Smith v. Hous. Auth. of Southbend

Decision Date30 September 2010
Docket NumberCause No. 3:09–CV–330.
Citation744 F.Supp.2d 775
PartiesWilliam SMITH and Lubirta Smith, Plaintiffs,v.HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTHBEND, et. al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Kent Hull, Indiana Legal Services Inc., South Bend, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Michael P. Palmer, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Aladean M. Derose, City of South Bend Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, Joseph S. Reid, US Attorney's Office, Hammond, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

RUDY LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on: (1) Defendant Stephen J. Luecke's Motion to Dismiss Complaint as to Him (DE # 16), filed by Defendant Stephen J. Luecke on October 29, 2009; (2) the Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) (DE # 24), filed by Defendant Shaun Donovan, Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, on December 9, 2009; (3) The Housing Authority's, Marva Leonard–Dent's, and the Commissioners' Motion to Dismiss (DE # 20), filed by Defendants The Housing Authority of South Bend, Marva J. Leonard–Dent, Susie Harvey–Tate, Earl L. Hairston, Rafael Morton, Robert B. Toothaker, and Gladys Muhammad, on December 2, 2009; and (4) the Request for Judicial Notice (DE # 22), filed by Defendants The Housing Authority of South Bend, Marva J. Leonard–Dent, Susie Harvey–Tate, Earl L. Hairston, Rafael Morton, Robert B. Toothaker, and Gladys Muhammad on December 2, 2009. For the reasons set forth below: (1) Defendant Stephen J. Luecke's Motion to Dismiss Complaint as to Him (DE # 16) is GRANTED and the claims against him are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (2) the Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) (DE # 24) is GRANTED and the claims against Defendant Shaun Donovan, Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (3) The Housing Authority's, Marva Leonard–Dent's, and the Commissioners' Motion to Dismiss (DE # 20) is GRANTED and the Court notes that the claims against the Housing Authority of South Bend are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE while the claims against the Board of Commissioners, Marva J. Leonard–Dent, Susie Harvey–Tate, Earl L. Hairston, Rafael Morton, Robert B. Toothaker, and Gladys Muhammad are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and (4) the Request for Judicial Notice (DE # 22) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO REFILE.

BACKGROUND

On July 23, 2009, the Plaintiffs, William Smith and Lubirta Smith (collectively, the Smiths), filed their Verified Complaint With Jury Demand. (DE # 1; Comp.) The Complaint describes the Smiths as married, African–American adults, who reside as tenants at 628 Western Avenue, South Bend, IN 46601 (the “Property”). ( Id. at 2; Comp. ¶ 3.) The Property is owned by the Housing Authority of South Bend (HASB). ( Id.) The Complaint further describes William Smith as “an individual with a disability or handicap in that he has significant limitations to major life activities, has a record of such limitations, and is perceived by Defendant HASB to have such limitations.” ( Id.) However, the Complaint does not identify what disability or handicap William Smith has.

The Smiths allege that the apartment in which they live and the Property as a whole fails, and has failed, to meet the standards of habitability and peaceable enjoyment, and that the HASB staff members have failed to remedy the problems of which the Smiths have complained. ( Id. at 3; Comp. ¶¶ 12–14.) Because of those complaints, the Smiths claim that the HASB staff members retaliated against them by failing to take remedial action and “by the manner in which HASB staff members treated [the Smiths].” ( Id. at 4; Comp. ¶ 15.) The Smiths point out that some of these acts took place before they were married and prior to William Smith residing with Lubirta Smith in her apartment in the Property. ( Id.; Comp. ¶ 16.)

The Smiths also allege that, prior to their marriage, the HASB evicted William Smith from his previous apartment while he was “seriously ill” and commenced legal proceedings against him when the HASB knew he was “hospitalized for serious surgery” because he had made repeated complaints about the conditions and services at the Property. ( Id.; Comp. ¶¶ 16–17.)

The Smiths claim that the HASB staff members retaliated against Lubirta Smith “because of her association with Mr. Smith” and because of her advocacy on his behalf both before and after their marriage. ( Id.; Comp. ¶ 18.) They assert that this retaliation was taken in “the form of refusal to provide service and rude remarks to her.” ( Id.)

The Smiths also allege that the HASB staff members “acquiesced in the bullying of Mr. Smith by at least one other resident and did nothing to intervene and stop the bullying.” ( Id.; Comp. ¶ 19.)

Finally, the Smiths allege that the Property, the HASB complex in which the building is located, and the neighborhood in general are all “populated overwhelmingly by residents who are African American” or Latino and that the “concentration of non-Caucasian residents” is “far out of proportion to the corresponding population figures for the City of South Bend or the County of St. Joseph.” ( Id. at 5; Comp. ¶¶ 20–22.) The Smiths claims that this “concentration” occurred and remained because of the defendants' “actions and acquiesce” and is the result of “intentional actions or deliberate indifference.” ( Id.; Comp. ¶ 23.)

The Complaint, which premises subject-matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, alleges fifteen claims seeking vindication of rights “guaranteed to [the Smiths], as residents of a federally funded public housing project, by the Fair Housing Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 3601 et seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 601 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. secs. 12131 et. Seq. And 12181 et. Seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. sec. 794; the United States Housing Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1437 et seq.; and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.1 (DE # 1; Comp. ¶ 1.) The various defendants sued by the Smiths include: (1) the HASB; (2) Marva J. Leonard–Dent, the Executive Director of the HASB; (3) the Board of Commissioners of the HASB; (4) the individual members of the Board of Commissioners of the HASB (Susie Harvey–Tate, Earl L. Hairston, Rafael Morton, Robert B. Toothaker, and Gladys Muhammad); (5) Stephen J. Luecke, the Mayor of the City of South Bend; and (6) Shaun Donovan, the Secretary of United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). ( Id. at 2–3; Comp. ¶¶ 4–9.) The Complaint indicates that all Defendants are “sued for acts under color of law.” ( Id. at 3; Comp. ¶ 11.) For each claim, the Smiths seek compensatory and exemplary damages, and the Complaint also requests equitable relief.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that a strikingly similar case is currently pending before the Honorable Theresa L. Springmann in the United States District Court Fort Wayne Division. The plaintiffs in Magee et al. v. Housing Authority of South Bend, No. 3:09–CV–337, filed an almost identical complaint against the same defendants named in this lawsuit four days after the instant complaint was filed. On July 28, 2010, Judge Springmann issued an order granting dismissal of various parties and setting forth a time frame in which the plaintiff was granted leave to file a motion to amend her complaint and a proposed amended pleading to clarify her cause of action as to certain defendants. Magee v. Housing Authority of South Bend, 2010 WL 3000660, *7 (N.D.Ind. July 28, 2010) (3:09–CV–337; DE # 56.). The Court notes that much of Judge Springmann's sound reasoning applies equally to this case, and the Court has quoted from Judge Springmann's dismissal order liberally as applicable.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides, in part: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a). In determining the propriety of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, the court must “take the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor from those allegations.” Abcarian v. McDonald, 2010 WL 3189153, *1 (7th Cir.2010) (citing London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir.2010)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is required if the complaint fails to describe a claim that is plausible on its face. Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

A complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, but it is not enough merely that there might be some conceivable set of facts that entitles the plaintiff to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff has an obligation under Rule 8(a)(2) to provide grounds of his entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and conclusions. Id. Factual allegations, taken as true, must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id.

The Seventh Circuit has instructed that plaintiffs may not “merely parrot the statutory language of the claims that they are pleading (something that anyone could do, regardless of what may be prompting the lawsuit) but must provide “some specific facts to ground those legal claims.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.2009). The court clarified the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) as follows:

First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of her claims. Second, courts must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, but some factual allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice...

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3 cases
  • Smith v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • March 30, 2012
    ...Urban Development (“HUD”). (Comp.¶¶ 4–9.) Motions to dismiss were filed by the various defendants, and on September 30, 2010, 744 F.Supp.2d 775 (N.D.Ind.2010), this Court issued an order granting those motions. (DE # 37.) While the claims against the Board of Commissioners, Marva J. Leonard......
  • Hagan v. Quinn
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    • January 19, 2012
    ...were not reappointed as arbitrators. Plaintiff Akemann was reappointed to a one-year term 1. See, e.g., Smith v. Housing Authority of Southbend, 744 F.Supp.2d 775, 785 (N.D.Ind.2010) (noting that it was proper to take judicial notice of historical documents, documents in the public record, ......
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    ...a plaintiff ‘must allege a concerted action in the commission of a tort that resulted in damages.’ ” Smith v. Housing Authority of South Bend, 744 F.Supp.2d 775, 787 (N.D.Ind.2010) (quoting K.M.K. v. A.K., 908 N.E.2d 658, 663 (Ind.Ct.App.2009)); see also Iom Grain, LLC v. ZEA Global Seeds, ......

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