaming the community freely, committing acts of crime." Pl.'s Opp. at 5; see also Compl. ¶¶ 10-12. The plaintiff asserts that although these violations were known or should reasonably have been known by Hope Village, the facility "never disciplined Kelly, never reported his actions to the appropriate federal agencies, and never recommended his return to federal custody for violating the conditions of his release to the halfway house." Pl.'s Opp. at 6 (emphases omitted); see id. at 8 ( ); see also Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 19 ( ). The plaintiff also contends that Hope Village negligently contributed to Kelly's parole when it, inter alia, "knowingly submitted erroneous documentation to the government that Kelly had met all conditions for release ... execut[ed] the documentation which permitted Kelly to be released[,] ... [and] recommend[ed] to federal authorities that Kelly be released to the community." Pl.'s Opp. at 6. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that Hope Village failed, in a manner that amounts to massive and large-scale institutional indifference and incompetence, to provide basic levels of facility security and resident oversight or to otherwise "exercise reasonable care to ensure that its residents did not, as a result of [Hope Village's] own action or inaction, cause harm to innocent members of the...
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