Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Engineers, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | HHDCV186086419 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Adam SMITH v. JENSEN FABRICATING ENGINEERS, INC. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The defendant, Jensen Fabricating Engineers, Inc. (Jensen), moves to strike the revised complaint of the plaintiff, Adam Smith alleging that Jensen refused to hire Smith when it discovered that Smith used marijuana to treat the symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in compliance with Connecticut’s Palliative Use of Marijuana Act, General Statutes § 21a-408 et seq. (PUMA). Jensen argues that the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (CSA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA), preempt PUMA’s provision barring employers from refusing to hire users of palliative marijuana. Jensen also moves to strike Smith’s revised complaint because PUMA authorizes no private right of action. Finally, Jensen moves to strike count two of the revised complaint, alleging common-law unlawful termination of employment, because it is duplicative of count one and moves to strike paragraph three of Smith’s prayer for relief seeking costs because such relief is not authorized by law or contract.
For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Jensen’s motion to strike in its entirety.
The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). A motion to strike requires no factual findings by the trial court. Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). If the facts provable in the complaint support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. Id. All well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted when deciding a motion to strike. Id. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court examines the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011). In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
The practice book allows for a motion to strike directed toward a claim for relief if the relief sought cannot be legally awarded. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
For purposes of deciding this motion to strike, the court takes the following allegations as true.
Adam Smith suffers from PTSD, a debilitating medical condition as defined in § 21a-408(3)(a). Rev. Compl. ¶ 2. Smith is a qualifying patient under § 21a-408(16) and engages in the palliative use of marijuana to alleviate his symptoms of PTSD in accordance with § 21a-408(12). Rev. Compl. ¶ 3.[1]
On or about October 11, 2017, Jensen offered Smith a position as an assembler. Rev. Compl. ¶ 5. At all relevant times, Smith was qualified to be an assembler at Jensen. Rev. Compl. ¶ 13. On or about October 12, 2017, Jensen informed Smith that he would have to go for a drug test. Rev. Compl. 116. On October 12, 2017, Smith went for a drug test and failed due to marijuana in his system. Rev. Compl. ¶ 7. Smith told the doctor and the drug screen facility that he had a medical marijuana card. Rev. Compl. ¶ 8.
On October 19, 2017, Smith received a call from a foreman at Jensen, informing Smith that he had to call Jensen’s human resources department. Rev. Compl. ¶ 9. Smith then telephoned and left a message with Katie Hurster of Jensen’s Human Resources Department, asking to speak with her regarding Jensen’s decision to revoke its employment offer due to Smith’s status as a medical marijuana patient. Rev. Compl. ¶ 10. Hurster called Smith back on October 26, 2017, confirming that Jensen was rescinding its offer of employment to Smith. Rev. Compl. ¶ 12.
On the basis of these facts, Smith alleges Jensen violated General Statutes § 21a-408p(b)(3), prohibiting employers from refusing to hire or terminating individuals solely because they are qualifying patients under PUMA. Rev. Compl. ¶ 14. In the alternative, Smith alleges Jensen’s failure to hire or terminate Smith violated Connecticut’s public policy and is, therefore, improper under the doctrine of common-law wrongful discharge as set forth in Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
Although Jensen correctly points out that the issues presented here are issues of first impression in Connecticut state court, they are, in the final analysis, not difficult to resolve. Three courts, Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F.Supp.3d 326 (D.Conn. 2017); [2] Chance v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. K 18C-01-056 NEP, 2018 WL 6655670 (Del.Super. December 17, 2018); and Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., Docket No. PC- 2014-5680, 2017 WL 2321181 , have considered identical or nearly identical arguments to those asserted by Jensen and each court has rejected those arguments. This court finds the reasoning of the Noffsinger, Chance, and Callaghan courts persuasive and resolves Jensen’s motion to strike in much the same manner.
Jensen first asserts that PUMA’s prohibition on employers refusing to hire or terminate individuals solely because they are qualifying patients under PUMA is preempted by the CSA and the ADA.
Because of the supremacy clause of the United States constitution, article 6, clause 2, state law must yield to federal law in certain circumstances. This doctrine of "preemption" comes in three varieties: (1) express preemption where Congress expressly states in a statute that it is preempting state law; (2) field preemption where Congress so pervasively regulates a certain area as to, effectively, leave no room for state law; (3) and conflict preemption. Island Park LLC v. CSX Transportation, 559 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2009); Sararazin v. Coastal, Inc., 311 Conn. 581, 592-93, 89 A.3d 841 (2014). Conflict preemption itself comes in two varieties. Congress may preempt state law where state law stands as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress (obstacle preemption), or where simultaneous compliance with both federal and state law is impossible (impossibility preemption). See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1591, 1595, 191 L.Ed.2d 511 (2015); Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 2505, 195 L.Ed.2d 839 (2016); SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2007). Generally, preemption of state law by federal law is disfavored and a federal statute will not be found to preempt claims arising under state law unless Congress’ intent to do so is "clear and manifest." Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009).
In this matter, Jensen argues PUMA should be preempted under obstacle preemption. As set forth by Judge Meyer in Noffsinger, "[a] defendant making an argument under obstacle preemption faces a heavy burden." Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., supra, 273 F.Supp.3d 333. "The mere fact of ‘tension’ between federal and state law is generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption, particularly when the state law involves the exercise of traditional police power." Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006). Rather, obstacle preemption precludes only those state laws that create an "actual conflict" with an overriding federal purpose and objective. Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Retirement System, 707 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1040, 133 S.Ct. 2823, 186 L.Ed.2d 881 (2013). What constitutes a "sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. Nevertheless, "the conflict between state law and federal policy must be a sharp one." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007). Indeed, there is no preemption unless "the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation, 725 F.3d 65, 102 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1080, 134 S.Ct. 1877, 188 L.Ed. 948 (2014).
The CSA makes it a federal crime to use, possess or distribute marijuana. The main objective of the CSA is to "to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12, 125 S.Ct. 2195 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). To carry out these goals, "Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA." Id., 13. Nevertheless, the CSA also states that it does not preempt state law "unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together." 21 U.S.C. § 903; see also Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., supra, 2017 WL 2321181, at *15 (); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,...
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