Smith v. Jones

• Decision Date: 31 December 1902
• Citation: 92 N.W. 1084,16 S.D. 337
• Parties: ALFRED SMITH, Plaintiff and appellant, v. ELI JONES, Defendant and respondent.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

16 S.D. 337

92 N.W. 1084

ALFRED SMITH, Plaintiff and appellant,

v.

ELI JONES, Defendant and respondent. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County, SD Hon. J. W. Jones, Judge Affirmed Winsor & McNaughton Attorneys for appellant. Kittredge, Winans & Scott Attorneys for respondent. Opinion filed Dec. 31, 1902

CORSON, J.

In March, 1901, the plaintiff was arrested upon a warrant issued by Frank Mellen, as justice of the peace in Valley Springs, in Minnehaha county, upon the complaint of Eli Jones, and executed by defendant G. H. Stone as the constable of said town. A hearing was had before the justice, and the plaintiff was held to bail for his appearance at the circuit court in the sum of $500. Before giving bail or being taken to jail by the officer under a commitment, a settlement was had of a certain matter between the plaintiff and the said Eli Jones, resulting in the dismissal of the action. Subsequently the plaintiff brought this action against the said Jones, complaining witness in the criminal proceedings, the said Mellen, and the said Stone, to recover damages for the said arrest and detention. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence the conrt dismissed the action as to the defendant Frank Mellen on the ground that, he being a judicial officer, no facts had been shown authorizing a recovery against him. The court, in its instruction to the jury, charged them that the present action was for malicious prosecution.

It is contended on the part of the appellant: First, that the court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant Mellen; second, that the court erred in charging the jury that the case was one for malicious prosecution, and in omitting to instruct the jury that it was an action for false imprisonment; third, that the court erred in holding that the facts stated in the complaint in the criminal proceeding upon which the plaintiff was arrested, were sufficient to authorize the justice to issue a warrant; and, fourth, that the court erred in holding that the complaint and warrant were sufficient to protect the justice in issuing and the constable in executing the same. Other errors are assigned, but, as they are not presented in the brief, and were not argued orally, they require no further consideration.

It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant Mellen was acting as justice of the peace, and defendant Stone as constable; that said Stone, as such constable, arrested this plaintiff upon a warrant purporting to be issued by said defendant Mellen as justice of the peace, upon the complaint of the defendant Jones, charging the plaintiff with disposing of certain personal property included in a certain chattel mortgage on the 11th day of August, 1894. It would seem from the complaint that the pleader intended the action to be one to recover damages for malicious prosecution; also one for malicious abuse of the process of the court, and for false imprisonment. The facts alleged clearly constitute three distinct causes of action, and should properly have been stated in separate counts in the complaint. Wood v. Graves, 144 Mass. 365, 59 AmStRep 95. But no motion having been made to make the complaint more definite and certain, we shall consider it, as it evidently was considered throughout the trial, as combining three causes of action in one count. That part of the complaint in which it is alleged that the defendants are guilty of malicious abuse of process of the court may be regarded as eliminated from the case, for the reason that there was no evidence proving or tending to prove any abuse of the process of the court: and such a cause of action assumes that the process is regular and legal in form. The grievances in such a case arise from an abuse of snch proceedings, legal and valid on their face. If, after an arrest upon civil or criminal process, the person arrested is subjected to unwarrantable injustice and indignities, is treated with cruelty, is deprived of proper food, and is otherwise treated with oppression and undue hardship, he has an action against the officer and any who may unite with the officer in doing the wrong. Wood v. Graves, supra. In the case at bar there was no evidence of any such treatment of the plaintiff in this action, or that the officer in any manner exceeded the commands of his warrant. The theory of the plaintiff throughout the case seems to have been that the process was not valid, and that by reason of this invalidity the defendants were liable for false imprisonment. This latter cause of action seems to have been eliminated from the case by the learned circuit court, he holding as a matter of law that the complaint in the criminal action was sufficient upon its face to constitute a protection to the justice and constable. The court, seems to have further held that the defendant Jones, having taken no part in the execution of the process other than that of signing the complaint, could not be held in this action. It was evidently upon this theory the learned circuit court discharged the justice of the peace on motion at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and instructed the jury that the only issue in the case was the one involved in the claim for malicious prosecution. The questions involved in that cause of action were left to the jury under very full instructions of the court, and, as they are not seriously questioned in this court, that cause of action may be considered as practically out of this case.

The only question, therefore, left for our consideration is, did the circuit court err in holding that the complaint and warrant state facts sufficient to protect the justice and constable in the execution of the same? It is contended on the part of the appellant that the complaint in the criminal proceedings was insufficient in that it failed to allege that the plaintiff herein had “willfully” disposed of the property included in the chattel mortgage, and, second, that it appeared upon the face of the complaint and warrant that the alleged offense was barred by the statute of limitations. As above stated, the offense was alleged to have been committed...